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Abstract 
Establishing similarities between embodied practices typically posed as fundamentally 
distinct (such as 'African' female genital cutting and 'Western' cosmetic surgery) has 
become increasingly common within feminist literatures. Cross-cultural comparisons 
can reveal the instability of essentialist binaries constructed to distinguish various 
groups as culturally, ethnically and morally 'different'. These strategies, however, are 
also problematic. In their emphasis on cross-cultural commonalities between practices, 
they often efface historical, social and embodied particularities, while reifying 
problematic notions of 'culture'. When employed by privileged 'Western' feminist 
theorists, such strategies can involve appropriations which affirm, rather than challenge, 
dominant discursive hierarchies. Consequently, the crucial links between violent 
histories of embodied differentiation and contemporary relations of power are not 
effectively interrogated and problematic binaries remain intact. This thesis thus seeks 
to develop a more historically-grounded, relational and politically accountable feminist 
approach to addressing essentialist constructions of embodied 'cultural practice'. 
Mapping feminist and other critical literatures, I identify three main approaches to 
linking embodied practices: the 'continuum', 'analogue' and 'subset' models. Through 
three case study chapters, I conduct a comprehensive analysis of these models, ,and their 
potential discursive-material effects. Each case study focuses on a different set of 
practices which have been linked: 'African' female genital cutting and.-`Western' body 
modifications; Muslim veiling and anorexia; and 'passing' practices associated with the 
categories of race, gender and sexuality. I argue that rather than illustrating how 
particular practices or their imagined subjects are fundamentally similar, we should 
examine how they are constructed relationally in and through one another. This is 
possible through genealogically tracing how their historical trajectories of production 
intersect and inform one another. As an alternative to commonality-based comparative 
approaches, I advocate a 'relational web model' which traces multiple constitutive 
connections within a network of differently situated embodied practices or figures. 
`I Carolyn Pedwell, hereby state that this thesis is my own work and that all sources 
used are made explicit in the text' 
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Chapter 1: 
Feminist Approaches to Embodied Cultural Practices 
Cross-Cultural Comparison, (Anti)Essentialism and 
(Anti)Humanism 
Western women have confronted the same problem of female genital surgeries that 
African women face today albeit in our own cultural context. 
Isabelle Gunning, 1991:226 
Making links between gendered practices rooted in divergent cultural contexts has 
become increasingly common within feminist literature on multiculturalism and cultural 
difference. Such cross-cultural comparisons are predominantly employed as a strategy 
to counter cultural essentialism — the production of culture-specific generalisations that 
depend on totalising categories such as 'Western' and 'non-Western', 'First world' and 
`Third world' or 'the West' and `the Muslim world'. For example, Isabelle Gunning 
(1991) argues that although African female genital cutting (FGC) 1 has been represented 
by Western commentators as a 'barbaric' and 'patriarchal' cultural practice of the 
`other', female circumcision is 'part of our own history' (211). Circumcisions 
performed on American and English women as a 'cure' for mental illness in the 
nineteenth century, she suggests, were explained by 'the same kind of rationales' as 
I have chosen the label 'female genital cutting' (FGC) to refer to the broad group of procedures which 
are, or have been, practiced (with great variation) within some African and Middle countries (i.e. Sudan, 
Somalia, Yemen, Egypt, Mali, Kenya and Ethiopia) and their diasporic communities. I have selected the 
label FGC as it avoids the pejorative tone of the term 'female genital mutilation' as well as the equation 
with male circumcision that the label 'female circumcision' implies. I also avoid using the terms 
`clitoridectomy' and 'infibulation', which refer only to more specific forms of FGC. These are value-
laden choices, however, as there is much controversy regarding what an appropriate label to identify such 
practices is, or whether it is appropriate to use one label to identify such a wide variety of practices. 
Some alternative labels that have been employed include the terms 'female genital surgeries', 'female 
genital operations' and 'female genital alterations'. 
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African practices of FGC are today, such as a belief in their health benefits (203, 218). 
African FGC and American clitoridectomies should thus be seen as cultural 
`analogues', she insists. 2 In a similar vein, Mervat Nasser (1999) argues that Muslim 
veiling represents a contemporary 'equivalent' to the growing epidemic of anorexia in 
the industrialised West. Both practices represent strategies on the part of women and 
girls that respond to 'conflicting cultural messages and contradictory cultural 
expectations' (407). Feminist critics have also linked Muslim veiling and 'Western' 
beauty practices, such as the wearing of makeup (Jeffreys, 2005), and fashion trends 
from Wonderbras' and 'mini-skirts' (Hirschmann, 1998) to the contemporary 'porno-
chic' style (Duits and van Zoonen, 2006). 3 
Cross-cultural comparisons have also been made between particular gendered forms of 
domestic violence. In order to deconstruct essentialist thinking which associates 
`culture' with practices of dowry-murders in India but not with domestic-violence 
murders in the United States, for instance, Uma Narayan (1997) shows how the two 
practices represent similar systemic problems of violence that affect roughly the same 
proportion of women in each nation. She explains how this connection is often 
unidentified by Western commentators because, 'in contrast to "dowry-murder", fatal 
forms of domestic violence in the US are a problem lacking a term that "specifically 
picks them out" from the general category of "domestic violence"' (95). This 
`absence', she maintains, 'operates to impede Americans from making the connections 
that would facilitate seeing dowry murder as a form of domestic violence' (96). 
Similarly, Lama Abu-Odeh (1997) offers a comparative review of the ways in which 
`crimes of passion' in the United States and 'honour killings' in Arab contexts have 
been constructed and evaluated within American and Arab legal frameworks. She seeks 
to interrogate 'the fallacy of both the orientalist construction that the East is different 
2 As I discuss in Chapter Three, African, Asian and Middle-Eastern rooted practices of FGC have also 
been compared to a host of other 'Western' practices such as: cosmetic breast augmentations, operations 
on intersex babies, body modification procedures (such as piercing, branding and cutting), transsexual 
surgery, female reproductive procedures (such as episiotomy, hysterectomy and caesarean sections), 
abortion and eating disorders, as well as various 'non-Western' practices including, Chinese foot-binding 
and Indian sati (or widow burning). 
3 Parallels have also been drawn between Muslim veiling and other 'non-Western' practices such as 
surgical hymen repair (Saharso, 2003). 
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from the West and the almost contradictory idea of international feminism that all 
violence against women all over the world is the same' (287) 4 
While these comparative feminist approaches differ in a number of ways, it is 
significant that they each frame their cross-cultural comparisons as a means to 
interrogate and disrupt cultural essentialism. Culturally essentialist representations 
`depict as homogenous groups of heterogeneous people whose values, interests, ways of 
life, and moral and political commitments are internally plural and divergent' (Narayan, 
1998:87-88). Furthermore, through constructing various cultural groups and practices 
as fundamentally and hierarchically distinct, culturally essentialist discourses often reify 
ethnocentric and racist notions of cultural difference. From the pervasive `us/them' 
rhetoric employed to 'legitimise' the Bush-Blair led 'War on Terror', 5 to the ubiquitous 
media representations of `the veil' as a sign of Muslim women's 'backwardness, 
subordination, and oppression' (El Guindi, 1999:3), culturally essentialist discourse is 
widespread within the contemporary socio-politico sphere. As several feminist critics 
emphasise, cultural essentialism has also pervaded feminist theory and practice, from 
second wave feminist calls for 'liberated Western women' to save African women from 
the 'unspeakable atrocity' of female genital mutilation (Daly, 1978; Hosken, 1981), to 
contemporary liberal feminist discourses which construct minority (i.e. foreign) cultures 
as 'more patriarchal' on the whole than mainstream (i.e. Western) cultures (Okin, 
1999:15). Through illustrating the ways in which particular gendered cultural practices 
involve similar bodily procedures and/or personal and social motivations and rationales, 
feminist cross-cultural strategies seek to reveal the constructedness and instability of the 
essentialist and imperialising boundaries which distinguish various groups as culturally, 
ethnically and morally 'different'. They also aim to encourage critical thinking about 
the geo-political relations of power through which particular gendered practices are 
represented and (re)produced and query how the term 'culture' is employed 
differentially on the basis of embodied axes such as race and nation. These are clearly 
important goals. 
4 See also Volpp, 2000 and Phillips, 2003,2004. 
5 Cultural essentialism of course also figures in Al Qaeda's representations of 'America' and 'the West'. 
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It is my contention in this thesis, however, that a more in depth inquiry into the possible 
effects of constructing various gendered cultural practices as `similar' equivalene or 
`universal' is necessary. It is crucial to ask, for instance, what such cross-cultural 
constructions of commonality may leave out or cover over. On what bases are links 
between specific practices made and could crucial historical, social and embodied 
particularities be effaced in the process? In extracting particular practices from their 
discursive-material 6 trajectories of production, might the construction of cultural 
`analogues' or 'equivalents' elide the complex relations of power through which 
particular cultural practices have been constituted? Furthermore, it is important to 
consider what views of 'the body' such feminist comparisons employ. If any attempt to 
see a multiplicity of embodied practices as equivalent or continuous necessarily 
depends on imposing one particular vision of embodiment across differently located 
subjects and practices, might it not be the case that any such vision will always function 
to include some bodies while excluding others? Might such a well-intentioned, yet 
ultimately homogenising, move perpetuate epistemic violence 7 in obscuring the 
processes of cothering' which continuously (re)produce embodied 'differences'? The 
motivations on the part of particular theorists for comparing various practices should 
also be explored. Are such comparisons impelled exclusively by a desire to counter 
cultural essentialism, or are there also other theoretical and representational objectives 
at work here? How can comparative feminist approaches be evaluated within the 
context of global 'Western' hegemony, and specifically the dominance of Euro-
American academic production? 
These questions relate, in part, to a larger trajectory of thinking about the relationships 
linking gender, embodiment and cultural difference. I began thinking about the 
6 I use the term 'discursive-material' to convey the complex coimbrication of 'discursive' and 'material' 
processes and structures of power. 
I follow Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) who employs the term `epistemic violence' to describe 'the 
remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other'. 
`This project', she writes, 'is also the asymmetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious 
Subject-tivity' (278-9). Epistemic violence involves establishing 'one explanation and narrative of 
reality...as the normative one' (italics in original) (Spivak, 1999:267) through silencing or disavowing 
other ways of knowing. 
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connections among these three axes during work on a Masters dissertation which sought 
to compare how the practices of disordered eating and Muslim veiling are constructed 
and portrayed. This project sprung from a particular frustration I had with the way that 
`Western cultures' are continuously portrayed as 'better for women' (offering more 
substantive opportunities for physical and mental development, fulfilment and freedom) 
than 'non-Western', and particularly, 'Muslim' cultures. The realm of body image and 
eating disorders initially appeared to be an arena in which this imperialising assumption 
might be revealed as untenable. If veiling, and the embrace of Islamic ideologies that 
the practice represents, serves to empower some Muslim women, ensuring that they are 
not affected (to the same extent or in the same ways) by the body-related cultural 
pressures that distress large numbers of mainstream Western women, perhaps this was a 
case study which could turn the Western/non-Western, non-Muslim/Muslim dualism on 
its head. 
I soon came to see, however, that simply reversing this binary was not going to get me 
very far, as it would leave the problematic binary structure intact and hence perpetually 
open to re-reversal. Furthermore, it clearly positioned 'Muslim women' as being 
beyond the binary in rather fetishising ways. I saw that in order to avoid reifying the 
original binary structure, I needed to examine and exploit the complexities and 
contradictions within the two groups constructed as 'Muslim' and 'non-Muslim' 
women. I proceeded to explore the particular privilegings and exclusions that my 
reversed Muslim/non-Muslim dualism entailed, interrogating the essentialist 
assumptions about agency and culture that it continued to uphold. I ended the 
dissertation with an attempt to further deconstruct the divide between the two groups by 
illustrating some of the ways that eating problems and veiling might be linked in respect 
to their mutual focus on the female body. Particular forms of both practices could, I 
argued, be seen to involve individual attempts to gain and assert control within cultures 
which regularly manipulate women's bodies in an effort to protect and project 
hegemonic social, political and economic interests. 
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At the time, this deconstructive and comparative cross-cultural methodology seemed to 
be the most effective way to disrupt culturally essentialist binaries. Since then, 
however, I have become convinced that such an approach is not sufficient to move 
beyond the binary structure, and, in fact, may serve to reify dominant relations of 
power. Drawing similarities between eating problems and veiling in this context 
involved privileging 'gender' above and beyond other axes of embodied differentiation 
and making broad generalisations that did not allow me to say anything particularly 
meaningful about the complexities of either set of practices. Instead, it left me in a 
position of political paralysis. This thesis thus begins in a sense from where my 
dissertation ended. It asks the critical question of 'what comes next?' after we 
recognise and revalue a particular essentialist binary. How can we theorise the relations 
between various gendered cultural practices posed as fundamentally 'different' without 
reifying essentialist notions of cultural difference or collapsing into disembodied 
sameness? And how can we disrupt and resignify problematic self/other, West/non-
West, non-Muslim/Muslim, First world/Third world binaries in the process? 
In this introductory chapter, I provide an overview of some of the cross-cultural linkings 
of different embodied cultural practices that have been made by feminist theorists in 
recent years. My focus here, and throughout the thesis, is on analysing the ways in 
which particular comparisons are made within feminist (and other relevant) texts and 
the potential social, political and theoretical effects such approaches produce. In the 
first section, I examine some of the cross-cultural parallels made between FGC and 
other body modifications and link such strategies to broader feminist criticisms of 
cultural essentialism. I consider some of the motivations underlying feminist cross-
cultural approaches and identify some of their potentially positive outcomes. I then 
move on to examine some of the more problematic effects associated with such 
comparative techniques. Drawing on critical feminist perspectives on embodiment, I 
suggest that in maintaining an emphasis on similarity or sameness, many cross-cultural 
comparisons risk eliding crucial particularities as well as the complex relations of power 
through which various practices are constituted as morally, politically and culturally 
`different' from one another. I then consider how varying feminist motivations for 
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deconstructing culturally essentialist binaries may be linked to the idea of an 
`unfinished' humanist project. I conclude by considering some epistemological and 
methodological concerns relevant to my project and outlining the structure of the thesis. 
Crossing Cultures: Comparative Feminist Approaches 
The cross-cultural comparison most commonly made by feminist theorists in the service 
of anti-cultural essentialism is that between 'African' female genital cutting and 
'Western' body modification practices, such as cosmetic surgery. Cosmetic surgery 
procedures, several theorists argue, can cause comparable levels of pain and suffering 
and may appear equally horrific (and condemnable) to 'Third world women' as FGC 
may appear to many Western women. As Isabelle Gunning (1991) asserts of breast 
augmentation surgery, 'how bizarre and barbaric must a practice like implanting 
polyurethane covered silicone into one's breast be perceived by one not accustomed to 
the practice' (213). In a similar vein, Sheila Jeffreys (2005) suggests that both 'female 
genital mutilation' and 'cosmetic surgery practices such as breast implant surgery' are 
associated with 'damaging health consequences' (30-1). The psychologically harmful 
consequences of beauty practices are downplayed or undocumented, she suggests, 
`because such practices have not been considered problematic' (31). She thus maintains 
that both cosmetic surgery and FGC should be considered, along with a host of other 
`Western' and 'non-Western' practices, such as veiling, transsexual surgery and 
makeup, as 'harmful cultural practices' within the United Nations' legislative 
framework. It has also been argued that such practices are often underscored by similar 
motivations and rationales. Simone Weil Davis (2002) suggests, for instance, that many 
of the reasons African women give for undergoing FGC are analogous to those 
articulated by Western women who undergo cosmetic labiaplasty, including 
`beautification, transcendence of shame and desire to conform' (23). Euro-American 
and African genital reshaping procedures should thus be conceptualised on a continuum 
rather than measured by different yardsticks. 
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While each of these theorists claims similarities between African or Middle-Eastern 
rooted practices of FGC and 'Western' body modifications, their political perspectives 
and theoretical approaches reveal some significant differences. For example, Jeffreys 
works from a radical feminist position to link FGC and cosmetic surgery through a 
notion of common gendered oppression. For her, the label of 'harmful cultural 
practices' usefully emphasises 'that culture can enforce and that women and girls are 
not free agents able to pick up and choose' (2005:34). By contrast, Weil Davis applies 
a critical feminist framework to resist representing women as 'undifferentiated victims' 
(2002:27). She is interested in pursuing an investigation of the complex issues of 
`agency' and 'consent' surrounding both sets of practices. These theorists also employ 
different theoretical models to link FGC and other body modifications. I have termed 
these models the 'analogue', 'continuum' and 'subset' approaches. The analogue 
approach, employed by Gunning, involves establishing a likeness between (at least) two 
cultural practices as counterparts. The continuum approach, utilised by Weil Davis, 
involves situating various cultural practices on a spectrum of embodied practices 
deemed similar to varying degrees. The subset approach, adopted by Jeffreys, involves 
including multiple practices of a similar kind within one encompassing category or 
subset. These various models are not always discrete and may merge or overlap in 
particular theorists' texts. I discuss the analogue and continuum approaches in further 
detail in relation to Gunning's and Well Davis's texts in Chapter Three, and the subset 
approach in Chapter Four and with particular reference to Jeffrey's text in Chapter Five. 
Notwithstanding these differences, all three thinkers frame their cross-cultural 
approaches with a desire to interrogate cultural essentialism. They each express 
concern with the theoretical inadequacy and underlying racism and cultural imperialism 
of dichotomising discourses which set 'Western cultures' in sharp relief against 'non-
Western cultures', 'First world women' against 'Third world women', 'non-Muslim 
women' against 'Muslim women' and so on. As such, we can see these comparisons as 
linked, though in different ways and to different extents, to a wider anti-cultural 
essentialist feminist project. 
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The feminist anti-cultural essentialist project 
While it would be misleading to identify a cohesive and unified anti-cultural essentialist 
feminist project, there are number of theorists, including Chandra Talpade Mohanty 
(1991, 2002), Uma Narayan (1997, 1998), Leti Volpp (1996, 2000), Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (1988, 1999), Lila Abu-Lughod (1998a, 1998b, 1999/1986), Anne 
Phillips (2003, 2004), Sherene Razack (1998) and Avtar Brah (1996, 2003), who may 
be seen as linked through their critical analysis of cultural essentialism and its 
relationship to sexual and racial essentialisms. Such theorists have paid careful 
attention to the ways in which cultural and other linked essentialisms are (re)produced 
through the construction and reification of cultural binaries. 
Feminist and postcolonial thinkers have long argued that the logic and effect of culture-
based (and indeed all) binary structures is to overvalue one pole (usually 'the West') 
while disparaging the other (usually the `non-West'). Such dualisms consistently 
function to exaggerate differences between groups while effacing differences within and 
to emphasise separation and opposition while suppressing similarity and overlap. 
Essentialist binaries which construct 'Third world women' (or 'Muslim women' etc.) as 
a homogenous group promote ethnocentrism which reinforces dominant Western values 
and modes of representation. As Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991) has most 
influentially argued, the construction of the poor, victimised, oppressed 'average third 
world woman' presumes and promotes the contrasting implicit self-representation of 
Western women as educated, modern and having control over their bodies (56). 
Similarly, we can see how the portrayal of the helpless, mutilated African 'victim of 
female genital mutilation' constructs the reciprocal image of the empowered Western 
`woman/saviour', or how the representation of the covered and oppressed 'veiled 
woman' implies the image of the skin-showing and liberated 'Western woman'. As a 
result of such 'discursive colonisation' all 'marginal and resistant modes and 
experiences' are erased (73). Those positioned as 'other' to the predominant 'Western 
self' are characterised as having no ability to shape the social relations in which they 
operate. From this perspective, it becomes hard to analyse specific historical and 
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contextual differences between 'Third world women' and thus difficult to theorise 
legitimate strategies for positive social transformation. 
As culturally essentialist binaries often position a bounded, ahistorical notion of 
`cultural difference' as the fundamental axis of differentiation between groups, they 
ignore the fluidity, contradiction and change within cultural groups. Such culturally 
essentialist dualisms also efface the role of other forces that are not exclusively 
`cultural' (i.e. economic, political, religious, legacies of colonisation, transnational 
capital etc.) in structuring conflict and oppression, as well as resistance. As Anne 
Phillips (2004) argues, there is a tendency to employ the term 'culture' when 'faced 
with something we cannot otherwise understand' (11). Phillips suggests that reference 
to culture can be unhelpful in addressing the current politics of both FGC and veiling, as 
`culture' (however defined) may not be primary to the ways in which such practices are 
constructed and maintained in particular contexts. Furthermore, when sharp, all 
encompassing contrasts are made between 'Western cultures' and 'other cultures', 
possible (Western-based) responses become polarised between the imperialising 
condemnation/salvation position, and the cultural relativist stance (which fails to make 
political and ethical judgements to curtail harm). Moreover, as Uma Narayan (1998) 
points out, essentialist constructions of 'Third world cultures' also pose particular 
problems for feminist agendas in developing countries. Political movements that are 
hostile to women's interests in various parts of 'the Third world' often depict culturally 
dominant norms of femininity and practices that adversely affect women as central 
components of cultural identity, so that women's conformity with the status quo is 
equated with the 'preservation of culture' and their challenges to such norms and 
practices as 'cultural betrayals' (91). In this sense, we can see how cultural essentialism 
is often intimately linked with sexual essentialism. 8 
8 It has also been argued that cultural essentialism is sometimes produced through efforts to prevent 
sexual essentialism. As Narayan (1998) suggests, 'The project of attending to differences among women 
across a variety of national and cultural contexts then becomes a project that endorses and replicates 
problematic and colonialist assumptions about the cultural differences between "Western culture" and 
"Non-Western Cultures", and the women who inhabit them. Seemingly universal essentialist 
generalizations about "all women" are replaced by culture-specific essentialist generalizations that 
depend on totalizing categories' (italics in original) (87). 
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The way that culture is conceptualised and linked with race within culturally essentialist 
discourses has also been analysed and critiqued by postcolonial and anti-cultural 
essentialist feminist theorists. Leti Volpp (2000) argues that problematic behaviour, 
such as underage marriage, is more readily attributed to 'culture' when it is the 
behaviour of immigrant groups of colour, rather than that of mainstream white 
Americans. A tendency to perceive white Americans as devoid of culture, she claims, 
leads to attempts to construct other, `non-cultural' explanations for white people's 
behaviour. Under this schema, white people are seen as individual actors (with agency) 
while people of color are perceived as members of groups (devoid of agency). 
Similarly, Narayan (1997) argues that a certain racialising of culture is in operation 
when 'cultural explanations' are produced to explain fatal forms of violence against 
`Third world women' while such forms of violence against mainstream Western women 
appear to be resistant to such 'cultural explanations' (84). This inconsistency, she 
claims, results in essentialising portrayals of Third world women as victims of their 
culture. Both Volpp and Narayan are concerned with how such racialised cultural 
binaries reify notions of fundamental moral differences between Western cultures and 
their so-called 'others'. By illustrating the ways in which particular cultural practices or 
behaviours are inherently similar, they, like Gunning, Weil Davis, and to some extent 
Jeffreys, aim to highlight the racialising discourses which construct various cultural 
groups as essentially different. 9 
Drawing cross-cultural parallels between gendered practices which have generally not 
been associated, or have been routinely posed as oppositional, can be an important 
technique to interrogate essentialist deployments of cultural difference, race and nation. 
Utilised alongside careful analysis that illustrates the heterogeneity and changes in 
practices within all cultural groups, such comparisons can disrupt rigid, culturally 
imperialist dualisms. Essentialist boundaries separating cultures can be shown to be 
human constructs, developed and deployed for political ends. Furthermore, the notion 
that 'actual cultural differences" correspond very neatly to the "packages" that are 
 Judith Butler takes up this argument in Precarious Life (2004b), suggesting that the racialising of 
culture operative in the US socio-political sphere not only positions some subjects as 'victims of their 
cultures', but also constructs some lives and bodies as more disposable than others. 
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currently individuated as "separate cultures" or manifest themselves as evenly 
distributed across particular "cultures"', can be problematised (Narayan, 1998:102). 
Careful, theoretically well-informed, cross-cultural feminist work may also play an 
important role in constructing bases for cross-cultural or transnational political alliances 
and activism. Jacqui Alexander and Mohanty (1997) argue, for instance, that cross-
cultural feminist endeavours can produce a shared sense of 'engagement based on 
empathy and on a vision of justice for everyone' (xlii). They suggest that in our current 
world order which is structured by the operation of transnational capital, 'comparative, 
relational feminist praxis' is required in order to understand and respond to the ways in 
which various global communities are connected and interdependent (xx). Making 
cross-cultural comparisons across embodied practices can therefore be an important 
feminist technique grounding political interventions at both local and transnational 
levels. 
It should be acknowledged, in addition, that within such feminist frameworks 
`essentialism' is not conceived as something which can be disrupted and dispensed with 
once and for all. As Sara Ahmed (1998) emphasises, 'we need to qualify our arguments 
by a recognition that essentialism is not a conceptual horizon that can be simply 
transcended' (91). Moreover, 'essentialism' and 'non-essentialism' are not cast 
straightforwardly as opposites. Rather, a more complex relationship between the two 
forms of representation is theorised. Diana Fuss (1989) has persuasively argued, for 
instance, that constructionism (the position that differences are constructed and not 
innate) actually operates as a more sophisticated form of essentialism, and hence 'the 
bar between essentialism and constructionism is by no means as solid and unassailable 
as advocates of both sides assume it to be' (xii). Rather than identifying clear cut, 
universalising categories of 'essentialism' and 'non-essentialism' which retain the same 
meaning across different contexts, feminist anti-cultural essentialist analyses seek to 
examine the operation of particular discourses which function in essentialist ways 
within specific historical, social and political contexts. What is problematically 
essentialist for particular subjects in one place or time may not be in another, and 
constructions of essentialism can alter and be transformed. Feminist debates relating to 
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essentialism have also discussed whether 'strategic' mobilisations of essentialism may 
sometimes be necessary within feminist political practice. I° Political action, it has been 
argued, may require some provisional forms of essentialism as one phase within larger 
deconstructive projects." 
There are also, however, several problematic effects associated with cross-cultural 
feminist strategies which require more in depth examination and analysis. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I draw primarily on critical feminist perspectives on 
embodiment to make a series of criticisms of these comparative feminist approaches. I 
use the term 'critical theorists of embodiment' to describe such thinkers as Elizabeth 
Grosz, Judith Butler, Sara Ahmed, Margrit Shildrick, Raia Prokhovnik, Moira Gatens 
and Rosi Braidotti. These theorists employ diverse (and sometimes conflicting) 
theoretical approaches. However, they may be linked by the view that bodies are not 
simply 'pre-given' in biology, nature, or culture but are continually produced and 
differentiated through complex historical, social and political relations of power. 
Interrogating the sex/gender distinction has been of particular theoretical importance to 
many of these thinkers, who have perceived it to be intimately intertwined with a host 
of other oppressive dualisms (i.e. mind/body, nature/culture, male/female and 
heterosexual/homosexual). In underscoring an overarching patriarchal, heteronormative 
system, the sex/gender distinction obscures recognition of how bodies (as opposed to 
being purely a product of nature) are constituted dichotomously as 'sexed' and/or 
gendered' through power-imbued grids of intelligibility (Prokhovnik, 2002; Gatens, 
10 One pervasive stand of feminist discourse relating to 'strategic' or 'provisional' essentialism relates to 
debates over whether Luce Irigaray's approach to sexual difference can be considered problematically 
essentialist. Early critics of Irigaray's work (1985), such as Torii Moi (1985), objected to Irigaray's 
`essentialist' position of women and femininity. Contemporary advocates of Irigaray's approach, such as 
Elizabeth Grosz (1989, 1994, 2005), Rosi Braidotti (2002, 2006), Naomi Schor (1994), Margaret 
Whitford (1994) and Diana Fuss (1989), however, argue that her 'essentialism' is in fact strategic or 
provisional. They insist that her project should ultimately be understood as one geared towards 
affirmative deconstruction. The major misinterpretation of Irigaray's work, they claim, has been to see 
her essentialism as the final stage, when it is actually part of a larger deconstructive process. 
Interestingly, other theorists advocate the development of new forms of 'essentialist' feminist analysis. 
For example, Mridula Nath Chakraborty (2004) argues for an 'embodied essentialism' imagined within 
the locus of race. For her, current trends of anti-essentialism merely reinscribe the racist and ethnocentric 
assumptions of hegemonic feminist theorising. Focusing on histories of slavery, imperialism, 
colonisation and global capitalism, this embodied essentialism would provide an in depth reading of the 
race relations structuring feminist knowledge. 
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1996; Butler, 1999/1990, 1993). Rejecting the notion of a pre-given biologically 
`sexed' body upon which gender is deterministically inscribed, they have emphasised 
the impossibility of ever having 'direct, unmediated access to some "pure" corporeal 
state' (Shildrick, 1997:14). As Moira Gatens (1996) asserts, one of the key questions 
feminists need to be asking is 'how does culture construct the body so that it is 
understood as a biological given?' (52). Sex/gender is of course not the only paradigm 
through which relations of power function to produce particular forms of embodiment. 
Critical feminist theorists of embodiment are also concerned with how bodies are 
constituted differentially through the heterosexual matrix of power (Butler, 1999/1990, 
1993, 2004a) and through processes of racial and cultural `othering' (Butler, 1993; 
Ahmed, 2000, 2004a). 
Problematic Effects of Comparative Feminist Approaches 
[T]o recognize the importance of an ever deepening understanding of the complexities 
of multiplicity and intersectionality should not preclude a parallel concern to analyse 
how discourses of the universal continue to operate as the constitutive ground for these 
geometries of power and structures of inequality. 
Gail Lewis, 2006•88 
One of the key problems feminist cross-cultural comparisons encounter relates to the 
structural analysis scholars employ to disrupt essentialising binaries. Margrit Shildrick 
(1997) and Raia Prokhovnik (2002) advocate similar deconstructive strategies designed 
to enable theorists to move away from conceptualising issues in terms of essentialising 
binaries (such as mind/body, reason/emotion, man/woman, sex/gender, self/other etc.). 12 
 Shildrick sees this strategy as involving three theoretical steps (Prokhovnik's strategy is 
conceived in two steps but is quite similar as she takes Shilthick's first step as a given): 
1. Expose the binary not just as a simple difference between equal terms but a 
hierarchy between margin and centre. 
12 Shildrick and Prokhovnik's strategies are influenced by both Derridean and Irigarian approaches to 
deconstruction and resignification. 
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2. Provisionally reverse the equation so that the marginal term is privileged or at least 
re-valued. 
3. Displace the very structure of the binary model with the irruptive emergence of a 
new concept which cannot be understood in terms of the preceding binary (110). 13 
The first step involves acknowledging, as many feminist and postcolonial theorists 
have, that dichotomies always imply a relation of power. As opposed to indicating an 
`A or B' relationship, binaries more specifically designate a hierarchical 'A or not-A' 
association. 
The second step is conceived as a critical, yet short-term or provisional, phase in which 
the typically undervalued `not-A' term is reclaimed and made visible as a means to 
expose the oppressive operation of the binary pair. This approach is evident in feminist 
strategies to reclaim a concept of embodiment as a means to highlight the oppressive 
operation of the mind/body dualism, or similarly, to make 'gender' or 'sexual 
difference' visible as a means to illustrate the patriarchal basis of 'gender neutrality'. 
This deconstructive technique can also be discerned in many of the cross-cultural 
comparisons of various embodied cultural practices. When similarities are drawn 
between female genital cutting and cosmetic surgery or between veiling and anorexia, 
and the self/other binaries which structure such pairings are discursively 'revalued', the 
constructedness and instability of such (liberated/oppressed etc.) binaries are revealed. 
To extend Shildrick and Prokhovnik's model somewhat, I would argue that the act of 
revaluing which takes place in the second step may involve a broader range of 
deconstructive options, beyond the technique of 'reversing' the two binary poles 
(whereby the previously inferior term is privileged). What is characteristic of the 
second step across various feminist approaches is that it remains deconstructive. 
Both theorists emphasise, however, that this second step of deconstruction will not be 
effective in the long-run unless it is followed by a critical final step which seeks to 
move beyond the binary structure. To simply reverse the dualism would leave the 
13 • Prokhovnik (2002) articulates a two-step deconstructive strategy:1) increase women's visibility rather 
than attempt to degender women 2) construct a relational mind-body connection, expressed in the 
recognition of corporeal subjectivity (11). 
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binary structure intact and thus could only reiterate the economy of the same, leaving 
open the possibility that the dualism will once again be reversed. It is necessary to 
follow the provisional second step with a third step which entails the creation of a new 
concept that can no longer be understood within the dichotomous terms of the original 
binary. For Shildrick, a celebration of 'radical sexual difference' can displace the 
interconnected mind/body, sex/gender, male/female binaries. By theorising difference 
beyond the dichotomous pairings of male/female, the concept of 'radical sexual 
difference' speaks to 'a multiplicity of differences in which all women might find a 
place' (1997:216). Similarly, Prokhovnik argues that the construction of a relational 
mind-body connection expressed in the recognition of 'corporeal subjectivity' can 
ultimately trigger movement beyond these restrictive dichotomies (2002:11). As she 
asserts, 'the concept of corporeal subjectivity takes into account that it is not enough to 
demonstrate the poverty of the dualism; we cannot simply dissolve oppositions and 
ignore them, but must construct something on the basis of them' (165). As I discuss 
later, because of its privileging of sexual difference over other axes of embodied 
differentiation, Shildrick's concept of 'radical sexual difference' may represent a 
limited or problematic approach to step three. I thus want to emphasise that the 
resignificatory phase may take a broader range of forms (beyond the paradigm of sexual 
difference). What is characteristic of step three is that it radically reconceives the 
dualistic relation of the A and not-A terms. /or both Shildrick and Prokhovnik the third 
step is not intended to do away with the teinis of the binary structure (as this would 
arguably be impossible), but rather to extend and resignify these categories so that their 
meanings are transformed and their relationship rearticulated/ 
Drawing on this model, I want to suggest that the problems feminist theorists encounter 
in making cross-cultural comparisons between embodied practices may be located 
within their problematic transition from the second to the third step of this (or a similar) 
deconstructive strategy. 14 To illustrate, I will provide a few brief examples in relation 
14 I do not want to claim, however, that such deconstructive strategies can be (unproblematically) 
conceptualised as involving three discrete and sequential steps. I take Susan Bordo's (1993) point that, as 
`relocations of this sort are always concrete, historical events enacted by real people, they cannot 
challenge every insidious duality in one fell swoop, but neither can they reproduce exactly the same 
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to Uma Narayan's and Leti Volpp's anti-cultural essentialist approaches. I share 
significant political ground with both these theorists (indeed my own project has sprung 
in part from their important and powerful critiques of cultural essentialism). However, I 
want to suggest that their shared emphasis on cross-cultural commonalties produces 
some problematic effects and may leave them stuck in the 'step two' phase of reversal 
or revaluing. 
Anti-cultural essentialism and recourse to 'sameness' 
In disrupting dichotomous pairings, both Shildrick and Prokhovnik take as a starting 
point the need to recognise the significance of (non-essential) embodied differences, as 
opposed to effacing such differences through claiming 'sameness' or collapsing into 
relativism. As Shildrick (1997) emphasises, in such a deconstructive approach 'the 
embodiment of differences, rather than their abstraction, will be taken as a determining 
feature' (5). By contrast, anti-cultural essentialists such as Narayan and Volpp start 
from the contention that it is the imposition of 'difference' upon homogenously 
characterised cultural groups that fundamentally underscores cultural essentialism and 
imperialism. For both theorists, it is thus predominantly essentialist notions of 
`difference', rather than 'sameness', that need to be tackled head on. 
Narayan (1997) emphasises the importance of acknowledging how cultural imperialism 
as it functioned in colonial contexts denied rather than affirmed that one's others were 
`just like one's self. Even when 'sameness' was implied, she argues, 'the other' was 
only seen as a deficient example of the Western, colonial self. She is particularly 
concerned with the ways in which references to 'culture' can 'combine with ideas of 
"Third world backwardness" and the tendency to think of Third world contexts as 
realms of "Very Other Cultures" to make "foreign phenomena" seem comfortingly 
intelligible while preserving their "foreignness"' (104). Similarly, Volpp (2000) is 
condition as before "in reverse"' (32). Clearly, as Shildrick and Prokhovnik point out, the steps overlap 
in different ways and therefore cannot be separated entirely. This is why, for them, each step must be 
conceived of and tackled as part of an integrated scheme, and not in isolation. Making a distinction 
between 'short-term' (second step) and long-term' (third step) goals is important, however, as trying to 
do both at the same time generates confusion (Prokhovnik, 2002:163). 
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concerned that through the projection of racialised 'cultural differences', immigrant 
groups of colour are perceived as fundamentally different (on a moral scale) from the 
white mainstream in America. Cultural imperialism, racism, misogyny and 
homophobia all depend, in part, on the perception and articulation of essentialist, 
hierarchical differences which separate subjects. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged 
that a feminist approach which insists on recognising the full significance of historical, 
social and embodied differences between particular practices and their imagined 
subjects risks perpetuating the 'violence of reifying, exoticizing or romanticizing the 
otherness of the Other' and thus reinscribing culturally imperialist discourses (Cornell, 
1992:54). The potential for episternic violence also exists in the act of assuming 'that 
the particularity of the other is within our grasp, that the place of the other is fully 
accountable from the outside' (Shildrick, 1997:3, see also Spivak, 1988). 
As discussed earlier, in order to deconstruct essentialist thinking which associates 
`culture' with practices of dowry-murders in India but not with domestic-violence 
murders in the United States, Narayan (1997) shows how the two practices represent 
similar systemic problems of violence that affect roughly the same proportion of women 
in each nation. Similarly, Volpp wants to disrupt culturally essentialist discourses 
which associate culture with the practice of underage marriage when such acts involve 
people of color, yet not when they involve mainstream, white Americans. She 
emphasises the parallels between a case of underage marriage involving a Mormon girl 
and man in Utah (seen as aberrant, individualised behaviour) and a case involving a 
Mexican girl and man in Texas (seen as culture-influenced, group-oriented behaviour) 
to show their overarching commonality. 'Juxtaposing these narratives of similar stories 
differently perceived', she asserts, 'illustrates how distinctive interpretive lenses are 
applied to virtually identical behaviour according to the actor's identity' (italics mine) 
(113). 
In drawing similarities between cultural practices perceived as fundamentally different, 
both these analyses do important work in exposing the racialising hierarchies which so 
often underscore culturally essentialist discourses. The advances they achieve, 
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however, may remain locked within 'step two' of Shildrick and Prokhovnik's strategy. 
If 'Americans' are encouraged to make connections that would allow them to conceive 
of dowry murder in India as similar or equivalent to domestic violence in the United 
States, or underage marriages within Utah-based Mormon communities and Texas-
based Mexican communities as representing 'virtually identical behaviour', might they 
not be tempted to avoid dealing with the (embodied) political processes through which, 
as Sara Ahmed puts it, 'some others are designated stranger than other others' 
(2000:76). Might attention be redirected from the ways in which relationships of social 
antagonism continually function to constitute bodies, subjects and practices differently? 
It should be emphasised that both Narayan and Volpp address the significance of the 
differences constructed between particular bodies. Indeed, they argue that it is precisely 
because of perceived embodied 'differences' (i.e. visual markers like skin colour, 
`traditional' dress etc.) that some groups are picked out as being culturally and indeed 
morally different from the white mainstream. They trace the historical differences that 
race and culture have made in the ways in which various groups have been (and 
continue to be) perceived and treated. Yet in illustrating the ways in which the practices 
they are concerned with are in fact alike (contra essentialising binaries), they seem to 
position this recognition of commonality as an appropriate end-point to the process of 
disrupting culturally (and racially) essentialist binaries. In the course of her article, for 
example, Narayan gives careful consideration to the divergent national and cultural 
contexts through which Indian dowry deaths and American domestic violence murders 
are constructed as 'different'. However, because she is so concerned to make a 'visible 
connection' between the two forms of gendered violence (1997:84, 89, 96) as a means 
to overcome the 'asymmetry that exists between explanations of violence against 
women' in the Indian and American cultural contexts (104), the thrust of (and 
conclusion to) her argument seems to be that beneath these distorting constructions, the 
two practices are fundamentally similar. I5 
15 As Narayan suggests in her conclusion, not only are the statistics for the deaths of women as a result of 
the two practices of violence comparable, but so are the reasons given by women in both contexts for 
remaining in abusive marriages, including 'economic dependency, worries about the custody and welfare 
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Narayan thus implies a problematic distinction between the discursive representation of 
particular practices and material reality. This prevents her from addressing effectively 
how the cultural context in which specific practices of violence are discursively 
produced in fact conditions the ways in which such violence will be experienced (and 
how particular bodies will be shaped as a result) — in other words, how 'the discursive' 
and 'the material' are fundamentally interwoven. From a critical feminist perspective 
on embodiment, one's understanding of one's own embodiment is always closely tied to 
historical, geographical and cultural specificities, and hence bodies cannot be separated 
from their cultural contexts. In this sense, I concur with Elizabeth Grosz's (1994) 
insistence that, 'Bodies cannot adequately be understood as ahistorical, precultural, or 
natural objects in any simple way; they are not only inscribed, marked, engraved by 
social pressures external to them but are the products, the direct effects, of the very 
social constitution of nature itself(x). In concluding via recourse to 'sameness', 
Narayan's analysis falls into a rather disembodied and a-cultural mode. It consequently 
fails to progress to the 'irruptive emergence' of a 'new understanding' which would be 
required to move from step two revaluing to step three resignification. 
Volpp, in particular, risks reinscribing the dominance and privileging of the 'Western 
self when she insists that one of the most important outcomes of such cross-cultural 
comparisons is to promote critical introspection on the part of the privileged Western 
subject. Volpp wants to force 'us' to recognise and examine the problematic practices 
within 'our own culture'. 'When we gaze with condemnation at other cultures', she 
suggests, 'we can miss the fact that "our" culture is also characterized by problematic, 
sex-subordinating behaviour' (2000:113). This is clearly an important point, and one 
that has been made by many feminist and postcolonial theorists (see, for example, 
Hirschmann, 1998; Honig, 1999). Cultural essentialism is indeed partly perpetuated by 
the failure of those in positions of privilege to interrogate their own notions of ethical 
and moral superiority by acknowledging the specific systems of oppression operating 
within their own culture. However, a strategy which repeatedly instructs those in 
of children...and the threats of violence that have followed upon previous attempts at leaving' 
(1997:115). 
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positions of power to focus on themselves risks maintaining attention predominantly (if 
not exclusively) on the privileged 'Western' or 'First world' subject, and perpetuating a 
situation where the 'other' is used for the purpose of self-discovery, to define the 'I' 
(Ahmed, 2000). While such a move may function initially to 'reverse' the imperialising 
gaze, it might also reinscribe the privileged Western subject, 'as the implicit referent, 
the yardstick by which to encode and represent cultural others' (Mohanty, 1991:52). 
In this vein, I want to argue that there is an important distinction to be made between 
the act of employing 'the other' as a mirror for Western consciousness, and adopting a 
critical feminist practice of reflexivity. A critical approach to reflexivity emphasises 
that we must 'interrogate the bearing of our location and context on what we are saying, 
and this should be an explicit part of every serious discursive practice in which we 
engage' (Alcoff, 1995:112) (see also England, 1994). From Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak's (1988) perspective, when the privileged theorist assumes her/his own 
`transparency' (while arguing that 'the other' can speak for her/himself), the structural 
relations of power which condition 'who can speak' (and be heard) are effaced. 
Reflexivity is thus a crucial starting point in discursive analysis of 'others' on the part 
of privileged speakers. In order to displace 'rather than only reversing oppositions', 
analyses 'must take the investigator's own complicity into account' (Spivak, 1999:244). 
Gaining awareness of (or altering) one's own consciousness is not, however, the 
exclusive or final aim of reflexivity, though it will surely be a key element in a larger 
reflexive process. Linked to this, reflexivity also works towards producing more 
`generous' discursive encounters with one's 'subjects'. From Ahmed's point of view, 
`a generous encounter may be one which would recognise how the encounter itself is 
implicated in broader relations and circuits of production and exchange' (2000:152). 
There must also, however, be room within a generous encounter for `the one who is 
already assimilated' to 'move beyond the encounter which names her and holds her in 
place' (152). By contrast, within analyses which employ `the other' as a mirror, 'the 
self is both the starting point for such a trajectory and its ultimate end-point, and, as 
such, the complexity and agency of 'the other' often gets lost somewhere in between. 
Rather than seeking to nurture more 'generous' encounters between self and other, the 
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privileged Western subject's analysis of 'the other' risks remaining predominantly 'self-
referential' (Chow, 2006). From this perspective, 'One is tempted to wonder whether 
we have merely taken a detour to return to the position of the Other as a resource for 
rethinking the Western self(Frankenberg and Mani, 1993:301). 
While not all comparative cultural analyses collapse into 'sameness', I6 those that over-
privilege cross-cultural commonality or invest in it as an endpoint risk effacing 
embodied particularities and recentring dominant discursive and material hierarchies. 
Such approaches may prevent analysis of the ways in which particular practices are 
discursively and materially linked beyond (or in contrast to) the relationship of 
commonality. They can also thwart the development of effective localised interventions 
which depend on recognising how practices and bodies are constructed and experienced 
differently. It is also important to consider, however, if the tendency of various feminist 
cross-cultural approaches to become permanently delayed in 'step two' may be related 
to the problematic structuring of the three-step deconstructive strategy itself in its 
inclusion of a binary 'reversal' phase. As these examples would seem to indicate, 
strategic reversals may actually thwart and circumscribe the possibilities for the 
disruption and radical rearticulation of oppressive binary structures. In the next section, 
I examine whether focusing on the relational construction of binary terms may provide 
a means of resignifying essentialist dualisms that avoids problematic second-stage 
reversals. I begin this discussion by considering how various feminist cross-cultural 
approaches may be linked to the notion of an 'unfinished' humanist project (Simpson, 
2001). 
16 For example, while Waririmu Ngaruiya Njambi (2004) draws links between 'female circumcision' and 
`cosmetic surgery' (291) she interrogates the notion that 'bodies can be separated from their cultural 
contexts' and criticises the act of 'universalizing a particular Western image of a "normal body" and 
sexuality' (281). Njambi advocates a critical feminist framework 'that is accountable to local specificities 
and variations, rather than replicating the Western view of a "natural body"' (293). 
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Cultural Commonality and the 'Unfinished' Humanist Project 
Identity is always bounded and particular... Nobody ever speaks of a human identity. 
The concept orients thinking away from any engagement with [a notion of] basic, anti-
anthropological sameness... 
Paul Gilroy, 2000:98 
In Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line (2000), Paul 
Gilroy claims that 'new hatreds' are being created not through the essentialist 
enforcement of stable racial categories, but through a troubling inability to maintain 
them. He argues that the only appropriate response to this uncertainty is to demand 
liberation from all racialising and racialogical thought through the development of an 
`empathetically post racial humanism' (37). I begin this section with Gilroy's utopian 
vision of a 'new humanism' because his argument coalesces with the feminist strategy 
of drawing cross-cultural similarities between embodied practices in several key ways. 
It also links with Shildrick and Prokhovnik's deconstructive approach, which I have 
used as a critical model to evaluate these cross-cultural methodologies. In this section, I 
want to suggest that the comparative cross-cultural approaches I have discussed 
represent a humanist move which posits an underlying (essential) commonality among 
human lives. Many feminist and anti-cultural essentialist theorists who seek to draw 
similarities between embodied practices, such as FGC and body modification, veiling 
and anorexia, domestic violence murders and dowry death, may thus support (either 
implicitly or explicitly) a 'new' humanistic ideology. From (at least one strand of) a 
critical feminist perspective on embodiment, however, such new humanist frameworks 
may problematically efface the exclusionary processes through which 'human' subjects 
are constituted. 
Gilroy contends that the contemporary socio-political climate is characterised by a 
`crisis of raciology' (2000:28). Race has 'lost much of its common sense credibility', 
he argues, because we have become more aware of the 'elaborate cultural and 
ideological work' that goes into (re)producing race as a category and, as such, it has 
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been 'stripped of its moral and intellectual integrity' (28). Moreover, the global 
market's flattening of substantial linguistic and cultural differences, alongside the 
impact of the DNA revolution, has further destabilised the 'meaning and status of racial 
categories' (24). This crisis of race, he stresses, offers us an opportunity to 'free 
ourselves from the bonds of all raciology' (15) through recognising the 'anachronistic 
condition of the idea of "race" as a basis upon which human beings are distinguished 
and ranked' (37). As an alternative to racialised notions of subjecthood, Gilroy 
advocates a conception of a fundamental human identity premised on 'basic, anti-
anthropological sameness' (98). This specifically post-racial notion of humanity signals 
for him a decisive move away from problematic and exclusionary humanist discourses 
of the past and constitutes a 'new' (inclusive) humanist endeavour. Thus, from Gilroy's 
perspective, humanism's potential as an 'unfinished project' may be within our powers 
to direct. 
Desires to deconstruct culturally essentialist binaries on the part of feminist theorists 
may be similarly related to larger commitments to an 'unfinished' humanist project. 
For example, Mohanty (1991) calls for 'a reconsideration of the question of "human" in 
a posthumanist context' (74) and, in a pertinent footnote, appears to indicate her hope 
for a 'new humanism'. 17 It seems relevant in this respect that in 'Under Western Eyes 
Revisited' (2002), Mohanty places more emphasis than she did in her earlier publication 
on feminist 'solidarity and shared values' (502), 'commonalities' across cultural 
contexts (504) and how 'specifying difference allows us to theorise universal concerns 
more fully' (505). Similarly, from Narayan's perspective, fundamental transfoiiiiations 
in the political, social and philosophical landscapes of our world will occur 'as the 
"Others" of modernity's ideal for humans — such as women, and peoples from non-
European races and cultures — increasingly are recognised as fully human' (italics 
mine) (Narayan and Harding, 2000:ix). These views resonate with Gilroy's vision of an 
emphatic 'post-racial humanism' in which race is no longer a 'basis upon which human 
17 Mohanty's note reads: Tor an argument which demands a new concept of humanism in work of third 
world women see Lazreg: "...when feminists essentially deny other women the humanity they claim for 
themselves, they dispense with any ethical constraint. They engage in the act of splitting the social 
universe into 'us' and 'them', 'subjects' and 'objects'" (Lazreg cited in Mohanty, 1991:77). 
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beings are distinguished and ranked' (37). From this perspective, it may be possible to 
extend drastically and transform humanism so that all human subjects might find an 
equal place within its parameters of representation. 
Some of the feminist comparisons made between FGC and other body modifications 
might also be interpreted within this 'new humanist' framework. Through illustrating 
fundamental similarities between embodied practices, these cross-cultural approaches 
seek to disrupt culturally essentialist and racist depictions of particular groups or 
subjects as 'barbaric', 'depraved' and 'non-human'. In place of such `othering' 
discourses, they construct a notion of underlying, cross-cultural human commonality. 
This theoretical move is illustrated particularly, I would suggest, through the calls for 
cross-cultural or transnational empathy in some of these texts. As I discuss in Chapter 
Three, in several of these analyses, the development of empathy is premised on the 
recognition of fundamental similarities in women's lives, experiences and practices 
across cultural contexts. For example, in employing an analogue approach to link 
`African' FGC and nineteenth century American clitoridectomies, Gunning seeks to 
compel Western feminists to empathise with African women through recognising that 
they 'have confronted the same problem of female genital surgeries that African women 
face today' (italics mine) (1991:226). Describing these differently located traditions of 
genital cutting as 'the same problem', she constructs African and American women as 
bearers of common 'cultural wounds'. 18 Jeffreys' (2005) argument that 'African' FGC 
and 'Western' body modifications must be understood as analogous 'harmful cultural 
practices' may be read as similarly producing shared cultural experiences of gendered 
violence or oppression. It is on the basis of these mutual cultural wounds that a 
common human conception of embodiment and a common human capacity for empathy 
are implied. In this sense we might read some of these comparisons as articulating not 
only an anti-cultural essentialist agenda but also envisioning a new humanist horizon. I9 
18 For discussion of how particular cultural 'wounds' can become problematically transformed into 
identities, see Brown, 1995 and Ahmed, 2004a. 
19 From a slightly different perspective, feminist cross-cultural approaches may be understood as 
responses to a 'cross-cultural nihilism'. These comparative frameworks may be interpreted as calling 
attention to the ways in which women's bodies are violated and damaged across cultures in ways that 
signal a common (problematic) will to power which represents a fundamental inhumanity. In this sense, 
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How would a critical feminist perspective on embodiment address new humanist 
claims'? Some thinkers I have grouped within this category, namely Prokhovnik, Gatens 
and Shildrick, would appear to share the hope for the construction of a 'new 
humanism'. While Prokhovnik (2002) argues for the need to make 'sexual difference' 
visible as a 'short-term' or provisional approach, she emphasises that in the long-run, 
the sex/gender distinction must be decisively resignified through the emergence of a 
new concept grounded in a non-dichotomous notion of 'human' corporeality. For 
Gatens (1996), the challenge of feminist theory is to 'theorize human embodiment 
without losing the sexual, political, or ethical particularity of different bodies' (italics 
mine) (viii). Prokhovnik also emphasises that 'the recognition that we all have bodies, 
which follows from overcoming the mind/body split, is more important that the sex 
(that is, the biological "natural" sexual difference) of those bodies' (italics mine) (13). 
From this perspective, like that of Gilroy and anti-cultural essentialists such as Mohanty 
and Narayan, it may be possible to rework humanism so that it is inclusive of all human 
subjects. As Shildrick (1997) argues, 'the recognition that the humanist subject is 
discursively constructed, but never fully determined, by a nexus of exclusionary 
practices, should allow us to resignify the parameters of agency' (135). 
For other critical feminist theorists of embodiment, however, the prospect of a new 
humanism is seen as inherently problematic. Elizabeth Grosz, Judith Butler and Sara 
Ahmed each seem to decisively reject the possibility of new humanism on the basis that 
no matter how much resignification of essentialising frameworks and categories takes 
place, constitutive social and psychic relations of power will always function to exclude 
some bodies in delimiting what qualifies as 'human'. While there are clear differences 
between Grosz and Butler's approaches to gender resignification, 2° their perspectives 
cross-cultural or transnational invocations of empathy may be employed to counter nihilism. This reading 
links with Gilroy's vision of a 'planetary humanism capable of comprehending the universality of our 
elemental vulnerability to the wrongs we visit upon each other' (2004:4). 
20 The differences between Grosz and Butler's approaches indicate, for example, two significantly 
different embodied strategies of deconstruction. Influenced by Monique Wittig's work, Butler believes 
that the categories of sex and gender can be radically disrupted through parodic acts which reveal their 
constructed nature. By contrast, because Irigarian influenced theorists such as Grosz and Rosi Braidotti 
see sexual difference as irreducible they believe that 'feminists cannot afford to merely cast off their 
sexed identity'. Instead, they need to radically repossess it (Braidotti, 1994:120). Shildrick and 
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may be seen to coalesce on the insistence that 'bodies are never simply human bodies' 
(Grosz, 1995:83), that 'sex' is one of the norms through which bodies become viable as 
human at all. As Butler (1993) asserts, `the matrix of gender relations is prior to the 
emergence of the "human"' (7). This claim that bodies will always be differentiated 
bodies before (if ever) becoming human bodies, and that cultural grids of intelligibility 
produce only some bodies as 'human', relegating others to the non-human or sub-
human domain, relates closely to Ahmed's (2000) argument that bodies are produced 
asymmetrically through relations of antagonism and violence. She contends that bodies 
only come to be 'lived' through being continually differentiated from 'other' bodies 
conceptualised and constituted as 'strange' or 'alien'. 'In such an approach', she 
claims, 'my body" and "the other's" body would not be structurally equivalent (even 
as impossible bodies), but in a relation of asymmetry and potential violence' (48). If 
bodies are actually constituted differently, to the point where they cannot be compared 
within the same structural field, 'new humanist' attempts to deconstruct cultural 
essentialism by emphasising cross-cultural parallels between particular embodied 
practices may be fundamentally misguided. 
This anti/new humanist divide 21 leaves us at a problematic impasse. On the one hand, 
the 'new humanist' position threatens to fall back on a vision of fundamental human 
commonality which precludes analysis of the exclusionary processes through which 
`human' subjects are constituted. On the other hand, the 'anti (or non)-humanist' 
Prokhovnik's three-step deconstructive strategy involves a similar process of 'repossession'. Thus Grosz 
and Braidotti's approaches may be described as seeking to repossess the feminine through an affirmative 
mode of mimesis and Butler's strategy might be articulated as aiming to disrupt the feminine through a 
parodic practice of performativity. 
21 Rosi Braidotti's (2002) position complicates this anti/new humanist divide between critical feminist 
perspectives on embodiment. On the one hand, her focus on sexual difference and her emphasis on 
embodied materialism provides a radical anti-humanist critique of the traditional humanist subject. She 
also underscores the importance of resisting 'the uncritical reproduction of sameness on a molecular, 
global or planetary scale' (13-22). On the other hand, her Irigarian linking of sexual difference with 
`issues of transcendence and universality' suggests that underlying her motivations for resignifying 
binary sexual differences is a desire to develop a new feminist humanism (58). Thus what Braidotti's 
position throws up is the need to make a distinction between 'new humanist' projects per se (whereby all 
human beings might be acknowledged and represented as human, first and foremost, and not as 'sexed' or 
`raced' in specific ways), and 'feminist (or feminine) new humanist strategies' aimed at creating a new 
version of humanity.whereby sexed subject positions are assumed from the start. Braidotti may be more 
aligned in this respect with Shildrick, who also envisions a rearticulation of the humanist subject through 
the development of a concept of radical sexual difference. 
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perspective risks reifying an essentialist notion of 'difference' which could thwart 
analysis of cross-cultural links or the development of transnational solidarities. Yet is 
the divide between these 'anti/new humanist' perspectives as stark as I have suggested? 
Is there a way to move beyond this impasse by refiguring the ways in which we theorise 
the relationships between `self and 'other'? Like Gilroy, Butler and Ahmed both 
indicate their awareness of the need to strike a balance between the poles of 
`fundamental sameness' and 'radical alterity'. Butler contends that 'at the level of 
political community, what is called for is the difficult work of cultural translation in 
which difference is honoured without (a) assimilating difference into identity or (b) 
making difference an unthinking fetish of alterity' (1995:140). Similarly, Ahmed points 
to the need to move beyond 'an opposition between narratives which totalize, which 
refuse the "otherness" of the other (human and modern) or narratives which resist that 
totalization by respecting the other as radically other (anti-humanist and postmodern)' 
(1996:88-89). She argues that what we require instead 'is an economy', which does 
`not exclude the possibility that discourses may be incommensurable' but 'suggests that 
incommensurability may not be radical, as the very fact that discourses are conflicting 
or competing means that they exist in some form of relationship to each other' (89) .22 
Taking these visions of a (relational) 'economy' which enables cultural translations 
across different discourses as a point of departure, I suggest that developing a 
perspective which draws out the constitutive connections (rather than commonalities) 
between bodies, practices and subjectivities may help us negotiate these counter-posed 
anti/new humanist positions. It may also enable us to move beyond the 
sameness/difference binary which these positions sometimes fall into. A focus on 
relationality and the mutual constitution of identity categories and embodied subjects is 
in fact shared by theorists across the anti/new humanist divide. Gilroy, for example, 
emphasises the importance of examining the relational 'interdependency' of dualistic 
pairings such as 'black/white, settler/native, colonizer/colonized' in the process of 
repudiating them (2004:45). A notion of interdependency also structures his 
22 As I discuss in Chapter Six, Elizabeth Grosz takes a more decisive 'anti-humanist' stance than either 
Butler or Ahmed. 
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perspective on the processes through which subjects and identities are constituted: 'The 
Other, against whose resistance the integrity of an identity is to be established', he 
argues, 'can be recognized as part of the self that is no longer plausibly understood as a 
unified entity but appears instead as one fragile moment in the dialogic circuits...called 
a "representation economy"' (2000:109-10). Similarly, both Butler and Ahmed 
understand subject foimation as an ongoing relational process. For Butler, 'One comes 
to "exist" by virtue of this fundamental dependency on the address of the other' 
(1997a:5). As 'interpellated beings' with a 'prior vulnerability to language' we are 
`dependent on the address of the Other in order to be' (5). Similarly, from Ahmed's 
perspective, 'given that the subject comes into existence as an entity only through 
encounters with others, then the subject's existence cannot be separated from the others 
who are encountered' (2000:7). As noted above, such processes of subject constitution 
and identity foimation are often exclusionary. However, the mutuality on which they 
depend also holds the possibility for imagining more positive embodied and social 
connections. 
Such possibilities are illustrated through the example of empathy. On the one hand, we 
can examine how empathy may function as a discourse of embodied exclusion which 
reifies the hierarchical categories of 'human' and 'nonhuman' or 'less human'. Butler's 
analysis of the ways in which the deaths of some subjects (i.e. the heterosexual victims 
of the 9/11 attacks) are grieved for within American society as 'our loss', whilst other 
deaths (i.e. gay people who have died of AIDS and Palestinians who have died by the 
Israeli military with the United States' support) are not, seems pertinent in this respect 
(2004b:32). The racialised cultural politics of which bodies are deemed `grievable' 
function to reify some bodies as 'more human' than others. Butler insists therefore that 
`we have to ask about the conditions under which a grievable life is established and 
maintained, and through what logic of exclusions, what practice of effacement and 
denominalization' (2004b:38). On the other hand, grief and empathy may enable 
connections to be forged between subjects based on the recognition of mutuality. As 
Butler points out, grief illustrates how 'we are in the thrall of relations with others that 
we cannot recount or explain' and this recognition 'often interrupts the self-conscious 
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account of ourselves we might try to provide in ways that challenge the very notion of 
ourselves as autonomous and in control' (2004a:19). [F]urnishing a sense of political 
community of a complex order', grief brings to the 'fore the relational ties that have 
implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility' 
(2004b:22). The recognition of mutuality which empathy and grief can produce may 
thus suggest the possibility of acknowledging 'a responsibility toward the trace of the 
other' (Spivak, 1999:199). 
Importantly, in emphasising constitutive connections, a relational approach does not 
depend on identifying some shared core or substratum that makes us all human. 
Recognising mutuality does not require claims of commonality or equivalence between 
bodies, lives or experiences. Indeed, if empathy is developed through the assumption of 
equivalence between various 'forms of injury', as in Gunning's and Jeffreys' texts, it 
can problematically cut off particular injuries from 'a history of "getting hurt" or 
injured' (Ahmed, 2004a:32). It 'turns the wound into something that simply "is" rather 
than something that happened in time and space' — and thus risks wounding all over 
again (32). 23 In suggesting that 'self' and 'other' are constructed in and through one 
another, a relational approach may be able to preserve particularities and recognise 
exclusions, without disavowing the possibility of common ground. In this vein, 
constitutive connection may provide a fruitful perspective from which to trace the 
articulations among embodied cultural practices and their imagined subjects. 
Throughout the following chapters I seek to develop and extend this understanding of 
relationality as part of the interpretive framework I draw on in this thesis. I discuss the 
politics of empathy further in relation to practices of FGC and cosmetic surgery in 
Chapter Three and return to consider the relationships between anti, new and post 
humanist perspectives in Chapter Six. In the next section I discuss some 
epistemological and methodological concerns that are pertinent to the thesis as a whole. 
23 	i It s also clear that reading all forms of FGC (or other body modifications) as 'wounds' or 'injuries' 
reifies (rather than disrupts) culturally essentialist and colonialist frameworks, which are premised on 
processes of imperialist exclusion rather than (new humanist) inclusion. 
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Epistemological and Methodological Issues 
This thesis has been particularly challenging to write, in large part because of the 
multiple pressures and contradictions I have struggled with as an author. As a white, 
Western, middle-class, female scholar, I have endeavoured throughout the processes of 
developing this thesis to think reflexively about how my particular social location may 
affect and shape the ways in which I conduct and present my research. I am aware that 
my location produces particular (partial) ways of looking at the world, including 
specific ways of evaluating issues of representation relating to embodied cultural 
practices. I am also conscious that my privileged position implies clear possibilities of 
reinforcing dominant relations of power. 
As such, I have felt somewhat anxious about trying to represent particular embodied 
practices of which I myself have no direct experience. My anxiety has been particularly 
acute in relation to dealing with African, Asian and Middle Eastern-rooted practices of 
FGC as well as Muslim practices of veiling, which have, within feminist circles, been 
the focus of intense debates around issues of location, representation and ethnocentrism. 
As a Western speaker who is not part of any particular circumcising community and 
does not wear any forms of Islamic dress, I am conscious that my interventions into 
discourses relating to FGC or veiling might be seen as uninvited, if not imperialist, by 
women who are members of such communities or who see themselves as linked to or 
invested in FCG or veiling in other ways that I am not. Indeed, some might argue that 
the very act of producing yet another analysis which takes practices of FGC or veiling 
as a focus, functions automatically to re-fetishise these practices. At the same time, 
however, I have had to interrogate my own, initially unacknowledged, presumption that, 
as a Westerner (a Canadian living in London), I have any more entitlement or authority 
to speak about practices such as cosmetic surgery, anorexia or passing (which I discuss 
in Chapter Four), or that my engagement with the discourses surrounding such 
procedures will necessarily be any less vexed or problematic. 
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In this vein, it seems appropriate to emphasise some things that I do not seek to suggest 
or undertake in the thesis. I do not claim to have any privileged knowledge about how 
particular embodied practices may be experienced by individuals in specific contexts 
nor do I endeavour to represent any of the embodied practices discussed in the thesis 
`fully' or with complete 'accuracy' (even if such a feat were possible). My focus is not 
on making judgements about any of the practices I discuss, nor do I seek to make 
practical recommendations for programmes or measures designed to address such 
practices (i.e. education, regulation, medicalization, eradication etc.). What I do want to 
pursue in the thesis is an investigation of the particular ways in which such embodied 
practices are represented within feminist and other critical literatures and an analysis of 
the potential effects of such representations. I am particularly interested in identifying 
modes of representation and theorisation which are problematic and in considering 
possible alternatives which may provide better tools for theorising the relations between 
particular embodied cultural practices, and the links between cultural difference and 
embodiment more generally. 
I am conscious, however, given my focus on embodied practices (such as FGC) which 
many feminists consider serious acts of gendered violence, that my emphasis on issues 
of discursive representation may be interpreted by some as a lack of concern (or 
empathy) for the suffering of 'real' women and children. Similarly, I have faced 
criticism that my discursive critique may obscure the social and material effects of, and 
relations of power surrounding, such practices (which such critiques suggest are more 
vital than discursive aspects). My feeling, however, is that we should not assume that 
violence or oppression is inherent to, or typical of, all forms of any of these practices -
although there are certainly aspects of some procedures which I would describe as 
violent, damaging or coercive. Furthermore, I feel that the epistemic violence inflicted 
by particular patterns of representation requires as much critical attention and analysis 
as material violence and, in fact, that these two forms of violence should be understood 
as intrinsically linked, rather than discrete. However, consistently illustrating and 
drawing out such discursive-material links is a challenging and ongoing process, and 
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one which, although important, I am not sure that I have had the time or space to do 
justice in this thesis. 
Another issue I want to address is my own partial (and fluctuating) ambivalence in 
regards to some of the arguments I make in this thesis. At times I have struggled to 
justify the critiques I have developed of the continuum, analogue and subset approaches 
in a social context in which the need to attack racist and culturally essentialist cultural 
binaries seems ever more pressing. Indeed, while much of the thesis is centred on a 
critique of feminist cross-cultural or transnational methods of linking different 
embodied practices, I have a lot of understanding and sympathy for such strategies. 
This sympathy surges every time I am faced with yet another essentialist media 
portrayal of the free and liberated 'West' set against a oppressive and barbaric 'Africa', 
`East' or 'Muslim World'. It intensifies each time I tell a new acquaintance that part of 
my research is concerned with critiquing the feminist linking of FGC and 'Western' 
practices such as cosmetic surgery as analogous and I elicit a response along the lines 
of, 'Well of course they're different, FGC is about coercion and force and cosmetic 
surgery is about active choice'. 
It is at these moments, in particular, that I am forced to consider the political effects and 
question the ethical implications of my work. I sometimes wonder if I should really be 
focusing my efforts on critiquing feminist strategies which earnestly seek to break down 
culturally essentialist and racist binaries. Will my critique be (mis)interpreted as a move 
intended to reinstate the very problematic dualisms feminists seek to upset? I have 
often then reminded myself that my intention is not to criticise the project of 
interrogating racist and culturally essentialist binaries, which I see my work as 
advocating and pursuing. Rather, I seek to critique the problematic aspects of specific 
theoretical models employed to upset such binaries, with the aim of improving those 
methods or developing more effective ones. 
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Conclusions and Outline of Chapters 
In this chapter I have set out my argument that the feminist technique of drawing links 
across different cultural practices in the service of anti-cultural essentialism, while 
potentially effective in highlighting the instability of imperialising binaries, does not 
move the analysis sufficiently beyond the problems that these binaries entail. Instead, 
through constructing 'fundamental' similarities between embodied practices, such 
comparative approaches risk effacing social, historical and embodied particularities and 
reinscribing dominant discursive hierarchies. Similarity-based cross-cultural 
approaches should not, therefore, be the end-point or overarching focus of effective 
feminist analyses. Through the examination of three in depth case studies - each of 
which interrogates the linking of a different pair or collection of salient cultural 
practices or figures - this thesis explores how the problems associated with feminist 
cross-cultural approaches play out in specific contexts. Attempting to do what I suggest 
others should, I take these examples as a starting point for thinking through the 
constitutive relations between particular practices, subjects and histories. While I focus 
on illustrating the ways in which various comparative feminist approaches produce 
similar problematic effects, I recognise that cross-cultural strategies are diverse, and do 
not seek to lump them all within the same (essentialising) category. As such, I also pay 
careful attention to the ways in which these approaches, as well as the locations and 
political agendas of particular theorists, differ. 
In Chapter Two, I outline and explore the conceptual tools I draw on throughout the 
thesis. My analysis engages with Black feminist approaches to intersectionality, 
postcolonial and queer perspectives on relationality and feminist frameworks for 
thinking about embodiment. I consider how these various (overlapping) literatures 
complement one another in fruitful ways and also productively illustrate one another's 
limitations. The chapter as a whole fleshes out a critical feminist framework for 
addressing the various techniques employed to link embodied practices and their 
imagined subjects within feminist and other critical literatures. 
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In Chapter Three, I provide an in depth mapping of the kinds of comparisons made 
between FGC and practices such as cosmetic surgery, intersex operations and 
nineteenth century American clitoridectomies. Two key critiques of the continuum and 
analogue approaches are presented. First, because these models privilege gender and 
sexuality, they tend to efface the operation of other axes of embodied differentiation, 
namely race, cultural difference and nation. As such, the continuum and analogue 
approaches often reproduce problematic relationships between race and gender whilst 
failing to address the implicit and problematic role that race, cultural difference and 
nation continue to play in such models. This erasure of these axes, I contend, is linked 
to the construction of a 'Western' empathetic gaze. This is my second key critique. 
The desire on the part of theorists working in the West to establish cross-cultural 
`empathy' through models which stress similarity and solidarity often conceals the 
continuing operation of geo-political relations of power and privilege. 
In Chapter Four, I explore how links between 'race passing', 'gender passing' and 
`sexuality passing' have been highlighted by critical theorists. Many of these authors 
adopt a 'subset model', which functions to encompass various passing practices within 
a single performative sphere. Unlike theorists who compare 'African' female genital 
cutting with 'Western' body modifications, these authors do not seek specifically to 
disrupt culturally essentialist First world/Third world, West/non-West binaries. 
However, in common with the previous case study, they are all interested in disrupting 
essentialist constructions of race, gender and sexuality as 'natural', ontological 
categories. I argue that, through subsuming a vast array of embodied cultural practices 
in the realm of 'the same', the subset approach often does not adequately address the 
relational, intersectional nature of passing and the important social and historical 
distinctions between different passing practices. Moreover, due to a problematic 
reliance on registers of visibility, the subset model can result in the fetishisation of 
particular 'passing' subjects. I suggest that an approach which focuses on historicising 
the relational construction of various passing practices may provide a more effective 
framework for theorising constitutive links without occluding or fetishising 
particularities. 
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In Chapter Five, I examine some of the similarities between attempts to link Muslim 
veiling with anorexia and/or 'Western' beauty practices and those comparisons between 
embodied practices made in the previous two case studies. I provide a mapping of the 
literature, showing how, in employing the analogue, continuum and subset approaches, 
authors risk producing many of the same problematic effects, such as making 
superficial claims of 'sameness' and failing to interrogate 'Western' privilege 
effectively. The main thrust of the chapter, however, is on theorising the ways in which 
the figures of 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman' have been produced relationally, 
and are hence constitutively connected. Drawing on historical and contemporary 
literatures, I highlight the ways in which the figures of 'the Western woman' and 'the 
Muslim woman' and 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman' have always been open to 
reformation and reconstruction, and hence cannot be fixed. 
In Chapter Six, I offer a 'relational web approach' as an alternative to the analogue, 
continuum and subset models. I argue that in order to move through the phase of 
discursive disruption and towards radical resignification, it is important to imagine each 
pair of mutually constructed cultural figures or practices as part of a larger 
representational economy. Employing examples from each case study chapter, I 
illustrate how we might begin weaving relational webs that map complex, intersectional 
relations between multiple 'selves' and 'others' and theorise both particularity and 
connection. Moreover, through locating binaries within a broader web of signification -
in which the categories of 'self' and 'other' are both multiple and shifting - the web 
approach presents the possibility of resignifying such binaries. 
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Chapter Two: 
Theorising Intersectionality, Relationality and 
Embodiment 
Developing a Critical Feminist Framework 
It makes no sense to hint at the superimposing and intersecting aspects of class, race 
and gender in the world of individual experience without being able to specify how and 
by what means class, race, and gender are constituted as social categories. 
Corelina Klinger, 2003:25 cited in Knapp, 2005:259 
If gender is constructed, could it be constructed differently, or does its constructedness 
imply some folin of social determinism, foreclosing the possibility of agency and 
transformation? 
Judith Butler, 1999/1990:11 
This chapter introduces and examines the conceptual tools I employ throughout the 
thesis. In Chapter One, I argued that feminist approaches which attempt to link various 
embodied practices across cultures are problematic when they fail to theorise the 
historical, political and cultural differences between such practices effectively. When 
these approaches collapse into an economy of sameness they do not succeed in 
disrupting essentialist self/other binaries through which embodied cultural practices are 
(re)produced. Thus, the key question guiding this chapter is, what tools and 
frameworks can we draw on to theorise the particularity of specific practices and their 
imagined subjects - as well as the links between them - without falling into the traps of 
cultural essentialism or disembodied, ahistorical sameness? 
My analysis engages with Black feminist approaches to intersectionality, postcolonial 
and queer perspectives on relationality and feminist frameworks for thinking about 
embodiment. Drawing on a selection of key texts, I examine the critical tools each set 
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of literature offers my own project while also exploring their limitations. My focus 
throughout is on mapping the fruitful ways in which intersectionality, relationality and 
embodiment overlap with, complement and critique one another. The overlaps are 
illustrated by my own citing of particular theorists across these categories and my 
selection of texts for discussion, such as those of Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991, 
2002), Judith Butler (1999/1990, 1992, 1993, 2004a), and Sara Ahmed (2000, 2004a), 
which straddle and productively integrate insights from two or more of these areas of 
critical analysis. Through probing both the differences between such literatures and the 
ways in which they merge and intersect, I aim to flesh out a critical, feminist 
epistemology and methodology for addressing how particular embodied practices and 
their imagined subjects have been linked within feminist literatures. This interpretive 
framework will infonn my analysis in both the critical case study chapters and the 
reconstructive concluding chapter, where I set out an alternative approach. 
Intersectionality: Black Feminist Thought 
Intersectionality was initiated through Black feminists' 24 powerful critiques of white, 
middle-class bias within mainstream feminist theory and practice in North America and 
Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. 25 It finds its roots in political projects such as 
that of the Combahee River Collective, a black lesbian feminist organisation from 
Boston which emphasised the problems with privileging one dimension of experience 
of oppression (gender) above and beyond other axes (such as race and sexuality). In 
their 'Black Feminist Statement', the group discussed the combined racial, sexual, 
24 I employ the label 'Black feminist' to signify a particular political position and perspective, rather than 
a fixed embodied identity category. 
2  It is important to acknowledge that the history and development of feminist approaches to 
intersectionality differ in other geo-political contexts. This is partly because categories of social and 
embodied differentiation, such as gender, race, sexuality, class and gender, do not retain the same 
meaning across different cultural contexts. Bahovec and Hemmings (2004) explore the ways in which 
the meaning of concepts such as sex and gender are 'context specific across space and time' (334). 
Moreover, Knapp (2005) has addressed how the Anglo-American triad of `race-class-gender' does not 
hold the same resonance in the German context. `Rasse is a category that cannot be used in an 
affirmative way in Germany', she explains: 'it is neither possible to ascribe a Rasse to others nor is it 
acceptable to use Rasse as a basis for identity claims, which by comparison is a common practice in the 
United States' (256). 
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heterosexual and class oppressions facing black women and stressed the importance of 
`the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major 
systems of oppression are interlocking' (Combahee River Collective, 1997/1977:272). 
The Collective's criticism of mainstream feminism's narrow (and unacknowledged) 
focus on white, middle-class experience was developed by numerous other Black 
feminists in the 1980s and onwards. Hazel Carby's 'White Woman Listen! Black 
Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood' (1982) provided a critique of key feminist 
analytical concepts such as 'patriarchy', 'the family' and 'reproduction', illustrating 
how each privileged gender over other social divisions, such as race, in a permanent 
hierarchy of social divisions. Other landmark texts such as Angela Davis's Women, 
Race and Class (1981), Gayatri Spivak's 'French Feminism in an International Frame' 
(1981), bell hooks' Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism (1982) and Feminist 
Theory: From Margin to Center (1984), Barbara Smith's Home Girls: A Black Feminist 
Anthology (1983), Audre Lorde's Sister Outsider (1984), Cherrie Moraga and Gloria 
Anzald? a' s This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color (1981), 
Anzald? a's La Frontera/Borderlands (1987) and Patricia Hill Collins' Black Feminist 
Thought (1990) contributed to a fundamental `decentring' of mainstream feminism's 
`normative subject' and underscored the need for analyses of women's particularities to 
address interlocking structures of oppression. 
The coining of the term `intersectionality' is most often attributed to the African 
American feminist legal theorist Kimberle Crenshaw. In two widely cited articles, 
`Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Class' (1989) and 'Mapping the 
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Women of Color' (1991), Crenshaw 
drew on and developed earlier Black feminist analyses to craft a potent critique of the 
treatment of race and gender as 'mutually exclusive categories of experience and 
analysis' within both feminist theory and antiracist politics (1989:139). While 
Crenshaw's articles were published nearly twenty years ago and several other feminist 
theorists have developed intersectional approaches in recent years, I focus on her texts 
47 
because of the enormous influence they have had, and continue to have, in the field of 
intersectionality and feminist studies more broadly. 26 
Employing American antidiscrimination law as a case study, Crenshaw (1989) 
illustrates how dominant conceptions of discrimination problematically frame 
subordination within 'single-axis frameworks' (139): 'In other words, in race 
discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terns of sex-or class-
privileged Blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus is on race-and class-privileged 
women' (140). Such single axis approaches, she argues, are also perpetuated in both 
feminist and antiracist politics which organise under the vectors of 'gender' and 'race' 
respectively. Through these frameworks Black women's particular experiences of 
oppression, produced through the interaction of race and gender (as well as other axes 
such as class), are elided. Stressing that 'intersectional experience is greater than the 
sum of racism and sexism', Crenshaw underlines the difficulty with simply adding (or 
subtracting) the multiple oppressions Black women face through the analogy of a traffic 
intersection: 
Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it 
may flow in another... if a Black woman is harmed because she is in an intersection, 
her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination. But it is not 
always easy to reconstruct an accident: Sometimes the skid marks and the injuries 
simply indicate that they occurred simultaneously, frustrating efforts to determine 
which driver caused the halm (149). 
While black women experience the complex coimbrication of race and gender in their 
daily lives, she emphasises, neither feminist theory nor antiracist politics seem prepared 
or equipped to address such intersectionality in any rigorous and sustained manner. 
Crenshaw offers several compelling examples of why the failure to address 
intersectionality within feminist theory matters to the types of analyses it produces. For 
instance, feminist discourses on rape, she argues, have routinely applied a single-axis 
framework of gender, thus taking white women's experiences as the noun and failing to 
26 For examples of feminist texts which draw on Crenshaw's analyses see Butler, 1997a; Narayan, 1997; 
Knapp, 2005; McCall, 2005; Zack, 2005. 
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consider how complex histories of racism make black women's experiences of sexual 
violence qualitatively different. While feminists rightly criticise the role that law has 
played in establishing the bounds of normative sexuality and in regulating female sexual 
behaviour, they often fail to acknowledge, Crenshaw argues, that rape statutes do not 
merely reflect 'male control of female sexuality' but specifically 'white male regulation 
of white female sexuality' (italics in original) (157). A feminist account of rape which 
is sensitive to Black women's experiences, she suggests, needs to account for the fact 
that, in contrast to white women, there has been no institutional effort to regulate Black 
female chastity and that, in fact, 'courts in some states have gone as far to instruct juries 
that, unlike white women, Black women were not presumed to be chaste' (157). While 
attempts to regulate women's sexuality put 'unchaste' (white) women outside the law's 
protection, Black women were always already constructed as `unrapeable': 'When 
Black women were raped by white males, they were being raped not as women 
generally, but as Black women specifically: Their femaleness made them sexually 
vulnerable to racist domination, while their Blackness effectively denied them any 
protection' (161). Therefore, feminism's 'singular focus on rape as a manifestation of 
male power over female sexuality', Crenshaw argues, 'tends to eclipse the use of rape 
as a weapon of racial terror' (161). Bringing the specificities of sexual violence into 
focus, she maintains, necessitates an intersectional analysis, which foregrounds histories 
of gendered racial prejudice.27 
Since the publication of Crenshaw's texts, many other feminist theorists have developed 
analyses of intersectionality and interlocking oppressions. For example, in Inessential 
Woman (1990), feminist philosopher Elizabeth Spelman analyses the texts of founding 
second wave feminist theorists such as Kate Millet, Shulamith Firestone, Betty Friedan 
27 In an article published two years later, Crenshaw (1991) extends her analysis of how race and gender 
interact in black women's experiences of violence, employing domestic violence and rape as case studies. 
In both cases, she emphasises, linear feminist or antiracist analyses which fail to address the ways in 
which 'systems of race, gender and class domination converge' produce inadequate theories of violence 
against black women and lead to ineffective interventions (1246). Single-axis frameworks also constitute 
counter-productive resistance strategies for feminist and anti-racist politics as 'the failure of feminism to 
interrogate race means that the resistance strategies of feminism will often replicate and reinforce the 
subordination of people of color, and the failure of antiracism to interrogate patriarchy means that 
antiracism will frequently reproduce the subordination of women' (1252). 
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and Mary Daly to illustrate the problems associated with additive analyses of gender 
and race that privilege one as more fundamental than the other. She argues that 'as long 
as race is taken to be independent of sex, racism as independent of sexism, we are 
bound to give seriously misleading descriptions of gender and sexual relations' (117). 
It remains crucial for feminism to address 'how one form of oppression is experienced 
is influenced by and influences how another form is experienced' (123). Furthermore, 
in 'Difference, Diversity and Differentiation' (1996), Avtar Brah argues that 'structures 
of class, racism, gender and sexuality cannot be treated as "independent variables" 
because the oppression of each is described in the other — is constituted by and is 
constitutive of the other' (12). From Brah's perspective, 'it is imperative that we do not 
compartmentalize oppressions, but instead formulate strategies for challenging all 
oppressions on the basis of an understanding of how they interconnect and articulate' 
(19). In a more recent publication, 'Ain't I A Woman? Revisiting Intersectionality' 
(2004), Brah and Ann Phoenix employ a broader perspective on intersectionality which 
encompasses the articulation of multiple axes of social differentiation within numerous 
overlapping frames of social analysis, including the 'economic, political, cultural, 
psychic, subjective and experiential' in 'historically specific contexts' (76). From this 
perspective, intersectionality signifies not only the importance of multiaxial analysis, 
but also the necessity of an interdisciplinary feminist framework. 
Intersectionality has today become a central category of analysis within feminist theory. 
As Leslie McCall (2005) comments, 'One could even say that intersectionality is the 
most important theoretical contribution that women's studies, in conjunction with other 
fields, has made so far' (1771). Despite (or perhaps because of) intersectionality's 
pervasiveness, some have argued that the era of intersectionality is now over (see, for 
example, Zack, 2005): that the concerns regarding mainstream (white) feminism's 
problematic privileging of gender have been taken on board within feminist theory and 
practice and hence are now outmoded. As Malini Johar Schueller (2005) comments, 
`The consensus seems to be that the kinds of challenges posed by Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak in her landmark 1981 essay "French Feminism in an International Frame" or 
even later by bell hooks in her book Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre (1984) 
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have now been met' (63): 'It seems anachronistic, therefore, to name a project of 
universalism within white feminist theory today' (64). Like Schueller, however, I 
would argue that many of the intersectional critiques raised by Black and other critical 
feminists from the 1970s onward remain cogent today. 
In response to Black feminist critique (as well as criticisms on the part of feminists 
speaking from 'lesbian', 'working class' and other 'marginal' locations), mainstream 
feminism has clearly made significant progress in its efforts to interrogate white, 
heterosexual, middle class privilege. Postmodernist and poststructuralist feminist 
critiques have also contributed to feminism's thoroughgoing deconstruction of the 
category 'woman' (see, for example, Flax, 1987; Heiman, 1990; Butler, 1999/1990, 
1992; Ahmed, 1998). 28 Yet, as I will argue in relation to the feminist cross-cultural 
approaches I address in my case study chapters, and in my assessment of feminist 
embodiment theory later on in this chapter, many feminist analyses continue to assume 
(in advance) that gender is privileged over and above other axes of social differentiation 
and/or treat gender and other axes, such as race, analogically. 29  
From this perspective, I want to argue that it is perhaps precisely because (the notion of) 
`intersectionality' has become so central to mainstream feminist theory that it has now 
come to function, in many texts, as merely a theoretical shorthand for the importance of 
acknowledging 'difference' — a shorthand which actually precludes sustained critique of 
frameworks which problematically privilege one axis of differentiation and rigorous, 
historical analysis of articulating axes of social differentiation and oppression. As 
Gudrun-Alexi Knapp (2005) asserts, the reification of 'race-class-gender' into a formula 
to be sign-posted in any feminist criticism, 'being largely stripped of the baggage of 
28 Clearly, as an intersectional approach would emphasise, 'Black feminists', 'lesbian feminists', 
`working class feminists' and `postmodernist feminists' are not mutually exclusive categories. 
29 In this vein, Schueller (2005) argues that influential critical feminist texts which continue to be highly 
salient within feminist theory and practice, including Gayle Rubin's 'Thinking Sex' (1984) and Donna 
Haraway's 'A Cyborg Manifesto' (1990), 'offer the dominant paradigm for the imperialist incorporation 
of women of color in contemporary gender and sexuality studies: incorporation by analogy' (65). While 
Haraway's more recent text, Modest_Witness (1997) as well as Judith Butler's Bodies that Matter (1993) 
further 'feminist theory's investigation of race', she suggests, 'they simultaneously continue to include 
race analogically' (65). 
51 
concretion, of context and history, has been a condition of possibility of its acceleration' 
(254-5). The dual message this formula signals 'is "I'm well informed" and "I'm 
politically correct". By just mentioning other "differences" besides "gender", the work 
to be done continues to be delegated to the respective "others"' (255). From this 
standpoint, it is not the case that the concerns raised by intersectionality are now 
anachronistic, but rather, that they remain pressing and yet are often still suppressed. In 
this vein, Brah and Phoenix (2004) insist that 'understanding complexities posed by 
intersections of different axes of differentiation is as pressing today as it has always 
been' (75). 
I want to suggest, therefore, that on the one hand, the brand of intersectionality that 
simply announces its 'position' or pays lip service to the race-class-gender triad needs 
to be discontinued within feminist studies as its engagement with particularity remains 
much too superficial and simplistic. On the other hand, we need to examine how the 
most valuable insights of intersectionality theory can be integrated more substantively 
within feminist analysis. Intersectionality's interrogation of linear analyses which 
privilege one single dimension of experience, its critique of additive and analogous 
approaches to evaluating discrimination and oppression, its disruption of 'women' (and 
other founding categories) as universalist constructions, and its advocacy of multi-axial 
analyses of interlocking oppressions which foreground the importance of historical 
context all signal its usefulness as a conceptual tool for theorising particularity in 
regards to cultural groups, subjects and practices. 
Feminist approaches to intersectionality, however, encounter various limitations. 
Firstly, intersectional perspectives provide in depth examinations of the intertwinement 
of different axes of social differentiation in the production of particular subjects and/or 
groups and their experiences of oppression. Yet they do not always provide the same 
close investigation of how particular subjects and/or groups are constituted through 
relations with other subjects and groups, or, in other words, how categories of 'self' and 
`other' are constituted relationally through intersectional processes in which multiple 
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axes of social differentiation articulate. 3° Intersectionality may therefore not be fully 
equipped to theorise the discursive and material connections between specific subjects, 
groups and practices in conjunction with their individual particularities. Furthermore, 
in suggesting that analysis of the intersection of multiple axes of differentiation is 
necessary to avoid excluding particular subj ectivities and experiences, intersectional 
approaches can become susceptible to their own critiques. In short, they become 
vulnerable to being accused of leaving out a crucial variable and thus not being 
intersectional enough. Finally, some intersectional approaches do not provide rigorous 
analysis of how particular essentialist identity categories and binaries might be 
productively disrupted and resignified, and instead tend towards maintaining such 
categories and relations. Without the possibility of disruption, it becomes difficult to 
contemplate how the violence and oppression (re)produced through the exclusive and 
hierarchical constitution of categories of embodied differentiation might be resisted. 
In the sections to follow I explore how feminist intersectional perspectives might be 
enhanced, and indeed transformed, through (further) taking on board some of the 
insights and methodologies of postcolonial and queer perspectives on relationality as 
well as feminist perspectives on embodiment. To be clear, my intention is not to 
construct a linear 'narrative of relentless progress' in which feminist thought moves 
from the radical Black feminist critiques of the 1980s towards the more 'sophisticated' 
and 'complex' poststructuralist critiques of the 1990s and beyond (Hemmings, 2005: 
115-116). Within this dominant narrative, 'feminist poststructuralist theorists are 
repeatedly positioned as the first to deconstruct "woman", and often as 'heroic in 
surpassing past mistakes' (116) whilst Black feminist critique (like radical and lesbian 
feminist discourses) is implicitly posed as overly simplistic and/or redundant. 31 In fact, 
30 It should be acknowledged, however, that some feminist approaches to intersectionality have usefully 
emphasised the importance of tracing the relational social and historical processes through which 
particular categories have been produced and reified. Hazel Carby (1987), for example, examines how 
norms of white and black femininity in the antebellum American South were constructed relationally 
through 'two very different but interdependent codes of sexuality' which produced 'opposing definitions 
of motherhood and womanhood for white and black women which coalesce in the figures of the slave and 
the mistress' (20). 
31 Again, 'Black', 'radical' and 'lesbian' feminism should clearly not be taken as discrete categories but 
rather as political designations which overlap and intersect. 
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I position Black feminism as pioneering complex critiques of mainstream feminisms' 
universalist nonnative subject which remain germane today. I argue, in turn, that queer 
and feminist perspectives on relationality and embodiment can be enriched through 
further integrating particular insights of intersectionality theory. In this next section I 
stage an encounter between intersectionality and relationality. 
Relationality: Postcolonial and Queer Perspectives 
Crenshaw's analogy of a traffic intersection with two lines of traffic (race and gender) 
colliding and becoming enmeshed enables us to envision the structural articulation of 
race and gender oppression experienced by black women. In her later text, Crenshaw 
employs a similar analogy of 'two tracks' intersecting to represent black women's 
experience of the coimbrication of racism and sexism (1991:1278). Yet what both 
models are less able to offer is an incorporated way of theorising how particular 
intersections might be linked or connected to other intersections. 'While Black women's 
experience, subjectivity or identity is constructed through the coimbrication of race and 
gender, it is also constituted through ongoing social and discursive relations with other 
groups of women, such as white women, Hispanic women or Arabic women, whose 
experiences are also produced through intersections of race and gender. How can we 
theorise the particularities of each group as well as their constitutive relationship to one 
another? 
It should be acknowledged that Crenshaw concentrates on black women 'as the starting 
point' for her analysis of intersectionality as a means to show how the use of single-axis 
frameworks in both feminist and antiracist politics function to 'erase Black women' 
(1989:140). She seeks to 'contrast the multidimensionality of Black women's 
experience with the single-axis analysis that distorts these experiences' (139). The 
problem, however, is that in focusing almost exclusively on how racism intersects with 
sexism in black women's experiences of oppression, and leaving largely unexplored the 
ways in which black women's intersectional experiences are materially and discursively 
contingent with those of other groups of women, she risks (unintentionally) reifying the 
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essentialist notion that race has 'something to do with the presence of Black people' 
(Brah, 1996:8-9). What is notable about Crenshaw's traffic intersection analogy and 
her image of 'two tracks intersecting' is that both models leave the roadway or tracks 
intact — they are fixed at the beginning and remain untransformed throughout. Within 
this framework, 'black women', it would seem, are always oppressed through the 
imbrication of race and gender and are produced and defined as a coherent category as 
such. 
From this perspective, we need not simply a critique of how 'woman' is universalised 
within mainstream feminism through the exclusion or effacement of black (and other 
minority) women's experiences, but also an in depth account of how a construction of 
`woman' which narrowly reflects white, middle-class women's experiences requires 
black femininity as its constitutive 'other'. Or, in relation to the FGC/cosmetic surgery 
binary, we need an account of how 'the victim of female genital mutilation' represents 
`the cosmetic surgery's consumer's' founding surrogate self, even while the two 
practices are posed as fundamentally separate and discrete. As Meyda Yegenoglo 
(1998) puts it, 'what is at stake is not merely an unveiling of the subject's abstract 
universal pretensions, but also a demonstration of the fact that its illusory self-
production is a denial of relationality, complexity and dependence on the other' (7-8). 
As I will discuss, theorising both particularity and relationality in this way is also 
crucial to the project of disrupting essentialist binaries. In order to resignify binary 
structures we need to understand and illustrate how they are (re)formed and operate in 
various contexts. It is in these senses that encounters between Black feminist theories 
of intersectionality and postcolonial feminist approaches to relationality have been (and 
could be increasingly) productive. 32 
One of the first (and certainly the most prominent and widely cited) texts to develop a 
postcolonial perspective on relationality was Edward Said's Orientalism (1978). Said 
32 Relationality has obviously also been theorised extensively from other disciplinary perspectives, such 
as critical anthropology, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxist economics, which I do not draw on 
explicitly in this chapter. Furtheimore, various queer and feminist perspectives on relationality have also 
been developed, which I address in later sections. 
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argued that 'the Orient' was essentially a 'constituted entity' (322), produced 
`politically, socially, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively' through 
Western (and non-Western) practices of Orientalist scholarship and cultural production 
(3). 'The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe', he claimed, 'it is also...one of its 
deepest and most recurring images of the Other' (1). This binary relationship between 
`the West' and 'the Orient' represented a 'relationship of power' (5) through which 
`European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient 
as a sort of surrogate and even underground self(3). Said's analysis of Orientalism has 
since been expanded, developed and criticised by feminist theorists working from a 
postcolonial perspective. Drawing on the legacy of Black feminist critique, feminist 
critics have focused on the ways in which Orientalist and imperial discourses were 
(re)produced intersectionally through the articulation of sex and gender with race, 
nation, and cultural difference (among other axes). 33 Yegenoglo, for example, argues 
that in order to understand the complex patterns of signification that constitute 
Orientalism we need to examine 'how the discursive constitution of Otherness is 
achieved simultaneously through sexual as well as cultural modes of differentiation' 
(1998:1-2). She suggests that because Orientalism produces and depends on a 
metonymic association between the Orient and its women, 'the process of 
Orientalization of the Orient is one that intermingles with its feminization. The 
interlocking of the representation of cultural and sexual difference is secured through 
mapping the discourse of Orientalism onto the phallocentric discourse of femininity' 
(italics mine) (73). 
Among the most influential feminist texts offering a productive amalgamation of 
intersectionality theory and postcolonial perspectives on relationality is Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty's seminal article, 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and 
Colonial Discourses' (1991). 34 Her focus on the discursive construction of embodied 
cultural practices and her critique of cultural essentialism within cross-cultural 
33 See Spivak, 1988; Mohanty, 1991; Aziz, 1992; Grewal and Kaplan, 1994; McClintock, 1995; Brah, 
1996; Yegenoglo, 1998; Ahmed, 2000, 2004a; Lewis and Mills, 2003; Lewis R., 2004 and Lewis G., 
2006. 
34 Mohanty first published a version of this article in 1984, following up with a revised version in 1988 
and a subsequent version in 1991 which I draw on here. 
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comparisons make her text particularly relevant to my own project. Mohanty 
interrogates the discursive colonization which is achieved through 'the production of 
the "third world woman" as a singular monolithic subject' in various Western feminist 
texts (51). She argues that such colonization is produced in these texts through the 
imposition of cross-cultural frameworks which problematically privilege 'sexual 
difference' in the form of a 'singular, monolithic notion of patriarchy or male 
dominance' (53). For example, Fran Hosken's (1981) analysis of 'female genital 
mutilation' in Africa, Mohanty argues, employs an essentialist concept of patriarchal 
oppression to define 'African women' as 'archetypal victims' (56). The problem with 
these types of analyses, she maintains, is that it is assumed that women 'are already 
constituted as sexual-political subjects prior to their entry into the arena of social 
relations' (59). Yet, in fact, women are also 'produced through these very relations' 
(59). Concepts such as 'gendered violence' and 'the sexual division of labour' are only 
helpful, Mohanty argues, 'if they are generated through local contextual analyses' (68). 
If such concepts are treated as if they are universally relevant, she stresses, 'the resultant 
homogenization of class, race, religious and daily material practices of women in the 
third world can create a false sense of the commonality of oppressions, interests and 
struggles between and among women globally' (68). 
While Mohanty's analysis is intersectional, it also utilises a relational postcolonial 
framework of critique. Situating Western feminist academic production within `the 
context of the global hegemony of Western feminist scholarship,' (55) she emphasises 
that linear Western feminist analyses which produce images of 'Third world women' 
also implicitly produce corresponding representations of 'Western women'. She seeks 
to 'draw attention to the similar effects of various textual strategies used by writers 
which codify Others as non-Western and hence themselves as (implicitly) Western' 
(52). What is shared by the various texts Mohanty critiques is that they each 'take as 
their referent feminist interests as they have been articulated in the US and Western 
Europe' (51). They all set up their 'own authorial subjects as the implicit referent, i.e. 
the yardstick by which to encode and represent cultural Others' (55). As in other 
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`Orientalist' discourses, representations of 'the other' thus function in these texts to 
define a privileged image of `the self. As Mohanty explains, 
A homogenous notion of the oppression of third world women as a group is assumed 
which 'produces the image of an "average third world women" who 'leads an 
essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and 
her being "third-world" (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, 
family oriented, victimized etc.) This... is in contrast to the (implicit) self-presentation 
of Western women as educated, as modern, as having control over their own bodies and 
sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions (56). 
`Without the "third world woman', Mohanty stresses, the particular self-presentation 
of Western women as privileged and liberated 'would be problematical...the one 
enables and sustains the other' (74). 
Postcolonial feminist perspectives both draw on and enhance intersectional approaches 
by tracing the ways in which embodied identity categories such as 'black' and 'white', 
`East' and 'West', 'Muslim women' and 'non-Muslim women', 'Third world women' 
and 'First world women' are relationally (re)produced through specific circuits of 
power in which multiple axes of differentiation intersect and articulate. They situate 
intersectional, raced gender relations within the context of global power relations 35 and 
place emphasis on the operations and effects of discursive representation in both 
reifying and resisting dominant material relations of power. As Mohanty says of her 
own perspective, 'the focus is not just on the intersections of race, class, gender, nation 
and sexuality in different communities of women but on the mutuality and 
coimplications, which suggests an attentiveness to the interweaving of the histories of 
these communities' (2002:522). Feminist perspectives which combine Black feminist 
theories of intersectionality and postcolonial feminist approaches to relationality can, 
from this standpoint, trace and illuminate 'the historical and experiential specificities 
and differences of women's lives as well as the historical and experiential connections 
35 Mohanty problematises her earlier construction of 'Western hegemony' in 'Under Western Eyes 
Revisited' (2002): 'Within the United States, the European Community, and Japan as the nodes of 
capitalist power in the twenty first century, the increasing proliferation of Third and Fourth Worlds within 
the national borders of these countries, as well as the rising visibility and struggles for sovereignty by 
First Nations/indigenous peoples around the world, Western and Third World explain much less than the 
categorizations North/South or One-Third/Two-Third Worlds' (italics in original) (505). 
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between women from different national, racial and cultural communities' (italics mine) 
(522). 
Yet despite these strengths, much of this intersectional postcolonial literature fails to 
interrogate assumptions of heterosexuality. Before I discuss this problem however, I 
want to take a brief detour to consider how it relates to another (broader) limitation of 
intersectionality theory. That is, in suggesting that analyses should always assess the 
intersections of multiple axes of oppression in order to avoid excluding particular 
experiences, intersectionality becomes susceptible to its own critiques. It has, for a 
number of years now, been the ultimate feminist 'trump card' to declare someone's 
work 'problematic' or 'lacking' because s/he has missed out a crucial axis of 
differentiation. As it is impossible to ever produce an analysis which is fully 
comprehensive or inclusive of every axis of differentiation, critiques can always be 
made on the basis of 'absence'. Judith Butler (1999/1990) refers to this problem as the 
dilemma of the 'embarrassed "etc"': 'theories of feminist identity that elaborate 
predicates of color, sexuality, ethnicity, class and able-bodiedness invariably close with 
an embarrassed "etc" at the end of the list. Through this horizontal trajectory of 
adjectives, these positions strive to encompass a situated subject, but invariably fail to 
be complete' (182). 
In this sense, it is easy to pick out variables which are absent from particular 
intersectional feminist analyses. Meaningful discussion of how sexuality factors in 
black women's lives is, for example, notably missing in Crenshaw's articles. While 
Crenshaw argues that single-axis analyses in feminist and antiracist discourses erase 
black women's experiences, it could be argued that her own analysis elides lesbian, 
bisexual and transgender women's (and men's) stories because her two vector model 
excludes examination of how sexuality makes a difference in their lives. However, we 
could similarly note that Crenshaw's analysis fails to engage with a (potentially endless) 
number of other axes, such as religion, ability, age etc. Moreover, this critique could be 
made of my own analysis in this thesis. Critiquing any text simply on the basis of what 
it leaves out, therefore, does not provide a particularly cogent or useful strategy on its 
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own. What is valuable and crucial, I would argue, is examining the effects of particular 
repeated elisions and/or privilegings. Identifying what sorts of categories, practices and 
subjectivities are reified through repeated occlusions of particular embodied axes of 
differentiation, and in turn, what categories, practices and subjectivities are 
marginalised or occluded through the ontological privileging of particular variables 
remains an important task. 
While I would not argue that sexuality is the one crucial variable missing from 
Crenshaw's analysis, her lack of attention to sexuality seems particularly problematic 
given that her focus is on sexual violence. Crenshaw is clearly aware of this omission 
in her work. In her later article she acknowledges that factors she addresses 'only in 
part or not at all, such as class and sexuality, are often critical in shaping the 
experiences of women of color' (1991:1244). 'My focus on the intersections of race 
and gender', she explains, 'only highlights the need to account for multiple grounds of 
identity when considering how the social world is constructed' (1244). Yet, in this 
same text, she makes some problematic statements which appear to reveal a profound 
lack of awareness regarding how sexuality may structure the lives of women and men 
who do not identify as heterosexual. For example, in discussing the ways in which race 
and gender often conflict in black women's experiences, she claims that 'The need to 
split one's political energies between two sometimes opposing groups is a dimension of 
intersectional disempowerment that men of color and white women seldom confront' 
(1251-2). In neglecting to acknowledge the ways in which, for example, gay, bisexual 
and transgender men of color (as well as lesbian, bisexual and transgender white 
women) may experience significant conflicts between race (as well as, for example, 
religion) and sexuality, Crenshaw not only erases their particularity, but also reifies 
heterosexuality as the norm. Later on in this text Crenshaw comments that when 
identity politics 'fail' women of color, 'it is not primarily because those politics take as 
"natural" certain categories that are socially constructed' but rather because 'the 
descriptive content of those categories and the narratives on which they are based have 
privileged some experiences and excluded others' (1297). It may be true that the 
negative value attributed to the categories of 'black' and 'female' (in relation to their 
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positive value accorded to 'white' and 'male') may, in some contexts, seem more 
damaging to women of color than the presumed naturalness of such categories. Yet 
Crenshaw's statement fails to acknowledge how lesbian or bisexual women of colour 
experience oppression precisely because their sexual subjectivity is deemed 'unnatural' 
in relation to constructions of heterosexuality as 'natural'. As Butler (2004a) argues in 
her analysis of heterosexual normativity, being called unnatural or 'unreal can be not 
only a means of social control but a form of dehumanizing violence' (217). 'To be 
called unreal', she maintains, 'and to have that call, as it were, institutionalized as a 
form of differential treatment, is to become the other against which the human is made' 
(217-218).36 
While performing a careful, in depth analysis of the relationships between two axes of 
differentiation may yield important insights which would not have been possible 
through a broader analysis of multiple vectors, such insights need not come at the cost 
of reifying other embodied identity categories in problematic ways. As Siobhan 
Somerville (2000) underscores, 'the challenge is to recognize the instability of multiple 
categories of difference simultaneously rather than to assume the fixity of one to 
establish the complexity of the other' (5). Theorists seeking to employ intersectional 
approaches, therefore, need to pay careful attention to, and become accountable for, the 
potential effects of repeatedly eliding particular vectors. When sexuality, for example, 
is consistently left out of intersectional analyses we need to ask what specific histories, 
processes or effects might be obscured from view, and in turn, what stereotypes or 
dominant categories (such as heterosexuality) might be fixed or reified. In this respect, 
I want to argue that feminist intersectional postcolonial perspectives might be enhanced 
through taking on board some of the key insights of queer approaches to relationality. 37 
36  Thi s failure to actively interrogate heteronormativity is reproduced in some postcolonial texts. While 
Said's analysis of Orientalism has been interrogated on the grounds that it does not deal effectively with 
gender, it has also been criticised for reifying heterosexuality. For example, Joseph Boone (2001) argues 
that Said's analysis of colonialist erotics remains 'ensconced in conspicuously heterosexual interpretive 
frameworks' (44). 
37 I am using the term 'queer' broadly here to refer to critical literature which critiques binary 
constructions of heterosexuality and homosexuality as well as stable notions of lesbian, gay (or straight) 
identification. There are many diversities and specificities within this literature, however, which 
complicate and fracture any notion of 'queer studies' as an overarching or all encompassing theoretical or 
disciplinary designation. 
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Like the postcolonial perspectives discussed above, queer frameworks examine how 
particular identities, practices and categories are discursively constructed through the 
production of binary oppositions, but with a particular focus on relational constructions 
of sexuality. 38 In her landmark text, Gender Trouble (1999/1990), Butler suggests that 
an `epistemic regime of presumptive heterosexuality' (xxviii) produces and reifies 
binary frameworks of gender and sexual difference. 39 Published one year later, 
Sedgwick's Epistemology of the Closet (1991) argues that 'many of the major nodes of 
thought and knowledge in twentieth-century Western culture as a whole are structured —
indeed, fractured — by a chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition' 
(1). Exploring the construction of the heterosexual/homosexual binary in her 
introduction to the collection Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories (1991), Diana 
Fuss discusses how it produces a distinction 'between a pure and natural heterosexual 
inside and an impure and unnatural homosexual outside' (2), whereby 'the homo 
becomes identified with the very mechanism necessary to define and to defend any 
sexual border' (3). Homosexuality, she suggests, 'becomes the excluded; it stands in 
for, paradoxically, that which stands without. But the binary structure of sexual 
orientation, fundamentally a structure of exclusion, and exteriorization, nonetheless 
constructs that exclusion by prominently including the contaminated other in its 
oppositional logic' (3). The ways in which the hetero/homo opposition both produces 
and elides 'other' sexualities and identities (such as bisexual, transgender and 
transsexual) has also been explored by numerous theorists in recent years. 4° Through 
focusing on how heterosexual/homosexual (and other) binaries structure and produce 
experiences, categories and identities, such queer perspectives on relationality call 
38 See, for example, Foucault, 1978, 1984; Butler, 1999/1990, 1993, 2004a, 2004b; de Lauretis, 1991; 
Sedgwick, 1991; Fuss, 1991; Epstein and Straub, 1991; Hemmings, 2002; Halberstam, 1998, 2005; 
Prosser, 1998; Fausto-Sterling, 2000. 
39 I save discussion of Butler's framework until the next section on critical feminist perspectives on 
embodiment. 
40 In Bisexual Spaces (2002), Clare Hemmings investigates 'the repeated production of bisexuality within 
much queer and feminist theory as an abstract and curiously lifeless middle ground' (1). In Second Skins: 
Body Narratives of Transsexuals (1998) Jay Prosser examines the ways in which the `transgender 
subject' is (re)produced as the subject who crosses, and hence subverts, boundaries through constructing 
the 'transsexual subject' as the agent that reifies them (5). Similarly, though from a different perspective, 
Judith Halberstam interrogates the subversive/conformist binary construction of 'butch lesbian' and 
`FTM transsexual' in Female Masculinity (1998) by examining 'the differences and continuities between 
transsexual, transgender, and lesbian masculinities' (142). 
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attention to the potential effects of continually excluding sexuality (and consideration of 
the effects of heteronormative power structures) from the much cited intersectional 
feminist triad of 'gender-race-class'. 
It is also crucial, however, that a critical approach be employed to queer perspectives on 
relationality in order to interrogate the effects of their own particular exclusions, namely 
a lack of attention paid to the vectors of race and nation. As Katrina Roen (2001) points 
out, 'Queer theories have been variously criticised for their ethnocentrism' (253). 
`White' and 'Western'-centred perspectives continue to resonate, largely 
unacknowledged within queer theorising. In this vein, Biddy Martin (1994) argues that 
constructions of 'queer studies' as able to offer more complex analyses of gender and 
sexuality than lesbian feminist theory often function to 'project fixity onto race and 
gender' (110). The move on the part of some queer theorists to construct `parodic 
performance as that which makes lesbianism specific and subversive', she suggests, 
`can obscure the social mobility of racial as well as sexual and gendered meanings and 
oppositions' (115). Furthermore, Gayatri Gopinath considers how Western ideals of 
queer visibility and embodiment often exclude gay and lesbian subjects in other parts of 
the world. Public and visible forms of 'queerness', she argues, may not be available to 
lesbians in South Asia, where it may be in the private sphere of home that bodies can 
explore homo-erotic pleasures (Gopinath, 2003, cited in Ahmed, 2004a:151). 
The number of queer-oriented texts which critically examine intersections between 
sexuality, race and nation has increased in recent years 41 and the field of 'transnational 
queer studies' is growing rapidly. 42 There is still, however, room for significant 
development of such intersectional, relational perspectives. Approaches which conduct 
relational analyses of the intersections of race, nation, gender and sexuality (among 
other vectors) from a queer-postcolonial perspective can illustrate, for example, how 
binary constructions of sexual identity, such as 'heterosexual' versus 'homosexual' are 
both produced by and in turn produce oppositional constructions of racial categories, 
41 See, for example, Somerville, 2000; Stokes, 2001; Hawley, 2001. 
42 See, for example, Manalansan, 1995; Lee, 1996; Puar, 2002. 
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such as 'white' and 'black'. Somerville (2000) explores how in the nineteenth century, 
`the formation of notions of heterosexuality and homosexuality emerged in the United 
States through (and not merely parallel to) a discourse saturated with assumptions about 
the racialization of bodies' (4). Similarly, employing a framework which integrates 
queer and postcolonial approaches, Joseph Boone (2001) shows how binaries such as 
`West' and 'East' and 'heterosexual' and 'homosexual' were (re)produced in and 
through one another in the narratives of Western male travellers. These narratives 
imposed 'traditionally assumed Western sexual categories' as well as 'stereotypical 
colonialist tropes' to construct a 'mythic East as an object of desire' and a site for the 
satisfaction of Western homoerotic desires (46). Such integrative frameworks can also 
be employed to trace the ways in which particular raced and sexualised figures are 
produced relationally through complex intersections of gender, race, nation and 
sexuality. Sander Gilman (1992) shows how two seemingly um -elated female images, 
the black African 'Hottentot' and the white, British 'lesbian', were produced 
relationally in mid-nineteenth century Britain, and reciprocally linked to the figure of 
`the prostitute', through notions about their shared deviant and degenerate sexuality and 
physiognomy. As these texts illustrate, particular raced and gendered experiences or 
constructions may only become visible in their intersection with sexuality (and vice 
versa) and indeed may be (re)constituted in various contexts through particular 
constructions of sexuality. In this vein, I argue in Chapter Four that intersectional 
analyses of race, nation, gender and sexuality are crucial in relation to cross-cultural 
practices of passing because of the ways in which racial and cultural distinctions are 
often (re)produced precisely through sexual pleasure and erotic desire. 
Importantly, queer-postcolonial perspectives can also help to develop an approach to 
relationality as a process that is never static, but always context-bound. This link 
between relationality and context is usefully developed within some of the queer 
literature on passing that I discuss in Chapter Four. Such texts explore how, through 
practices of passing, particular embodied identities are variably (re)constructed via 
inter-subjective interactions between multiple bodies which are conditioned by time and 
space. For example, Amy Robinson (1994) conceptualises passing as a 'skill of 
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reading' that involves 'multiple codes of identity' (716). 'The pass', she suggests, 
`offers competing rules of recognition in the place of discrete essences or "natural" 
identities' (716). Within this framework, 'not only is the passer's "real" identity a 
function of the lens through which it is viewed, but it is the spectator who manufactures 
the symptoms of a successful pass by engaging in the act of reading that constituted the 
performance of the passing subject' (728). From this perspective, the constitutive 
relations between particular embodied subjects or groups cannot be conceptualised in 
deterministic ways as such interactions will always be dependent on inter-subjective 
dynamics as well as social and historical context. Moreover, particular embodied 
identities cannot be fixed, as identities and bodies may be constructed differently 
through various relational encounters. In other words, different differences come to 
matter in different times and places. Race, for instance, might take on greater 
significance in some times and spaces than others and the ways in which race is 
constructed or interpreted will change across contexts. While this standpoint suggests 
that particular regimes of power and differentiation may hold greater weight in some 
contexts than others, it also emphasises — in common with intersectionality theory - that 
presuming in advance that particular axes can and should be privileged above and 
beyond others is problematic. It is on this notion of the fluidity and `unfixability' of 
embodied identity categories that queer theory productively merges with critical 
feminist perspectives on embodiment. 
Embodiment: Critical Feminist Approaches 
As discussed in Chapter One, theorists such as Elizabeth Grosz, Judith Butler, Sara 
Ahmed, Margrit Shildrick, Raia Prokhovnik, Rosi Braidotti and Moira Gatens explore 
the ways in which bodies and embodied identities are constituted differently through 
particular relations of power. Through focusing on embodiment, they explore how 
complex processes of social, cultural and psychic differentiation proceed through bodily 
channels, and how power shapes bodies in particularly enduring ways. 43 In several 
43 Some of these theorists argue that it is the 'indeterminate' position of the body that enables it to be 
employed as a powerful strategic tool to upset the logic of oppressive embodied binaries. Neither wholly 
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ways these feminist perspectives are similar to, and are intertwined with, queer 
approaches to relationality. Indeed, many of these thinkers may also be characterised as 
`lesbian' or 'queer' theorists. I discuss these thinkers together in this section because, in 
contrast to other prominent queer theorists, they have all (at some point) identified their 
theoretical concerns as 'feminist'. Reading these theorists together enables me to 
highlight some of the overlaps in their perspectives on sex/gender, embodiment and 
power as well as the points on which they (sometimes substantively) differ. In this 
section, I consider both the tensions between critical feminist perspectives on 
embodiment and feminist approaches to intersectionality, and in turn, how embodiment 
theory might be employed to enhance intersectionality. 
In one sense, intersectionality, postcolonial and queer relationality and feminist 
embodiment theory might be seen to converge in their common interrogation of the 
universalising operations through which the category 'woman' is (re)produced within 
mainstream feminist theory. Thus, from Brah and Phoenix's perspective, 
`intersectionality fits with the disruption of modernist thinking produced by postcolonial 
and poststructuralist theoretical ideas' (2004:82). There are also, however, significant 
tensions between these literatures which relate to the kind or extent of disruption each 
advocates and produces. As mentioned earlier, a good deal of feminist intersectionality 
theory does not seek explicitly to disrupt essentialist identity categories, such as race, 
gender and sexuality, but rather to address how these categories reproduce particular 
exclusions. From Crenshaw's standpoint, the oppression facing marginalised groups 
such as African Americans stems not predominantly from the fact that they are 
categorised in essentialist ways, but rather from the fact that particular categories are 
negatively valued and exclusionary (1991:1298). She sees it as a key problem that 
categories such as 'black' and 'woman' are constructed through narratives which 'have 
privileged some experiences and excluded others' (1298). Indeed, rather than seeking 
to radically disrupt essentialist identity categories, Crenshaw calls attention to the ways 
natural nor cultural, neither fully material nor discursive, the ambiguous character of the body can play an 
important tactical role in interrogating essentialist discourses (see, for example, Grosz, 1994:22). The 
fluidity of bodily boundaries, or the ability of bodies to continually exceed and seep beyond the dualistic 
frameworks which seek to control and regulate them, is seen to indicate the permeability and indiscretion 
of all binaries and borders (Shildrick, 1997). 
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in which 'the most critical resistance strategy for disempowered groups is to occupy and 
defend a politics of social location rather than to vacate and destroy it' (1297). 
By contrast, critical feminist theorists of embodiment (in conjunction with queer and 
other postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches) have argued that embodied 
identity categories are always produced relationally through hierarchical processes of 
`saming' and `othering'. As such, there exists a fundamental problem with the 
categories themselves which cannot be remedied simply by revaluing or expanding 
them to make them more equitable or inclusive. A significant amount of the theorising 
in this respect has revolved around the exclusionary and hierarchical production of 
categories of gender, sex, and sexuality. Luce Irigaray44 has famously sought to 
illustrate, for example, how women are positioned within the male symbolic system as 
representable only in relation to men (either as inversion or counterpart), and hence as 
ultimately unrepresentable. She points to the power of phallocentric structures of 
thought 'to reduce all others to the economy of the same... to eradicate the difference 
between the sexes in systems that are self representations of a "masculine subject"' 
(1985:76). Both the subject and the Other, she suggests, are masculine foundations 
within a phallocentric signifying economy which excludes the feminine altogether. The 
goal is thus not to neutralise women's embodied differences in order to grant them full 
membership in the universal realm of humanity, as this would keep the hegemonic male 
economy intact. The only route to achieving genuine autonomy for women is through 
radical resignification of the whole phallocratic system of representation through which 
embodied differences and their effects are produced. 
Later critical feminist theorists of embodiment aim to reveal how the history of Western 
thought, language and ethics has been founded and developed around the exclusion and 
denigration of the female body, and other bodies outside the white masculine 
mainstream (Grosz, 1994; Gatens, 1996; Shildrick, 1997; Braidotti, 2002). Moira 
Gatens (1996) has argued that the concept of rationality (one of the key historical 
44 Irigaray's work has been particularly influential to the analyses of many of the critical feminist theorists 
of embodiment. 
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criteria for political participation and other citizenship rights) has been defined in 
opposition to the qualities typically thought to con-elate with femininity and the female 
body. As she asserts, 
Women are most often understood to be less able to control the passions of the body 
and this failure is often located in the a priori disorder of anarchy of the female body 
itself... Political participation has been structured and defined in such a way that it 
excluded women's bodies (50). 
Such historical exclusions, she argues, have caused the public sphere, in most, if not all, 
societies, to develop in ways which assume that its participants have a male body and 
thus to enshrine within public life the preferences, desires and interests of a very 
specific embodied group. From Gatens' perspective, these patterns of development 
have had important material effects on the ways in which excluded bodies have been 
constituted, affecting both their present capacities as well as their future possibilities 
(104): 'Power differentially constitutes particular kinds of bodies and empowers them to 
perform particular kinds of task, thus constructing different kinds of subject' (italics in 
original) (66). She points out, for example, that the body of a woman confined to the 
role of wife/mother/domestic worker, 'is invested with particular desires, capacities and 
forms that have little in common with the body of a female Olympic athlete' (69). She 
thus maintains that denying the historical forms that sexual difference has taken, and 
treating subjects as essentially sex-neutral, will result only in reifying present 
inequitable relations between the sexes. In a similar vein to Irigaray, Gatens 
emphasises that what is required is a politics of difference which accounts for the ways 
in which bodies have been constituted differently through complex relations of power, 
and acknowledges that different forms of embodiment are open to change. 
Coming from a somewhat different (though related) perspective, Judith Butler proposes 
that gender, and the accompanying categories of sex and desire, are produced 
performatively. That is, 'what we take to be an internal essence of gender is 
manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylization 
of the body' (1999/1990:xv). Gender 'is performatively produced and compelled by the 
regulatory practices of gender coherence', which are underscored by the regime of 
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compulsory heterosexuality. In turn, the ontological categories of sex, gender and 
desire 'support gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality' (xxviii). The 'very 
thinking of what is possible in gendered life', Butler suggests, is thus 'foreclosed by 
certain habitual and violent presumptions' (viii). The conception of 'gender' 
presupposes 'not only a causal relation among sex, gender and desire, but suggests as 
well that desire reflects or expresses gender and that gender reflects or expresses desire' 
(30). Idealising gendered categories within feminist identity politics can thus only 
function to 'produce new forms of hierarchy and exclusion' (vii-iii). As such, Butler is 
concerned to explore the ways in which gender categories might be 'denaturalised' and 
`resignified'. 
It should be acknowledged that several critiques of Butler's notion of performativity 
suggest that it is inherently a disembodied approach. Grosz (2005) and Braidotti (2002) 
argue that in reducing morphology and corporeality to discursive practices, Butler 
ultimately de-emphasises the embodied nature of the subject. Furthermore, Lynne 
Pearce (2004) claims that performativity is probably the 'most striking and familiar 
instance of disembodied thinking in 1990s feminist and cultural theorising' (144). 
From her perspective the linguistic performative 'is not adequate in all the contexts that 
Butler uses it and all the different things she clearly hopes it will suggest' (144). What 
is common to these critiques is the assertion that linguistic strategies are ultimately 
ineffective in this context, because they function to reduce everything to discourse. I 
accept that Butler's theory is one geared more towards language and less towards the 
materiality of the body. However, I do not agree with the charge that her approach is 
fundamentally limited by its focus on language or that performativity is essentially 
disembodied. I think that Butler makes some convincing arguments about why taking 
materiality for granted as irreducible can be a dangerous exercise and her suggestion 
that 'feminists should be invested not in taking materiality as an irreducible, but in 
conducting a critical genealogy of its formulation' is key (1993:32). Theorists of 
performativity in fact seek to trace the relationship between 'the linguistic' and 'the 
material' as opposed to permanently dismissing the latter in favour of the former. As 
69 
Butler emphasises, perfoiniativity is not just about speech acts, but also about bodily 
acts — and more specifically the relation between them (2004a:198). 
By contrast, Crenshaw seeks to distance her approach to intersectionality from 
`antiessentialise and `postmodernist' perspectives which emphasise the constructedness 
of various identity categories, because she fears that such frameworks will lead to the 
paralysis of marginal politics. It is important to recognise, Crenshaw stresses, that 
while projects of naming involve 'unequal power', 'there is nonetheless some degree of 
agency that people can and do exert in the politics of naming' Identity remains 'a site 
of resistance for members of different subordinated groups' (1991:1297). From her 
perspective, 'recognizing that identity politics takes place at the site where categories 
intersect thus seems more fruitful than challenging the possibility of talking about 
categories at all' (1299). Similarly, Mohanty (2002) objects to the 'postmodern 
appropriation' of her earlier work which produces a misreading 'that labels as 
"totalizing" all systemic connections and emphasises only the mutability and 
constructedness of identities and social structures' (504). 'I am misread', she claims, 
`when I am interpreted as being against all forms of generalization and as arguing for 
difference over commonalities' (504). 
Crenshaw's and Mohanty's concerns seem both understandable and important. In the 
context of the late 1980s and early 1990s, anxiety surrounding the rise of 
deconstructionist postmodernist and poststructuralist theories was widespread within 
feminist academic communities. 45 Cogent critiques of the 'elitism' and 
`disembodiment' of postmodernist and poststructuralist theory called attention to the 
ways in which, through their (ironically) 'universalising' frameworks, such perspectives 
risked marginalising the concerns of those traditionally positioned as 'other' all over 
again and thus thwarting, rather than enabling, social justice. As Ziauddin Sardar 
45 While some scholars argued that feminist studies had much to learn from postmodernist and 
poststructuralist perspectives (see, for example, Flax, 1987; Haman, 1990; Butler, 1992), others voiced 
concerns that, in dismissing the 'grand narratives' of modernity and facilitating deconstruction of the 
category 'women' into an array of multiple and fragmented identities, postmodernist frameworks 
obscured material inequalities between the sexes (see Klein, 1991). It was also claimed that 
deconstructive postmodernist approaches bolstered post-feminist claims regarding the 'death of 
feminism' and feminist studies (see De Groot and Maynard, 1993). 
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(1998) argues, 'far from being a new theory of liberation, postmodernism, particularly 
from the perspective of the Other, the non-Western cultures, is simply a new wave of 
domination riding on the crest of colonialism and modernity' (13). Such concerns have 
certainly not gone away or become anachronistic in contemporary contexts. Moreover, 
it is probably true that some postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches contributed 
to the generation of (sometimes over-stated and/or uncritical) academic preoccupation 
with the dangers of 'essentialism' and 'identity politics' (Fuss, 1989). Nevertheless, I 
would argue that Crenshaw's and Mohanty's representations of the dangers of 
postmodern deconstruction present more a caricature of postmodernism, than a 
complex or nuanced portrayal. While Crenshaw acknowledges that 'the descriptive 
project of postmodernism of questioning the ways in which meaning is socially 
constructed is generally sound' (1991:1296), she focuses narrowly on the dangers of 
`one version of antiessentialism' which offers what she terms a 'vulgarized social 
construction thesis': 'since all categories are socially constructed, there is no such thing 
as, say, Blacks or women, and thus it makes no sense to continue reproducing those 
categories by organizing around them' (1296). It is telling that neither Crenshaw nor 
Mohanty provide any references for texts which participate in the 'vulgarized social 
construction' or 'postmodern appropriation' that they criticise. 
In fact, many critical feminist approaches to embodiment argue for an interrogation and 
resignification of essentialist binaries and categories, whilst acknowledging that such 
categories neither can nor should be dispensed with all together. Butler, for instance, 
argues for 'not doing away with the category, but trying to relieve the category of its 
foundationalist weight in order to render it a site of permanent political context' 
(1992:8). She also maintains that because 'juridical structures of language and politics 
constitute the contemporary field of power' (1999/1990:8) we can find 'no political 
position purified of power' (xxvi). Thus, for her, 'the political task is not to refuse 
representational politics — as if we could' (1999/1990:8). This is one point at which 
Butler distances her approach to 'troubling' the categories of sex, gender and desire 
from that of Irigaray, who argues that the only route to genuine autonomy for women is 
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through making the feminine express a 'different difference' that goes beyond 
patriarchal representation. Contra Irigaray, she argues that 
If sexuality is culturally constructed within existing power relations, then the 
postulation of a normative sexuality that is "before", "outside", or "beyond" power is a 
cultural impossibility and a politically impractical dream, one that postpones the 
concrete and contemporary task of rethinking subversive possibilities for sexuality and 
identity within the terms of power itself (40). 
For Butler then the aim is not to do away with particular categories all together, or act 
as if they do not exist, but to produce 'a critical genealogy' of their constitution and 
`legitimating practices' (8) which in turn enables 'a thoroughgoing appropriation and 
redeployment of the categories of identity themselves' (163). 
Moreover, whilst Crenshaw (1991) fears that revealing categories such as 'black' and 
`women' to be wholly socially constructed will deny marginal political groups the 
means to articulate their agency and resistance, Butler insists that 'the deconstruction of 
identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very 
tetras through which identity is articulated' (189). Political agency, for Butler, emerges 
then not through the preservation of embodied identity categories, but through their 
critical interrogation and rearticulation: `the question of agency is reformulated as a 
question of how signification and resignification work' (italics in original) 
(1999/1990:184). In this vein, I want to argue that one of the most valuable theoretical 
tools that feminist embodiment theory offers intersectionality theories, as well as my 
project as a whole, is a genealogical approach to tracing the complex historical, social 
and political processes through which particular embodied identity categories are 
formed and reformed (and secured as 'natural' or ontological).46 A genealogical 
method simultaneously enquires into the political processes through which such 
categories might be disrupted and resignified. 47 
46 Butler's genealogical approach draws significantly on Foucault's reformulation of Nietzche (Foucault, 
1984). 
47 Butler's genealogical method offers a different resiginificatory approach to Shildrick and Prokhovnik's 
three-step deconstructive strategy because it does require a provisional phase of binary reversal. 
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Critical feminist approaches to embodiment can move intersectional approaches away 
from an abstract, 'grid-lock' model of social differentiation in which particular pre-
formed axes of differentiation interact in deterministic ways, and towards a more fluid 
framework in which the nature of particular embodied 'differences' cannot be known in 
advance, but rather is continuously (re)formed through located articulations of power. 
Moreover, through treating the production of embodied subjectivities as an ongoing and 
always unfinished process, such frameworks acknowledge that no approach to 
theorising processes of social differentiation can be complete or all encompassing —
there will always be excesses which evade recognition or translation. 
Intersectionality strikes back 
Several critical feminist theorists of embodiment employ the language of 
intersectionality in their work. Judith Butler discusses 'the political problem that 
feminism encounters in the assumption that the term women denotes a common 
identity' (italics in original) (1999/1990:6). The term 'fails to be exhaustive', she points 
out, because 'gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different 
historical contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual and 
regional modalities of discursively constituted identities' (italics mine) (6). As such, 'it 
becomes impossible to separate out "gender" from the political and cultural 
intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained'(italics mine) (6). 
Similarly, Elizabeth Grosz acknowledges that 'bodies are always irreducibly sexually 
specific, necessarily interlocked with racial, cultural and class particularities' (italics 
mine) (1994:19-20). She argues that 'this interlocking, though, cannot occur by way of 
intersection (the gridlock model presumed by structural analysis in which the axes of 
class, race, sex are concerned as autonomous structures which then require external 
connections with other structures) but by way of mutual constitution' (20). 
Despite employing the discursive apparatus of intersectionality, critical feminist 
perspectives on embodiment may not be as substantively intersectional as their 
language suggests. Irigaray's project clearly positions sexual difference as the 
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difference which plays the most crucial role in the constitution of embodied subjects. 
She famously claimed in The Ethics of Sexual Difference: 'Sexual difference is one of 
the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age' (1993:5). As Rosi Braidotti 
(1994) points out in relation to Irigaray's work, 'In her perspective sexual difference 
cannot be considered as one difference among many, but rather as a founding, 
fundamental structural difference, on which all others rest' (118). Grosz similarly 
makes it explicit that, for her, sexual difference not only precedes race, but actually 
conditions how racial differentiations take shape. In a paper focusing on developing 
feminist links with the work of Darwin, for instance, she advocates Darwin's view 'that 
it may be precisely the sexual appeal or attractiveness of individual racial variations... 
that explains the historical variability and the genealogical emergence of racial 
differences' (Grosz, 1999:37). 48 Thus, for Grosz, it seems that sexual difference is 
irreducible because it is the founding morphological phenomenon through which all 
other forms of differentiation are produced. 
From an intersectional perspective, this ontological privileging of sexual difference is 
problematic because it assumes that sex or sexual difference is always prior to and 
separable from other axes of differentiation such as race or racial difference. Grosz 
argues against an additive approach to social differentiation and emphasises the need to 
focus on mutual constitution. Yet it is precisely the privileging of sexual difference as 
primary that underscores the additive analyses of social differentiation which feminist 
theorists of intersectionality have criticised. If sexual difference is positioned as prior to 
racial difference in this way, sexual difference is problematically read as white sexual 
difference in ways that 'other' non-white women. As Butler asserts, 'to claim that 
sexual difference is more fundamental than racial difference is effectively to assume 
that sexual difference is white sexual difference, and that whiteness is not a form of 
racial difference' (1993:182). 
48 From Grosz's perspective, 'Darwin provides an ironic and indirect confirmation of the Irigarian 
postulation of the irreducibility, indeed ineliminability, of sexual difference, and its capacity to play itself 
out in all races and across all modes of racial difference' (1999:42). 
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While in Gender Trouble Butler focuses on how gender differences are produced 
through the heterosexual matrix of power, in Bodies that Matter (1993) she revisits this 
construction, emphasising how the 'social regulation of race... subverts the monolithic 
working, of the heterosexual imperative' (17). Despite her stated intentions, however, 
Butler has been criticised for her work on race by feminists who argue that she 
continues to subsume race to gender (Fusco, 1995; Zita, 1998; Schueller, 2005). Many 
of the critiques have been directed at her analysis of Jenny Livingston's film Paris is 
Burning (1991), a documentary about black and Hispanic drag ball culture in Harlem. 
For Butler, the film suggests - contrary to dominant psychoanalytic perspectives on the 
symbolic - that 'the order of sexual difference is not prior to that of race or class in the 
constitution of the subject' (1993:130). She claims that the drag queen competitions 
that the film depicts (all of which are judged on the taken for granted criteria of 
`realness'), illustrate that the 'symbolic is also and at once a racialising set of nouns', 
that 'the norms of realness by which the subject is produced are racially informed 
conceptions of "sex"' (130). Butler's critics insist that her reading of the film 
ultimately depends on the act of assuming sexual difference as primary and determinant 
that she herself claims to critique. Coco Fusco (1995) argues that while Butler's 
analysis is partly a response to bell hooks' (1992) earlier critique of the film," she fails 
to adequately acknowledge hooks' particular references to the drag queen's 'embrace of 
white supremacist notions of female beauty' (72). From Fusco's perspective, Butler 
accuses hooks of essentialism in assuming that the drag queens are imitating women in 
a misogynist way, but does not deal with the distinction hooks makes between ideals of 
femininity and ideals of white femininity, hence allowing race to drop out of the 
equation. 5° 
49 hooks (1992) argues in regards to Livingston's film that 'within the world of the black gay drag ball 
culture she depicts, the idea of womanness and femininity is totally personified by whiteness' (147). 
From her perspective, what viewers are seeing in the film is 'not black men longing to impersonate or 
even to become like "real" black women but their obsession with an idealised fetishized version of 
femininity that is white' (147): 'The film in no way interrogates whiteness' (149). 
50 Furthermore, Fusco, along with Jacquelyn Zita (1998), cites Butler's claim that Livingston's 
apparently 'gender-bending' gaze (as director) subverts ethnographic convention as another instance of 
sex and gender taking priority over race in her analysis. They argue that while Butler wants to see the 
possibility of a white lesbian director's desire for a black transvestite subject as transgressive because it 
introduces ambiguity which subverts gender identity, such a perspective functions to efface histories of 
racial exploitation that cross genders and sexualities. From Fusco's perspective, Butler's reading of the 
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In failing to fully integrate the matter of race into her analyses of subject formation, 
Butler sometimes privileges gender, sex and sexuality. While she provides in depth 
analysis of how sexuality and gender are performatively constituted, she does not give 
the same space to discussing precisely how race is inteipellated through `racialising 
norms' (Salih, 2002:94). Thus, if Butler really wants to avoid privileging white sexual 
difference, she may need to examine further the ways in which sex and sexuality 
continue to overlay and outweigh race in her work on subject foimation. It has also 
been argued that Butler's analysis of the intersections of gender, race and sexuality in 
Bodies that Matter remains lodged within a problematic additive framework. Schueller 
(2005) suggests that 'although Butler is clearly aware of the problems of simply adding 
race to the understandings of the body and of sex, her own positioning of race in the 
introductive is nonetheless additive' (83). She points to Butler's comment that 'race is 
not simply another domain separable from sexual difference, "but...its 'addition' 
subverts the monolithic workings of the heterosexual imperative...' (Butler, 1993:18, 
cited in Schueller, 2005:83). In this sense, critical feminist approaches to embodiment 
such as Grosz's and Butler's might be productively interrogated and enhanced through 
a more substantive encounter with feminist perspectives on intersectionality. 
It is also worth considering, however, whether Butler's efforts to incorporate race into 
her analysis of gendered subject formation are problematic from the start because of her 
reliance on psychoanalytic models which position racial difference as secondary to a 
logic of (white) sexual differentiation. Sara Ahmed (1998) argues, for example, that 
`the use of psychoanalysis has invariably meant that other differences are explained 
through an act of translation back into the model which elaborates the division of 
subjects into sexes (the resolution of the Oedipal crisis, castration anxiety and the 
phallic logic of fetishism)' (103). From her perspective, the translation of racial 
difference into the logic of Freudian psychoanalysis means that 'the "unmarked" 
language of that topology is held in place (whereby "the subject" becomes implicitly 
conflated with "the white subject")' (104). Arguably, it is Butler's rootedness in 
film reveals a tendency to fetishise crossing as inherently transgressive, which depends on once again 
positing sex and sexuality as primary and downplaying the role of race. 
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psychoanalysis which returns her to sexual difference paradigms she would otherwise 
reject. As different as Butler's approach to gender resignification is from those of 
Irigaray and Grosz, they all would seem to reify sexual difference as prior to (or more 
fundamental than) other axes of differentiation through their mutual focus on the 
primacy of the psychoanalytic within processes of sexual subject formation. For this 
reason, I am more interested in the social, cultural and political processes of 
differentiation through which embodied differentiations are produced. 51 What Butler's 
work offers to a process of thinking about how axes such as race and cultural difference 
intersect with sex, sexuality and gender in the production of bodies and embodied 
subjectivities, is an understanding of how embodied subjects are constituted through 
relational processes of 'othering'. This is the strain of Butler's work that I see Sara 
Ahmed as developing. 
Sara Ahmed's work provides one example of how Black feminist theories of 
intersectionality, postcolonial and queer approaches to relationality and critical feminist 
perspectives on embodiment can be productively integrated. In Strange Encounters: 
Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (2000), Ahmed explores how bodies come to be 
lived precisely through being differentiated from 'other' bodies constituted as 'strange' 
or 'alien', a process which she refers to as 'inter-embodiment'. From her perspective, 
embodied identities and particularities are historically determined (relationally) through 
antagonistic encounters with (and between) 'others'. While embodied identities are 
constituted through such encounters, so are social bodies. The boundaries of 
communities are demarcated and fortified by expelling those 'others' who, on account 
of their 'marked' bodies, are seen not to 'belong'. Within this framework, 
globalisation, migration and multiculturalism all represent particular contemporary 
modes of proximity, which, through re-opening such prior histories of encounter that 
already mark some bodies as stranger than others, (re)produce both the figures of 'the 
stranger' and the 'body-at home' in different ways (13). Via such antagonistic 
embodied encounters, notions of gender, race, sexuality and cultural difference are 
51 I do, however, want to acknowledge the productive feminist work that seeks to trace links between 
psychoanalytical and postcolonial perspectives. See for example Ranjana Khanna (2003) Dark 
Continents: Psychoanalysis and Colonialism. 
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continually (re)produced. Furthermore, in The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004a), 
Ahmed extends her framework to consider the role of heteronormativity in (re)forming 
both individual and social bodies through processes of inclusion and exclusion. 
Discussing how 'heterosexuality becomes a script that binds the familial with the 
global', she suggests that 'it is this narrative of coupling as a condition for the 
reproduction of life, culture and value that explains the slide in racist narratives between 
the fear of strangers and immigrants (xenophobia), the fear of queers (homophobia) and 
the fear of miscegenation (as well as other illegitimate couplings)' (144). 
For Ahmed, acts of othering and fetishisation which produce and fix particular bodies as 
`other' can be disrupted (and potentially prevented) in part, through conceiving of 
`difference' differently. She suggests that we need to locate difference, not on bodies of 
individuals, but within particular modes of encounter. 'Rather than thinking of gender 
and race as something that this other has (which would thematise this other as always 
gendered and racialised in a certain way) we can consider how such differences are 
determined at the level of encounter' (italics in original) (2000:145). From this 
perspective, difference cannot simply be read off the body of 'the victim of genital 
mutilation', 'the veiled woman' or 'the anorexic'; it must be understood as created 
through a relation between bodies. When embodied particularity is understood 'as a 
question of modes of encounter through which others are faced' (144), transforming 
essentialist discourses about embodied differences becomes a project of changing the 
ways we encounter one another. From Ahmed's point of view, 'a generous encounter 
may be one which would recognise how the encounter itself is implicated in broader 
relations and circuits of production and exchange' (152). Thus, such an encounter 
would necessitate awareness of the relations of power which already mark some bodies 
differently than others and the ways in which particular forms of embodiment must 
always be conceived in relation to the 'others' which have enabled their construction. 
As a critical approach to analysing processes of social differentiation and the formation 
of embodied subjectivities and identities, Ahmed's concept of inter-embodiment 
enables theorising of how embodied particularities are (re)formed through 
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intersectional, relational processes and encounters which are situated contextually 
within particular configurations of power. At the same time, her perspective is not 
deterministic. It seeks to trace the ways in which such relational encounters might be 
redirected, and hence how the formation of particular problematic and essentialist 
identity constructions might be rearticulated. Within her framework, various embodied 
selves and others are differentiated and yet also fundamentally connected, but never 
essentially fixed in place. As in Butler's approach to performativity, from Ahmed's 
perspective, embodied identity categories are understood to be the product of complex 
histories of relational construction. As such, the possibility exists that they might be 
disrupted and 'constructed differently' (Butler, 1999/1990:11). 
Conclusions: Fleshing out a Critical Framework 
Throughout this chapter I have explored various conceptual tools for theorising cultural 
formations and practices offered by critical approaches to intersectionality, relationality 
and embodiment. By mapping their specific overlaps and intersections, I have sought to 
illustrate how these literatures can illuminate and critique one another's limitations 
whilst also enhancing one another and producing useful insights. It is important to 
emphasise that the critical interpretive framework which I have begun fleshing out 
through this analysis is not one that simply transplants the tools each approach offers 
(intact) and combines them additively to create a 'more comprehensive' approach. 
Rather, the theoretical 'encounters' between intersectionality, relationality and 
embodiment staged in this chapter have altered the character and contours of each, and 
hence the role they play in the emergent framework. 52 By way of concluding, I outline 
the key elements which define this approach. 
52 In this sense, while my framework seeks to incorporate some of the most productive insights of 
intersectionality, it may not itself be characterised as 'intersectional', if `intersectionality' remains 
associated with a more deterministic project of examining the ways in which particular pre-formed 
vectors come together to produce specific experiences of oppression or with a superficial process of 
paying lip service to the 'race-class-gender' triad. 
79 
In tracing the particularity of various subjects, groups, practices and experiences, my 
framework seeks to resist assumptions of universality or linearity and to avoid 
privileging (in advance) one axis of social differentiation as primary. Drawing on the 
insights of Black feminist approaches to intersectionality, it underscores the importance 
of looking for and addressing complex articulations between multiple axes such as race, 
gender, class, sexuality, nation and culture, without assuming that these axes exist 'out 
there' in any fixed foini. My hope is to avoid additive or analogical analyses which 
elide historical, contextual and embodied specificities and instead to focus on tracing 
the (re)production of relational links. As opposed to looking for (or constructing) 
commonality - which often collapses into superficial or uncritical constructions of 
sameness - my framework seeks to trace the constitutive connections which mutually 
implicate particular subjects, figures and practices. Focusing on connection enables an 
understanding of subj ectivities and identities as relationally contingent, and hence 
unfixed and inessential. This emphasis on relational connection involves the 
genealogical tracing of the multi-axial configurations of power in which social and 
embodied differentiation occurs and through which particular embodied subjects and 
figures are (re)constructed. 
In examining the ways in which social differentiation proceeds through inter-subjective 
embodied encounters which function to (re)shape and (re)constitute bodies, my 
framework seeks to move away from the abstraction and rigidity that conceptual models 
of intersectionality sometimes encounter. Avoiding a perspective in which categories of 
social differentiation come pre-foamed and interact in deterministic ways, it understands 
such categories as continually (re)produced through particular relations of power and 
hence unfinished and always dependent on historical and social context. Furthermore, 
as I will argue in my three case studies and illustrate in my final chapter, it is precisely 
the process of tracing the relational histories of construction of various cultural 
practices and their imagined figures that provides the means by which such histories 
might be redirected and by which problematic or essentialist constructions might be 
constituted differently. 
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Chapter Three: 
Theorising 'African' Female Genital Cutting and 
`Western' Body Modifications 
A Critique of the Continuum and Analogue Approaches 
Bored with your Brazilian? Hundreds of North American and European women are 
choosing female genital mutilation. 
Kate Catchpole, Jane magazine, April 2004 
This rather sensationally headlined article (above) was passed on to me a couple years 
ago by a friend. It suggests that 'female genital mutilation' is not merely an African 
practice and discusses a range of genital modifications being undertaken by women in 
the US and the UK as a form of 'body art' or as a means to increase or decrease sexual 
pleasure. While surfing online a few weeks later, I came across a Newsweek interview 
with Eve Ensler, creator of the Vagina Monologues. Asked to comment on the 
relevance of the title of her newest play, The Good Body, Ensler responds that 
`everything women do is about being good'. In every culture, she suggests, this 
imperative to be 'good' is linked with particular ways of controlling women through 
`mutilating, hiding, fixing, reducing, shrinking' female bodies: 'There's skin lightening 
in some countries, female genital mutilation in another, fattening a bride in another, and 
dieting and anorexia in another' (Ozols interview with Ensler, 2004). These articles 
represent only two mainstream examples of 'African' practices of female genital cutting 
(FGC) being linked with 'Western' body altering procedures. 53 
53 I feel it is necessary to use labels such as 'African practices of FGC' (or simply `FGC') and 'Western 
body altering procedures' to indicate how particular practices have been differentiated and compared 
within the literature I am analysing. Such descriptive markers, however, are problematic because they 
group together and homogenise a vast range of diverse practices, downplaying complexity, contradiction 
and hybridity. My use of such labels should therefore not signal an assumption that all practices placed 
within particular categories (such as that of `FGC') are necessarily similar in their origins, characteristics 
or meanings. However, as most of the theorists who make comparisons between practices of FGC and 
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I had already identified a growing trend towards making such cross-cultural 
comparisons in the feminist academic literature. In The Whole Woman (1999), for 
example, Germaine Greer suggests parallels between `African' female genital 
mutilation' and a wide range of 'Western' procedures, including operations on intersex 
babies, male circumcision, body piercing, cutting, gender reassignment surgery, breast 
augmentation, episiotomy, hysterectomy and caesarean sections. Criticising Martha 
Nussbaum's (1998) portrayal of African-rooted FGC as worse than, and in greater need 
of eradication, than Western practices of cosmetic surgery and dieting, Clare Chambers 
(2004) considers connections between FGC and cosmetic breast implants. Outside the 
specifically feminist literature, Gerry Mackie (1996, 2000) links FGC with Chinese 
foot-binding, whilst Sander Gilman (1999a) and David Gollaher (2000) suggest 
similarities between FGC and male circumcision. Legal scholars Sally Sheldon and 
Stephen Wilkinson (1998) compare FGC and cosmetic surgery procedures such as 
breast augmentation, suggesting that the legal frameworks relating to the two sets of 
practices in the UK should be made more consistent. 
It would seem that, within both mainstream and academic discourses in the 
contemporary West, African-rooted practices of FGC have become a prevalent site for 
comparison with a broad range of other embodied practices. An analysis of the diverse 
collection of actors who seek to link FGC with other embodied practices and the wide 
array of practices to which FGC gets compared would be interesting for a number of 
reasons. How is FGC figured as such a porous and flexible practice that can be 
stretched to link with such a varied spectrum of other practices worldwide? Through 
what processes has FGC become fetishised as the practice of choice for so many 
comparisons? What are the motivations for making such comparisons on the part of 
other body altering procedures do not consistently specify which particular form of FGC they are 
referring to, it will often be difficult for me to make such distinctions in my own discussions. These labels 
are also problematic in that they force false dichotomies between 'Western' and 'non-Western' 
procedures which are often untenable given that practices of FGC are not only rooted in African cultures, 
but also some Asian and Middle Eastern cultures. Furthermore, such practices are performed within 
many Western locations, whilst cosmetic surgery and intersex operations are now practiced all over the 
world. This discursive division also effaces the historical processes through which practices have been 
constructed as 'African' and 'Western' in the first place. Thus, while I employ such labels in this chapter 
for practical reasons, I will seek throughout the course of my analysis to illustrate the ways in which they 
continue to be problematic. 
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various theorists? And crucially, what are the potential discursive-material effects of 
such comparisons? 
In what is to follow, I address each of these questions. My particular focus, however, is 
examining how making links across different cultural practices is employed by feminist 
theorists as a means to counter racism and cultural essentialism. The vast majority of 
texts fitting into this category are produced by theorists living and working in the West 
(who are situated differently in regards to race, ethnicity, nation and sexuality). Within 
the feminist texts I have analysed, practices of FCG, which themselves are very diverse, 
have been compared to cosmetic surgery procedures such as breast augmentation, 
labiaplasty, and liposuction 54 ; 'body art' practices such as piercing, tattooing and 
cutting55 ; nineteenth century circumcision operations performed on women in the 
United States and Britain to 'cure' masturbation, nymphomania and hysteria 56 ; 
contemporary reproductive procedures such as caesarean sections, episiotomies, tubal 
ligations, hysterectomies and radical mastectomies; 57 and, more recently, operations to 
`correct' ambiguous genitalia in intersex babies. 58 
Clearly, these comparisons are diverse and the feminist theorists who make them vary 
in their approaches and motivations. What these thinkers may be seen to share, 
however, is an objection to the cultural essentialism and racism involved in mainstream, 
as well as feminist, representations of such embodied cultural practices as 
fundamentally different. 59 Some also take issue with national laws and international 
54 See Women's Caucus of the African Studies Association (WCASA), 2002/1983; Wolf, 1990; Gunning, 
1991; Greer, 1999; Meyers, 2000; Weil Davis, 2002; Chambers, 2004; Njambi, 2004; Jeffreys, 2005. 
55 See Leonard, 2000; Salecl, 2000; Njambi, 2004; Jeffreys, 2005. 
56 See WCASA, 2002/1983; Gunning, 1991; Meyers, 2000. For a historical analysis of such procedures 
see Barker-Benfield, 1975. 
57 See WCASA, 2002/1983; Greer, 1999. 
58 Meyers, 2000; Boyle, 2002; Chase, 2002; Weil Davis, 2002. 
59  Portrayals of FCG by second wave feminists such Fran Hosken and Mary Daly which described 
`female genital mutilation' as an 'unspeakable atrocity' (Daly, 1978) and purely patriarchal (Hosken, 
1981; 1993) have been the subject of much critique by African, 'Third world' and other feminist theorists 
who have conceived such representations as highly problematic in their essentialism and implicit racism 
(Mohanty, 1991; Gunning, 1991; Abusharaf, 2001). More recent portrayals of FGC, such as Alice 
Walker's novel, Warrior Marks, and Walker and Pratibha Parmar's subsequent film, Warrior Marks: 
Female Genital Mutilation and the Sexual Blinding of Women (1993), have been similarly critiqued 
(Engle and Khanna, 1997; Abusharaf, 2001; James and Robertson, 2002). 
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directives designed to regulate, ban or eradicate practices of FGC and yet not other 
body altering procedures which may involve similar health risks. 60  Waririmu Ngaruiya 
Njambi (2004), for example, criticises the American Medical Association and the 
World Health Organisation for producing directives which describe FGC as 'medically 
unnecessary' and requiring 'eradication', while failing to address 'culturally acceptable' 
practices such as male circumcision and cosmetic surgery (291). She also questions 
how the label 'mutilation' becomes attached to practices of FGC in African cultures, yet 
not to a range of body modifications fashionable in Western cultures, such as tattooing, 
piercing, penis/clitoris slicing, tongue slicing, and cosmetic procedures, including botox 
injections, liposuction, breast implants, and female genital trimming (299). These 
theorists thus seek to establish similarities between FGC and Western body 
modification practices as a means to break down culturally essentialist binaries which 
construct non-Western (in this case usually African) cultures as patriarchal and 
oppressed and Western cultures as liberated and self-determining As discussed in 
Chapter One, in order to emphasise the cross-cultural affinities between such embodied 
practices, some feminist theorists have adopted a 'continuum approach'. Others have 
advocated an 'analogue approach'. Both models seek to position various practices of 
FGC alongside other body altering procedures deemed 'similar' or comparable. 61 
60 The platform of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 explicitly cited FGC 
as dangerous to women's reproductive health and a violation of their human rights and directives urged 
countries to pass and enforce strict laws 'against the perpetrators of practices and acts of violence against 
women, such as female genital mutilation' (Gollaher, 2000:194-5). Joint statements by the international 
bodies WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA and UNDP in 1996 expressed support for FGC eradication efforts under 
the women's rights as human rights model (Boyle, 2002:55) and strategies for eradication have been 
pursued in countries such as Senegal, Sierra Leone and Egypt (Lionnet, 2003:371). The UK was the first 
Western country to introduce legislation prohibiting FGC in 1985, with similar laws banning the practice 
in the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia following in the 1990s (Sheldon and Wilkinson, 1998). In 
France, and recently in the United States (Haines, 2006), officials have taken legal action against both 
circumcisers and the legal guardians of circumcised children. Furthermore, in 1996, the US Board of 
Immigration appeals granted Fauziya Kassindja political asylum, establishing fear of female genital 
mutilation as legitimate grounds for granting asylum (Gollaher, 2000:188). By contrast, while the US 
Food and Drug Administration has banned the use of silicone implants for women who want them strictly 
for cosmetic reasons, cosmetic surgery and other 'Western' body modification procedures have not, on 
the whole, been seen as a matter of criminal law, and there have been no international movements, 
directives or calls for eradication by international bodies in relation to such practices (Sheldon and 
Wilkinson, 1998). 
61 As mentioned in the introductory chapter, a third model employed by theorists to link such practices is 
the 'subset approach'. I save discussion of the subset model until Chapters Four and Five. 
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In the introductory chapter I suggested that strategies of establishing similarities 
between embodied cultural practices are problematic because they often flatten out 
critical historical and contextual distinctions between embodied practices and, in the 
process, shore up dominant discursive-material hierarchies. In this case study chapter, I 
consider these critiques, as well as others, in greater depth. I begin by mapping some of 
the comparisons made between FGC and other body altering procedures within the 
feminist literature and consider three theorists whom employ analogue or continuum 
models. I move on to two specific critiques of the continuum and analogue models. 
First, because these models privilege gender and sexuality, they tend to efface the 
operation of other axes of embodied differentiation, namely race, cultural difference and 
nation. As such, the continuum and analogue approaches often reproduce problematic 
relationships between race and gender whilst failing to address the implicit and 
problematic role which race, along with culture and nation, continue to play in such 
representations. This erasure of race, culture and nation, I contend, is linked to the 
construction of a 'Western' empathetic gaze. This is my second key critique. The 
desire on the part of theorists working in the West to establish cross-cultural 'empathy' 
through models which stress similarity and solidarity often conceals the continuing 
operation of geo-political relations of power and privilege. 
Mapping the Continuum and Analogue Approaches 
As discussed in Chapter One, I employ the term 'continuum approach' to describe the 
model of theorising advocated by authors who suggest that imagining FGC alongside 
other body altering procedures within a single 'continuum', 'spectrum' or 'range' of 
cross-cultural body modification practices would enable a move beyond problematic 
binary representations. I use the term 'analogue approach' to refer to the theoretical 
model utilised by theorists who seek to highlight similarities between different 
embodied practices, but do not explicitly conceive of them as forming a single 
continuum. The continuum and analogue approaches are not mutually exclusive: The 
continuum model involves identifying cultural practices which are similar and 
analogues can (though need not necessarily) be part of larger continuums. Some 
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theorists employ a combination of the continuum and analogues approaches. Both 
approaches are utilised to imagine and theorise connections between various forms of 
FGC and 'Western' body altering procedures deemed to be similar or comparable. 
It is necessary to make a distinction between the two approaches, however, because in 
some cases, their structural differences can become significant. A continuum is, by 
definition, 'a continuous sequence in which the elements next to each other are very 
similar, but the last and the first are very different' (Oxford UP, 2001:185). Choices 
regarding where to position various practices in relation to one another on a particular 
continuum are shaped by culturally specific norms and beliefs and as such the 
continuum model risks reifying culturally essentialist differences. An analogue, on the 
other hand, is defined as 'a person or thing that is like or comparable to another' (27). 
The emphasis in this model is on 'likeness' and thus, when employed uncritically, the 
analogue approach risks collapsing into sameness. 
Feminist anti-cultural essentialist theorists who explicitly employ continuum 
approaches to link FGC and 'Western' body altering procedures include Diana Teitjens 
Meyers (2000) and Simone Weil Davis (2002). Among those who adopt an analogue 
model, Isabelle Gunning's 'world-travelling' approach (1991) may be the most well-
known. Each of these theorists has a different motivation for employing comparative 
approaches to emphasise similarities between different embodied cultural practices. 
Meyers wants to advocate FGC-related educational programmes in Africa which 
emphasise the possibility of autonomy within culture, Weil Davis is interested in 
examining issues of consent, aesthetics and social control in relation to embodied 
practices in the United States and elsewhere, and Gunning seeks to consider how 
international human rights discourse can be employed as a non-punitive model for 
eradicating practices of FGC. All, however, articulate their projects through a desire to 
interrogate racist and culturally essentialist representations of embodied practices. 
There are also other prominent examples of the continuum and analogue approaches in 
the feminist literature concerned with cultural essentialism. The American volume 
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Genital Cutting and Transnational Sisterhood (2002) provides a case in point This 
collection begins with a reprint of the Women's Caucus of the African Studies 
Association's 'Position Paper on Clitoridectomy and Infibulation' (2002/1983). In this 
piece, the authors critique imperialist Western interventions into debates on African 
practices of FGC, arguing that such condemnations fail to recognise the many 
analogous procedures which are part of Western cultures: 
Surely no one residing in a nation in which newborn males are routinely circumcised 
without benefit of anaesthesia and in which other operations such as caesarean sections, 
tubal ligations, hysterectomies, and radical mastectomies are sometimes performed on 
women for questionable medical reasons ought to single out any other group's customs 
for special attention. Western cultures have in the recent past practiced clitoridectomy 
on young women as a cure for masturbation and nymphomania and certainly do not 
regard the sexuality of women as a benign or positive force (2). 
In their introduction to the articles which follow, editors Stanlie James and Claire 
Robertson suggest that much feminist theorising about FGC falls foul of what they refer 
to as 'the colonial flaw': 'although many feminists by now are aware that 
clitoridectomy was practiced at different times and places in the United States, most 
confine it to the past' (2002:13). As a means to overcome this problem, James and 
Robertson advocate an analogue approach which traces the similarities between FGC 
and other embodied practices normally categorised as 'different', namely US intersex 
operations. Other chapters in the collection, such as Cheryl Chase's, adopt a similar 
perspective. Chase critiques Western constructions of African practices of FGC as 
fundamentally distinct from American operations on intersex babies asserting, 'Western 
feminism has represented African genital cutting as primitive, irrational, harmful, and 
deserving condemnation. The Western medical community has represented its genital 
cutting as modern, scientific, healing and above reproach' (2002:145-6). She maintains 
that laws prohibiting African practices of 'female genital mutilation' in the United 
States should apply equally to intersex surgeries. The message conveyed by the 
collection as a whole is that issues relating to female genital cutting require 
transnational feminist responses which are sensitive to the links and similarities 
between different gendered embodied practices across cultures. 
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Another recent example of the analogue approach can be found within a 2004 issue of 
Feminist Theory which focuses on new feminist responses to FGC. The issue is 
structured around a key article, 'Dualisms and Female Bodies in Representations of 
African Female Circumcision — A feminist critique', by Waririmu Ngaruiya Njambi 
(2004), and a series of responses to it by various critics, including Kathy Davis, who has 
become well-known for her work on cosmetic surgery (1994, 1997, 2003a, 2003b). 
Njambi interrogates the 'imperialistic impression that only those with some social, 
political and economic power and who live in the west have the right to take risks with 
their bodies' (2004:299). She seeks to explore how it may be possible to 'situate the 
potential for infections associated with female circumcision in the context of similar 
risks with the multitude of other body modifications practices by people worldwide' 
(298). 62 In her response, Davis suggests that Njambi's argument is 'well-taken' and 
that Western feminists should treat African practices of FGC as similar to cosmetic 
surgery or intersex operations in the sense that all such practices require analysis, rather 
than automatic condemnation (3004:306). Davis concludes that cross-cultural 
comparison is a crucial means of making Western feminists aware of their own 
ethnocentrism, enabling them to become more critical of their own local practices (309). 
Several other examples can be found. Lori Leonard (2000) argues that particular forms 
of FGC are comparable to Western body modification practices such as piercing and 
tattooing in that all such procedures are, in some senses, fads - they are partly about 
`about young girls copying each other' (227). Sally Sheldon and Stephen Wilkinson 
(1998) suggest that making legal frameworks pertaining to body modifications in the 
UK more consistent would challenge 'the perception that female genital mutilation and 
cosmetic surgery are fundamentally different' and situate 'both on a continuum of body 
modification practices' (italics in original) (284). As these examples illustrate, within 
the Western feminist literature concerned with questions of culture, essentialism and 
embodied practice, continuum and analogue approaches seem to be employed 
62 Njambi's text is exceptional (representing a departure from most texts which employ analogue and/or 
continuum approaches), however, in that she employs cross-cultural comparisons between FGC and other 
`Western' body modifications in ways that avoid uncritical and ahistorical assumptions of sameness, and 
interrogates universalist constructions of female embodiment. 
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frequently, and perhaps increasingly. In the remainder of this section I look more 
closely at the continuum and/or analogue approaches employed by Meyers, Gunning 
and Weil Davis, focusing on why and how they link FGC and other body altering 
procedures. 
In 'Feminism and Women's Autonomy: The Challenge of Female Genital Cutting' 
(2000), Diana Teitjens Meyers utilises a continuum approach to link `the range of 
worldwide FGC practices — including "corrective" surgery for "ambiguous genitalia" in 
Western cultures as well as the various initiation rites observed in some African and 
Asian cultures' (469). 63 Through imagining such practices on a fluid continuum she 
seeks to disrupt neo-colonialist binaries which pose FGC and intersex operations as 
oppositional and distinct. Meyers is particularly concerned 'to dispel some prevalent 
misconceptions about culture' which portray non-Western women who practice FGC as 
oppressed by culture and without autonomy, in contrast to Western women as active 
agents freely negotiating their flexible cultural milieus (474). As such, she aims to 
illustrate that FGC is a practice common to both non-Western and Western cultures. 
Drawing a discursive similarity between the different sets of cultural practices, she 
adopts the label 'female genital cutting' (usually only employed to refer specifically to 
African or Asian practices of female circumcision or infibulation) to describe a wider 
range of body altering procedures including Western operations on intersex babies: 
Many Euro-Americans believe that female genital cutting is a single procedure, but this 
is not true. In addition to Western cosmetic procedures designed to "feminize" 
ostensibly male genitalia, practices range from sunna... to infibulation... (italics mine) 
(473). 
Intersex surgeries and practices of FGC are comparable from Meyer's perspective 
because they are both potentially harmful and health-endangering practices of cutting 
female genital tissue. Linking all such practices in regards to their possible health risks, 
Meyers suggests a continuum: 
63 Meyers also links nineteenth century American clitoridectomies to African practices of FGC, although 
this is not her central comparison (472). 
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Correlated with this spectrum of outcomes is a spectrum of health risks in the 
immediate aftermath of the procedure and a spectrum of long-term consequences for 
women's sexuality, physical health and psychological well-being (italics mine) (473-4). 
She also claims that both intersex surgeries and various forms of FGC are impelled by 
`potent culturally specific feminine bodily norms' (486) which do not tolerate 
`unnatural' or 'ambiguous' genitalia. Meyers' key aim in the article is to advocate 
educational programmes which seek to enhance women's autonomy within FGC-
practicing communities, without necessarily calling for the eradication of the practice. 
She wants to emphasise that 'autonomy' is not mutually exclusive with 'culture' for 
women who practice FGC and that 'many women exercise effective agency' with 
respect to the practice, as both accommodators and resisters (469). 
In 'Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of 
Female Genital Surgeries' (1991), Isabelle Gunning advocates an analogue approach as 
a means to disrupt culturally essentialist depictions of FGC and Western body 
modifications. Gunning is particularly concerned to address what she, borrowing from 
previous feminist critiques, refers to as 'arrogant perception', 64 a self-centred and 
culturally essentialist way of viewing 'the other'. 65 As a means to prevent arrogant 
perception in this context, Gunning draws on the concept of 'world-travelling' 
developed by Maria Lugones (1990) to advocate a three pronged approach: 1) 
understanding one's own historical context 2) seeing yourself as the other woman might 
see you and 3) seeing the other woman, her world and sense of self through her eyes 
(202). Required as part of Gunning's 'world-travelling' approach is 'an in depth look at 
one's own cultural context in search for analogues to culturally challenging practices in 
the "other's" culture' (italics mine) (205). For her, nineteenth century female 
circumcisions performed on American and English women as a 'cure' for mental illness 
64 Marilyn Frye uses the term 'arrogant perception' in her collection The Politics of Reality: Essays in 
Feminist Theory (1983). Maria Lugones in turn draws on Frye's use of the term in her article 
`Playfulness, "World"-Travelling, and Loving Perception' (1990). 
65 As Gunning explains, arrogant perception involves the construction of distance between self and other: 
`The "other", in arrogant perception terms, is unlike me. The "other" has no independent perceptions and 
interest but only those that I impose. Any evidence that the "other" is organized around her own interests 
is evidence of defectiveness in the "other"' (1991:199). She claims that arrogant perception operates in 
many representations of FGC, including those of the well-known second wave feminist Fran Hosken 
(200-1). 
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provide one suitable analogue with FGC. She argues that 'the same kind of rationales' 
have been given for both sets of procedures, such as beliefs in their health benefits, 
(205, 218) and suggests that women have demonstrated similar attitudes or responses 
towards the two sets of procedures, including, in some cases, 'submissive or welcoming 
behaviour' (208). Furthermore, women have played a key role in supervising, and in 
some ways perpetuating, both procedures. 
Through illustrating that female genital surgeries have been practised in Western 
cultures too, she seeks to disrupt culturally essentialist and racist perceptions of FGC-
practicing communities as 'backward' or 'barbaric' and women who have undergone 
clitoridectomies as victims of 'false consciousness'. In a similar (though not identical) 
way to Meyers, Gunning employs language to discursively equate the two forms of 
body alteration: 
The practice of reconstructing female genitalia through surgery is a universal one that 
crosses cultural boundaries. It is part of our own history (italics mine) (211). 
Western women have confronted the same problem of female genital surgeries that 
African women face today albeit in our own cultural context (italics mine) (226). 
Gunning also makes links between FGC and other embodied practices, such as cosmetic 
breast augmentation, intersex surgery, abortion and eating disorders such as anorexia 
and bulimia. These comparisons are established to encourage Westerners to 
acknowledge that 'non-Westerners too can view Western practices as culturally 
challenging' (212) and to increase 'multicultural dialogue' through a 'shared search for 
areas of overlap, shared concern and values' (91). Establishing such multicultural 
dialogue is important to Gunning's overarching objective in this article, which is to 
advocate 'the international human rights regime' as a positive tool, for developing and 
applying 'universal human rights norms' to practices of FGC (247-8). 
In 'Loose Lips Sink Ships' (2002), Simone Well Davis advocates a continuum approach 
as an alternative to binary depictions of FGC and Western procedures of genital 
alteration. Concerned with culturally essentialist and racist representations of FGC in 
the media, US law and Western academic critique, she claims: 
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It is a (prevalent) mistake to imagine a quantum distinction between Euro-American 
and African reshapings of women's bodies: far too often, they are measured with 
entirely different yardsticks rather than on a continuum (21). 
Elsewhere in the paper she again uses the word 'continuum' to link African and Middle 
Eastern practices of FGC and American labiaplasty (as well as intersex surgeries) (27). 
In constructing links between these practices, Weil Davis seeks explicitly to employ 
Gunning's world-travelling approach, and its requirement to 'look at one's own culture 
anew and identify [...] practices that might prove "culturally challenging" or negative to 
some other' (Gunning cited in Weil Davis, 2002:27). From Weil Davis's perspective, 
labiaplasty would likely not only seem as 'culturally challenging' to African women as 
FGC appears to American women, but could also be understood as analogous to FGC in 
several ways. The key motivations impelling women to undergo both sets of practices 
are similar, including 'beautification, transcendence of shame, a desire to conform' 
(24). Moreover, both sets of practices involve issues of agency, choice, consent and 
appropriation which should be analysed with a feminist lens. Through using a 
continuum approach, Weil seeks to move beyond the 'prurient, bifurcating tunnel 
vision' of many Western commentators who 'pretend a clean break between the 
"primitive barbarism" or "ritual" cutting of African women... and the aesthetic of 
medical "fixings" of those Amero-European women' (27). She argues that a less binary 
approach to interpreting such embodied practices could lead to 'a deeper understanding 
of core issues like the nature of consent, of bodily aesthetics and social control, and of 
cross-culturalist activist collaboration' (22). 
Discussion 
Both the continuum and analogue approaches challenge the widespread perception that 
practices of FGC are fundamentally different from other body altering procedures. 
They situate the potential for health risks associated with FGC in the context of similar 
risks linked to other body modifications and highlight the comparable motivations 
across cultures for undergoing such procedures. They can also encourage people to 
think critically about different cultural practices (including those within their own 
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cultures) and challenge their ethnocentrism, whilst increasing solidarity and 
`multicultural dialogue' (Gunning, 1991:91). However, in my view, the continuum and 
analogue approaches do not provide ultimately effective means disrupting and 
resignifying binary structures. 
Meyers and Weil Davis's use of a continuum approach may make them more 
susceptible than Gunning to reifying problematic differences between various embodied 
practices. For example, Meyers' image of a 'range' of female genital cutting practices 
correlated with 'a spectrum of health risks' and 'a spectrum of long-term consequences 
for women's sexuality, physical health and psychological well-being' (2000:473-4) 
suggests that some practices of genital alteration will be more serious, harmful or 
problematic than others. The point I want to make here is not that we should never 
make distinctions between particular practices (indeed, this thesis underscores the 
importance of differentiating practices), but rather that if we are delineating practices on 
the basis of how harmful, damaging or extreme they are, these judgements cannot be 
neutral. They will always be guided by culturally inflected values which need to be 
recognised and accounted for. The continuum argument should thus not be seen as a 
simple 'way out' of cultural essentialism or ethnocentrism. In light of the difficulties 
the problem of cultural 'bias' would seem to raise for advocates of the continuum 
approach, it is perhaps significant that neither Meyers nor Weil Davis endeavour to 
undertake any specific plotting of practices within a continuum structure. The fact that 
such continuums must remain completely vague in order to avoid re-essentialising 
various cultural practices raises crucial questions about the theoretical utility of the 
continuum approach in this context. 
Gunning's use of the analogue approach may make her more susceptible to the trap of 
`sameness' than the other theorists. While in her discursive linking of intersex 
operations and FGC practices Meyers explicitly states that female genital cutting is not 
a 'single procedure' (1991:473), Gunning's language at times suggests that nineteenth 
century circumcisions and contemporary African practices of FGC are 'the same' (226). 
In such moments, her analogy collapses into an equalization, which effaces contextual 
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and historical distinctions. Yet, in other moments, Gunning appears to re-establish 
fundamental differences between the very practices she has previously equated. For 
example, it seems significant that after linking FGC to a number of 'Western' practices 
including, cosmetic surgery, anorexia, bulimia, intersex surgeries and abortion (in 
addition to her central comparison with nineteenth century clitoridectomy), it is only 
FGC which she argues should be addressed (and indeed eradicated) through the 
international human rights regime (albeit through non-punitive means). The 
unavoidable, if unintended, implication is that African practices of FGC are worse than 
the Western body altering procedures. This would seem to represent a problematic slip 
into a continuum approach on Gunning's part. Furthermore, unlike Myers and Weil 
Davis, who make comparisons between FGC and contemporary Western procedures, 
Gunning's central analogue links FGC to Western procedures which took place in the 
past. It may be telling that she chooses to focus her critique on nineteenth century 
procedures that no longer exist in the present context of the West (at least in the specific 
forni and context which Gunning details) and thus cannot be addressed or eradicated 
through contemporary human rights frameworks. 
Considering that Gunning claims to be employing a version of Lugones' world-
travelling' approach, and that Weil Davis seeks in turn to follow Gunning's 
methodology, it may be useful to think briefly about the extent to which we might see 
these theorists as being faithful to Lugones' vision. Lugones (1990) describes world-
travelling as 'the experience of "outsiders" to the mainstream White/Anglo organization 
of life in the US' which involves the 'the acquired flexibility in shifting from the 
mainstream construction of life to other constructions of life where she is more or less 
"at home"' (390). She suggests that while this flexibility is necessary for the outsider, it 
can also be employed by those who are at ease in the mainstream as a means to prevent 
arrogant perception. Travelling to the 'other's world' can enable the self to recognise 
the other's complex subjectivity and hence to identify with her: 'to see oneself in other 
women who are quite different from oneself (393). Lugones stresses, however, that the 
approach to travelling must be 'playful' rather than 'agonistic'. While the playful 
attitude involves 'openness to surprise, openness to being a fool, openness to self- 
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construction or reconstruction' (401), the agonistic attitude is imperialistic, revealing a 
desire to conquer (400). By playfully travelling to other women's worlds, she contends, 
`we can understand what it is to be them and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes' 
(italics in original) (401). 
On the surface, Gunning's three-pronged methodology would seem to capture the spirit 
of Lugones' approach, enabling the (Western) traveller to comprehend what it is to be 
the (African) 'other' and to understand how the 'other' sees her. What Gunning adds to 
Lugones' methodology is the requirement on the part of the traveller to search for 
analogues (practices in one's own culture which may be analogous to those in the 
others'). As I have suggested, a common outcome of the analogue approach in the 
feminist literature is a melding of self and other which can result in an uncritical 
assertion of sameness. Yet, as far as I can see, Lugones does not suggest that travelling 
to the other's worlds should require us to identify the ways in which the two worlds are 
inherently similar or that identification between self and other should depend on the 
recognition of likeness. In fact, her approach to world-travelling would seem to place 
an emphasis on the recognition and appreciation of in•educible differences between 
women and their worlds: 'Seeing myself in her through travelling in her "world" has 
meant seeing how different I am from her in her "world"' (402). From this perspective, 
it may be that the analogue and continuum approaches are actually incompatible with 
Lugones' vision of world-travelling Keeping these questions regarding the theoretical 
effectiveness of the continuum and analogue models in mind, the remainder of the 
chapter fleshes out two more specific critiques. 
Erasing Race, Erasing History 
At the most basic level, African practices of FGC are linked with Western body altering 
procedures, such as nineteenth century clitoridectomies, cosmetic labiaplasty and 
operations on intersex babies, on the basis that all are practices which are performed 
exclusively (or predominantly) on female bodies. They are all procedures designed to 
alter (or, in the case of intersex surgery, construct) female genital tissue in ways that 
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may be harmful or health-endangering. Beyond this primary gender-based similarity, I 
have mapped five recurring, and overlapping, sub-themes present in the ways in which 
particular sets of practices are linked. While some theorists make different connections, 
the five sub-themes I have picked out came up repeatedly in the texts I examined, and 
thus seem to signify (at least some of) the primary ways in which the various practices 
are connected. 
The first theme is the cross-cultural notion of there being two separate and distinct sexes 
which correspond with two separate and distinct gender identities. For example, 
Gunning links 'the belief in the existence of only two clearly delineated sexes' 
(1991:210) to the development of African and Asian practices of FGC, nineteenth 
century American clitoridectomies and contemporary US intersex surgeries. Along the 
same lines, Meyers agues that both FGC and US intersex surgery reflect the cultural 
belief that 'babies can be born with "unnatural", though not sexually or reproductively 
dysfunctional, genitalia' (2000:472). She claims that particular forms of both practices 
are linked to the notion that surgical 'demasculinizing' is required in order to enable the 
formation of proper female identity (472). 
The second theme centres on aesthetic norms about the ideal female body. Weil Davis 
argues that one of the key motivating factors raised by both African women who 
support FGC and American women seeking labiaplasty is 'beautification' (2002:23-4). 
She claims there are 'aesthetic parallels' between FGC and labiaplasty which are 
illustrated through the common desire 'for the clean slit' (24). Similarly, Stanlie James 
and Claire Robertson assert that both FGC and operations on intersex babies are 
impelled by aesthetic ideals which produce disgust for 'abnormal' genitalia: 'In some 
African societies, "ugly" female genitalia are made "beautiful" by infibulations; in the 
United States, nonconforming genitalia are regarded with aesthetic distaste, theoretical 
puzzlement, and possibly even fear' (2002:13). Gunning also comments that 
`contemporary African arguments favouring the [FGC] surgeries are very similar to 
Western rationales for the enhancement of feminine beauty' (209). 
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The third theme relates to how such feminine bodily norms are established and 
enforced. Kathy Davis, who links FGC and intersex surgeries, suggests that both sets of 
practices reflect 'the ways femininity is constructed and policed through interventions 
in women's bodies' (2004:309). In a similar vein, Weil Davis suggests that, in relation 
to both FGC and American labiaplasty, feminine body norms are often enforced 
through gendered feelings of 'bodily shame', produced and circulated within relations 
between females. She maintains that the two sets of practices are linked in their 
relationship to ideas about 'gendered bodily performance' which girls, in both Africa 
and the US, learn through their experiences as 'members of both real and imagined 
female "communities"' (2002:26). 
The fourth theme relates to female agency, autonomy and notions of consent. Many 
theorists relate both FGC and various Western procedures to the patriarchal control of 
women. For example, Gunning suggests that particular forms of both FGC and 
nineteenth century clitoridectomies are linked to 'the basic motivating desire to control 
women into submission' (1991:210). Most theorists, including Gunning, however, 
acknowledge that neither practices of FGC, nor the various Western procedures to 
which they are compared, can be understood only through a model of patriarchy. Many 
seek to examine how issues of women's agency, autonomy and consent relate to such 
practices in more complex ways. For example, Meyers includes both African practices 
of FGC and American intersex operations in a 'range of worldwide FGC practices' in 
which women's agency and autonomy are at stake (2000:469). Yet, through 
emphasising the significant variation within practices of genital cutting, and women's 
responses to it, she seeks to 'undercut simplistic dismissals of women's autonomy with 
respect to female genital cutting that rely on attention-grabbing horror stories and 
generalised theories of patriarchal domination' (471). Similarly, Weil Davis 
acknowledges that FGC is often positioned as different from cosmetic surgery on the 
basis of consent (in this construction FGC is understood to be forced on unconsenting 
minors and cosmetic surgery freely sought by consenting adults). She argues, however, 
that 'we must also look at the social and cultural means whereby consent is 
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manufactured, regardless of age, in the West as well as in African and other countries 
engaging in FG[C]' (2002:22). 
The fifth theme focuses on the effects of the various procedures on women's sexuality. 
Meyers argues that both African practices of FGC and nineteenth century American 
clitoridectomies have been connected to the rationale that 'female genital cutting 
reduces women's sexual appetite and enforces noruis of chastity, and thereby protects 
family honour' (2000:472). Similarly, Gunning argues that, in relation to both FGC and 
nineteenth century American clitoridectomies, there have been particular contexts 
where women saw themselves as facing a 'social quagmire' in which 'women undergo 
the surgeries to secure marriage and satisfy their husbands, but the surgeries can lead to 
difficulties in sexual satisfaction for both men and women' (1991:219). Other analyses 
have suggested, however, that both FGC and cosmetic surgery procedures have been 
employed, in particular contexts, with the belief that they will increase women's sexual 
sensitivity and pleasure (Ogbu, 1997:414 cited in Meyers, 2000:472; Braun, 2005). 
Common to all these sub-themes is a linking of FGC and other body altering practices 
on the basis of gender, and in some cases, its intersection with sexuality. Gender and 
sexuality are clearly crucial to the operation all of these embodied practices, which 
makes feminist analysis particularly important in this context. Furthermore, many of 
these gendered comparisons reveal important links between particular forms and aspects 
of embodied practice across cultural contexts which are not often identified within the 
mainstream and are actively effaced by binary constructions which pose the practices as 
fundamentally distinct. 
My concern, however, is that within all these comparisons and continuums, establishing 
similarities on the basis of gender appears to proceed (in part) through a temporary 
erasing of embodied, social and historical differences relating to race, culture, and 
nation. If we examine the language used by particular theorists in their advocacy of the 
continuum and analogue approaches, I think we can detect this inclination to address 
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problematic constructions of race through acts of erasure. For example, as Weil Davis 
makes clear of her own use of a continuum, 
In approaching the politics of female genital operations... I would argue that it is 
imperative that both consent issues and vaginal modifications themselves be considered 
on a continuum that is not determined along hemispheric, national or racial lines 
(2002:27). 
It is clear that she intends here to emphasise that race and nation should not be used to 
differentiate 'Western' and 'non-Western' forms of genital alteration in neo-colonialist 
ways within the continuum model. However, by occluding the significance of 
`hemispheric, national or racial' considerations, she leaves her theoretical models less 
able to deal with the ways in which axes of differentiation such as race, nation and 
culture (in their intersection with gender and sexuality) have been crucial to the 
construction of meaning in relation to different forms of both sets of embodied 
practices. Admittedly, the theorists I am critiquing have been making particular 
political arguments and, as such, have not set out to offer a comprehensive analysis of 
any of the practices, theorising the significance of every axis of social differentiation 
within each specific cultural and historical context. Indeed, attempting to provide an 
analysis which 'does everything' is problematic and counterproductive (Butler, 
1993:18-19). My argument, however, is that if the object is to address the racism and 
cultural essentialism inherent in representations of these embodied practices, a model 
that proceeds by dropping race, nation and cultural difference out of the picture is 
problematic. 
For example, we could construct a continuum which situates particular African 
practices of FGC alongside American labiaplasty on the basis that both procedures 
relate to aesthetic ideals of femininity, pressures to approximate appropriate gendered 
bodily performance and desires to conform on the part of women and girls. These links 
might well be legitimate, but what elements are hidden through this construction? How, 
for example, would historical links between slavery and the development of practices of 
FGC in specific contexts be represented and theorised? Gerry Mackie (1996) has 
outlined a strong connection between the enslavement of Sudanic people by Egyptians 
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in the 15th century and the adoption of FGC in Sudan and Egypt. Documentation from 
this period suggests that female slaves were more lucrative in the Islamic slave trade if 
they were infibulated in a way that made them unable to conceive (Mackie, 1996; 
Boyle, 2002). Here we see how a particular form of FGC in one region may have 
originated and spread through violent embodied encounters in which race, religion and 
cultural difference intersected with gender and sexuality. A model which links FGC 
and 'Western' body altering practices exclusively on the basis of gender and/or sexuality 
risks occluding these intersectional historical trajectories and the role they may play in 
how particular foi 	 ins of FGC are represented and experienced in specific contexts. 
Furthermore, how would a continuum approach take into consideration histories of 
colonial domination and religious imperialism, which have been central to the 
construction of FGC as an oppositional practice in particular contexts? To take the 
example of Kenya, by the 1930s, after more than two centuries of Western Christian 
missionary attempts to ban FGC, the practice had become closely linked to nationalist 
sentiments in the country (predominantly through the rhetoric of nationalist male 
leaders66). In response to such discourses, images of FGC as primitive, barbaric and 
patriarchal were employed by colonial administrators to illustrate why such populations 
were in need of colonial control. This only served to shore up support for the practice 
among some native Kenyans and to intensify nationalist fervour (Njambi, 2004). Thus, 
as Karen Engle and Ranjana Khanna argue, FGC 'is (and was) in at least some places 
for at least some people an oppositional practice. Gender violence and patriarchy 
cannot alone explain it' (1997:76). Without downplaying the patriarchal nature of 
colonial and nationalist rhetoric concerning 'cultural' practice and women's bodies, 
theorising FGC in this context would necessitate an intersectional approach which 
avoids repeatedly privileging one axis of embodied differentiation (i.e. gender) above 
and beyond (or through the erasure of) other articulating axes. 
66 In his national treatise, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu (first published in 1938), 
Jomo Kenyatta, who would later become Kenya's first president, criticised missionaries and other 
Westerners for seeking to eradicate FGC without any true understanding of the practice. He portrayed 
FGC, referred to as `irua', as a source of cultural and ethnic Kikuyu identity (Zabus, 2001:336), 
describing it as 'the very essence of an institution which has enormous educational, social, moral and 
religious implications' (Boyle, 2002:39). 
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We could ask similar questions in relation to practices of cosmetic surgery. How, 
within the continuum model, would the relationship between the construction of 
cosmetic surgery as 'white' and 'Western' and histories of Western imperialism and 
colonial appropriation be represented? The oldest existing records indicate that 
cosmetic surgery originated in Hindu castes in India. 67 Yet, after the 'discovery' (and 
exportation to the West) of such techniques by colonial powers in India, cosmetic 
surgery was appropriated and portrayed as an invention of modern Western medicine 
(Gilman, 1999b:75; Sullivan, 2001:33-4). Western commentators' explanation for why 
traditional Indian medicine had developed such sophisticated procedures (while 
Western physicians had been left in the dark for several centuries) was that Indian 
culture included 'barbaric' customs of punishing thieves, deserters and adulterers which 
made such surgeries necessary, while European cultures did not (Gilman, 1999b:77). 68 
 According to this narrative, it was only through exporting the procedures to the West 
that they could be redefined as civilised within structures of modern medicine and 
culture. Thus, it is through a relational model of colonial othering that cosmetic surgery 
comes to be appropriated and constructed as belonging to the 'West'. Rather than 
effacing such relational constructions, it would seem crucial to recognise and trace the 
processes of their formation. We might also ask how a continuum approach would 
consider the relationship between the medicalization of cosmetic surgery procedures in 
Europe and North America in the nineteenth century and popular racial ideologies or 
how it would enable one to theorise the links between contemporary cosmetic 'beauty' 
procedures such as labiaplasty and breast augmentation and histories of racist aesthetics 
(Gilman, 1999b). 
67 The oldest known written account of surgical reconstruction of the nose and ear lobes is contained in 
the Sushruta Samhita, written approximately 600 BCE and based on the Hindu hymn Rig Veda, which 
originated some 900 years before (Brown 1986, cited in Sullivan, 2001:33). The procedures, which 
involved using skin grafts from the cheek, and later the forehead, were first carried out by families in the 
lowly Hindu castes of potters and bricklayers (Sullivan, 2001:33-4). 
68 While a similar technique had been employed in Europe in the sixteenth century to rebuild syphilitic 
noses, it had subsequently gone into disuse and disappeared until it was 'rediscovered' by British colonial 
powers in India in the eighteenth century, and published in a 1794 edition of The Gentleman's Magazine 
(Gilman, 1999b:9-10). 
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The continuum and analogue approaches would seem to lack the resources to represent 
and theorise the intersection of gender and sexuality with race, cultural difference and 
nation (among other axes of differentiation such as religion, class or ability). 69 This 
weakness is particularly notable in the case of the continuum model which, because of 
its linearity, appears only to work as a means of linking practices through a singular 
model of social differentiation (in this case, gender). Yet a relational, intersectional 
analysis of the practices tells quite a different story than a linear gendered one about the 
relations between practices such as FGC and cosmetic surgery. First, it reveals that the 
practices are disjunctive. For example, particular forms of FGC appear to be linked to 
slavery as well as postcolonial nationalist struggle in ways that practices of cosmetic 
surgery are not. Second, it points to how such practices might be connected in ways 
that cannot be reduced to gender/sexuality. Here, we might consider how the 
development of particular forms of both practice are related to Western imperialism 
during the colonial period. 
I am not arguing here that the thinkers I have mentioned fail to acknowledge the 
importance of race, nation and cultural difference. Indeed, the racial hierarchies 
implicated in certain ways of analysing FGC and other body modifications represent the 
starting point for most of these authors. Weil Davis, for example, discusses the ways in 
which 'gender politics' has often linked with 'racial imperialism' in relation to the 
historical objectification and manipulation of female genitalia (2002:18). Similarly, 
Gunning acknowledges that insidious ideas about race, nation and class intersected with 
those about 'gender' in the development of nineteenth century American 
clitoridectomies." My point is that, after identifying the relevance of race as it 
articulates with gender and sexuality in the development and meaning of particular 
practices, they then go on to advocate models of representing and theorising the 
similarities between particular embodied practices which do not seem capable of 
69 An article in the Guardian, 'Malaysian Muslims told not to use Botox' (Aglionby, 2006), which reports 
on a ruling by the country's National Fatwa Council 'that Botox contains substances prohibited under 
Islam, including those from pigs', suggests that cosmetic procedures such as Botox may also be 
discursively constructed through recourse to religion in various contexts. 
7° She points out that while the operations were practiced mainly on upper or middle class white women, 
related gynaecologic surgeries had first been 'tested' on black slave women and then destitute white 
immigrant women (Baker Brown, 1978 cited in Gunning, 1991:204) 
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illustrating such articulations in any sustained way. It, also seems important that while 
several theorists raise the relevance of issues of race, nation and cultural difference in 
regards to practices of FGC at some point in their texts (if not in the theoretical models 
they employ), most do not see such issues as also relevant to cosmetic surgery. 
Presuming that FGC is 'raced' and that cosmetic surgery is not, may function to keep 
intact the problematic racialised binaries which these theorists want to disrupt. 
From binary to continuum or analogue 
How might we better understand what is happening in this erasing of race at the moment 
that a new representational/theoretical model is conceived or advocated? I use the 
ubiquitous (Euro-American) binary construction of FGC and cosmetic surgery to work 
through this process. It is relevant here to remember that within this dualism the 'victim 
of female genital mutilation' is invariably raced and coded as 'black', whilst the 
`cosmetic surgery consumer' is (almost) always de-raced and hence coded as 'white' 
(whiteness, within this construction, is seen as not having to do with race, which is only 
seen to accord with blackness). These codings of race are then associated 
problematically with ideas about culture and agency, as depicted in the chart below. 
`Victim of female genital mutilation' 
Black 
African/Asian/Middle Eastern 
Oppressed by culture 
Sexuality repressed by others 
Victim of primitive tradition/custom 
`Cosmetic surgery consumer' 
White 
Western 
Operating outside realm of culture or 
actively negotiating flexible cultural 
norms 
Seeking to enhance own sexuality 
Active consumer of modern 
science/technology 
In order to upset this racialised, culturally essentialist binary, the continuum and 
analogue approaches are then used by feminist theorists to link the two sets of embodied 
practices and their imagined figures as common gendered subjects through constructing 
a continuous `raceless' plane, as depicted in the chart below. 
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2 
`Common gendered subject' of female genital cutting and cosmetic surgery 
Restricted by heterosexist norm of dichotomous gender identification 
Compelled to achieve bodily nouns of ideal femininity 
Under pressure to perform appropriate gendered bodily performance 
Desire to conform and validate membership within female community/peer group 
Member of society/cultural group in which choice and consent are manufactured 
In the movement from the top chart to the bottom chart, the continuum and analogue 
approaches work to collapse the original binary into a single field. 7 ' The imagined 
characteristics of the common gendered subject on the bottom chart (relating to 
gender/sexuality) do not, on the whole, correspond with those listed in the binary chart 
above (relating to race, nation, culture). Where we do see an overlap is in regards to 
sexuality and agency. However, whilst in the original binary, agency and sexuality 
were figured differentially on the basis of ideas about race, nation and culture, now 
agency and sexuality are linked with gender. From this perspective, the continuum and 
analogue approaches have not specifically interrogated each point of assumed 
difference within original binary, but rather have replaced the entire binary with a new 
construction emphasising similarity. The new 'common gendered subject' is a de-raced 
subject — it has been constructed through erasing the previous divisions of race, culture 
and nation. 
Yet while race, cultural difference and nation, on the one hand, are erased within such 
analyses, they problematically resurface on the other hand. Indeed, the 'common 
gendered subject' is only a façade, temporarily disguising the role that race, nation and 
cultural difference continue to play within the continuum approach. The continuum 
functions as a rather 'fuzzy' model in these texts: no one ever seeks explicitly to plot 
various embodied practices on a continuum structure and it is assumed that there are 
71 	• 	• Within the analogue approach both subjects would exhibit each of the criteria or characteristics listed 
in the chart in (largely) analogous ways, whilst in the continuum approach it is assumed that there will be 
some differences in the quality of or degree to which each criteria is exhibited or experienced by the 
different cultural subjects and these differences will determine at which points particular subjects are 
placed on continuum structure. 
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sections within which distinctions between practices will be blurred. There are still, 
however, implicit assumptions being made about where particular practices would sit in 
relation to each other. One clear example of this is Gunning's implication that only 
practices of FGC, and not the other 'Western' body altering procedures she discusses 
are in need of eradication. These assumptions are often highly racialised — those 
practices which are seen to be raced (various fauns of African, Middle-Eastern or 
Asian-rooted FGC) are on the whole seen to be more extreme, harmful or damaging, 
and thus are imagined as sitting towards one pole of the continuum whereas those 
practices which continue to be seen as de-raced or un-raced (cosmetic surgery, 
reproductive surgery, intersex surgery) are assumed to be less extreme, harmful or 
damaging and are thus imagined as sitting towards the opposite pole. From this 
perspective, within the continuum model, race continues to play the problematic role 
that it did within the original essentialist binary. Rather than upsetting the binary 
structure, the continuum has merely stretched it out, leaving its previous divisions more 
or less in tact. While the analogue often risks collapsing into uncritical assertions of 
sameness, its simultaneous susceptibility to slipping into the continuum mode (as noted 
in Gunning's text) reveals what is often a continuing dependence on racialised scales of 
difference. To be clear, my point here is not to deny that some practices are more 
extreme or carry greater health risks than others, but to call attention to the ways in 
which particular notions about race and culture often operate 'invisibly' in the process 
of making such distinctions. 
Empathy, Location and the 'Right' to Represent 
In linking FGC with other body modification practices, several feminist theorists 
working in the West have argued for the importance of establishing empathy with those 
in 'other' cultural groups through recognising 'common' experiences of violence or 
oppression. For example, Gunning's use of the analogue approach seeks to compel 
Western feminists to empathise with women in other global locations, by endeavouring 
to 'see' such women as these women 'see themselves'. As mentioned earlier, Gunning 
sees the development of such empathic understanding as aided by 'an in depth look at 
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one's own complex cultural context in search of analogues to culturally challenging 
practices in the "other's" culture' (1991:205). In other words, being able to empathise 
with `the other' in her cultural context requires that the Western subject identify similar 
experiences in her own context. In constructing nineteenth century circumcisions 
performed on women in the West as an analogue to contemporary practices of FGC in 
Africa, Gunning implores Western feminists to empathise with African women who 
`today' face 'the same problem of female genital surgeries' (211). 
Similarly, Meyers argues that empathy on the part of Western subjects is important in 
disrupting conceptions of embodied practices such as FGC and intersex surgery as 
fundamentally different: 
Sensitized to the role that Western gender norms are playing in one's empathy for the 
American mother, one now appreciates how potent culturally specific feminine bodily 
norms are, and one can sympathetically reconstruct how a vastly different set of norms 
could figure in an African mother's feelings and decision about infibulation (2000:486). 
Like Gunning, she suggests that developing transnational empathy requires that, 
through introspection, the Western subject 'discover hidden similarities between others' 
experience and one's own' (486). 72 
As a concept, empathy has been important to the development of feminist ethics and 
epistemologies. 73 From my own perspective as a Western researcher working on cross-
cultural and transnational issues, empathy seems important as a continuous reminder 
that the embodied practices I discuss do not exist merely as words on a page, but are 
linked to real women with real experiences and emotions, which may include pain and 
suffering, but also joy and pleasure. The process of trying to understand the 
circumstances a woman might face, and the feelings she might have, in a cultural 
72 Although, in contrast to Gunning, Meyers' language in this example does not suggest that the Western 
subject should consider the two practices 'the same'. Indeed she suggests that the two sets of practices 
involve 'vastly different' sets of norms. In addition to this example of transnational empathy, Meyers 
also discusses the importance of developing empathy within particular local communities that are divided 
by differences in regards to religion, socio-economic class, sexuality etc. This particular invocation of 
empathy is not about encouraging privileged the Western subject to empathise with the Third world 
`other' (2000:485). 
73 See, for example, Hill Collins, 1990; Meyers, 1994; Koehn, 1998. 
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context very different from one's own seems crucial to conducting valid and ethical 
research. I remain concerned, however, about the effects of developing an 'empathy' 
imagined or produced through collapsing critical historical and contextual distinctions 
between different embodied locations, practices and subjectivities. The potential for 
appropriation on the part of the privileged 'Western' subject in this context is especially 
worrying. 
I am using the term 'Western' here to denote a geo-political location of relative social 
and economic privilege within transnational circuits of academic knowledge production 
and dissemination. The individual theorists whom I include in this category are of 
course located (and hence privileged) differently on the basis of intersecting axes of 
social differentiation such as race, ethnicity, class, nation and sexuality. For example, 
while Meyers locates herself as a white, Western feminist theorist, Gunning 
acknowledges that she speaks from the position of an African American, feminist 
scholar. Other feminist thinkers working on these issues within various Western 
contexts may identify as 'African', 'Black (African identified)', or in a multitude of 
other ways that complicate any clear-cut binary of 'privileged Western theorist' and 
`African other'. Such specificities relating to social location and identity will surely 
make a difference to (without directly determining) the ways in which particular cross-
cultural constructions of empathy are formed and interpreted in a variety of ways I want 
to acknowledge and do not have space to explore fully here. I am aware that in tracing 
the construction of a generalised 'Western empathetic gaze' I sacrifice a more in depth 
analysis of the complexities and contradictions of feminist social and geo-political 
positionalities and discursive strategies. However, I would argue that there are also 
important locational specificities and discursive patterns associated with 'the West' in 
an academic and political context within which Western hegemony remains salient 
(Mohanty, 1991; Grewal and Kaplan, 1994). Such patterns need to be examined and 
highlighted precisely so that they may be accounted for and addressed. Indeed, what is 
interesting, and problematic, about a number of 'Western' constructions of cross-
cultural empathy articulated from different social locations is the way in which they 
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nevertheless function to reify dominant Western dualisms and discursive hierarchies 
(though in different ways and to different degrees). 
It is well known that within feminist circles (and more broadly), practices of FGC have 
been the focus of intense ongoing debates about location and representation. In a 
historical context in which African women's bodies have been routinely fetishised, 
pathologised and violated by Westerners, interventions in discourses relating to the 
eradication of FGC by Western feminists, and other commentators outside of particular 
FGC-practicing communities, have been perceived by many African women as 
ethnocentric and imperialist. In such circumstances, arguments have developed about 
who has the 'right' to represent the interests of women who practice (or are at risk of) 
FGC and have been directly linked with particular ideas about embodied location. 
For example, the Women's Caucus of the African Studies Association argue that 
`changes in the practice of clitoridectomy and infibulation in Africa must be initiated 
and carried out by members of those African cultures in which the custom exists' 
(2002/1983:2). By contrast, Christine Walley claims that practical or representational 
restrictions made on the basis of experience or race and ethnicity essentialise 'both 
practitioners and non-practitioners by locating them in bounded groups assumed to 
share common beliefs — a reductionist view that ignores a far messier reality' (2002:21). 
Within a political framework in which representation is a fraught issue, the continuum 
and analogue approaches may be employed by 'outsiders', in part, as a strategy to 
establish their authority to speak. If, through the production of cross-cultural 
`empathy', a Western feminist theorist can show that FGC is inherently similar to 
practices within her 'own' culture, such as cosmetic surgery, body art or operations on 
intersex babies, and that such body modifications thus represent something shared 
across cultures, then perhaps she can more easily establish her legitimacy to represent 
`contested' cultural practices such as FGC. Gunning, for example, argues that, 
As feminists... we must develop a method of understanding culturally challenging 
practices, like female genital surgeries... The focus needs to be on multicultural 
dialogue and a shared search for areas of overlap, shared concerns and values (191). 
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Her claim that 'The focus needs to be on multicultural dialogue' functions implicitly to 
reject claims (such as that of the WCASA's) that only those who are part of cultures in 
which FGC is practiced should have the right to initiate changes in relation to FGC. 
Similarly, Kathy Davis encourages 'sympathetic' cross-cultural comparisons between 
FGC and intersex surgeries. She writes: 
Genital cutting in all its manifestations, both in Africa and in the west, demands a 
reflexive and sympathetic politics of engagement. This is not the time for feminists in 
different parts of the world to "back off" and focus on their own parochial concerns, 
rather it is time to take up the challenge posed by transnational feminism and find ways 
to build coalitions around issues that are of concern to us all (italics mine) (2004:309). 
Within this statement about challenging ethnocentrism, there is an explicit claim about 
Davis's (and other Western theorists') authority and legitimacy to speak about FGC. 
Presumably, in this context, it is the privileged Western feminist, and not the indigenous 
African or 'Third world' feminist, who worries (or has been told) that she should 'back 
off and focus on her 'own parochial concerns'. 
Making claims which establish one's legitimacy or authority to speak is important, and 
indeed necessary, on an ongoing basis in academic discourse and dialogue. Clearly, as 
a white, Western scholar, I have been involved in multiple acts of implicitly 
establishing my own legitimacy to discuss such issues throughout this thesis. As I have 
suggested, I realise that some might wish to dispute my 'right' to intervene in these 
debates. However, like Walley, I feel that placing restrictions on the 'right' to speak or 
represent on the basis of 'experience' or various other embodied axis of differentiation 
can be highly problematic due to the essentialist distinctions they construct. 74 Yet if 
privileged 'Western' theorists are claiming their 'right' to represent or speak about 
particular embodied practices via constructions of cross-cultural empathy, it seems 
important to interrogate the relations of power through which this 'empathy' is 
74 There is also the question of how practical, or indeed possible, it is to delineate particular embodied 
locations, in definite and distinct ways. For example, whilst the Women's Caucus of the African Studies 
Association argues that changes in practices of FGC in Africa 'must be initiated and carried out by 
members of those African cultures in which the custom exists' (2002/1983:2), the boundaries of this 
category remain blurry. Does it refer only to indigenous Africans living within circumcising 
communities or does it also include African Americans (such as Gunning) who identify with African 
culture, yet live and work in the United States, and claim no attachment with circumcising communities? 
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produced and may in turn reify. From my perspective, an empathy based on claims to 
commonality risks appropriating 'points of view and modes of expression from the so-
called margins and mystiffying] the very workings of power that enable such 
appropriations' (Kaplan, 1994:148). It thus seems necessary to ask whether Western 
theorists' constructions of cross-cultural commonality can generate empathetic 
engagement with differently situated subjects that is grounded in an awareness of the 
relations of power which condition their interaction or whether they are more likely to 
shore up Western hegemony precisely through covering over such power differentials. 
Interestingly, there are also examples where continuum and analogue approaches are 
employed by Western feminists as a rhetorical device within discourses which take 
`Western' practices as their focus, rather than as a means to enter debates relating to 
African practices of FGC. For example, Cheryl Chase links African-rooted FGC with 
American intersex surgery to raise awareness for the US intersex campaign, which 
seeks to call attention to the dangerous and damaging effects of 'corrective' surgery on 
intersex babies. Chase, who is Executive Director of the Intersex Society of North 
America, opens the article by criticising 'media and scholarly discourses on "female 
genital mutilation" which have not engaged with intersex surgeries, 'instead serving up 
only representations of African women' (2002:126). She frames her concern with this 
phenomenon as one relating to ethnocentrism: 
These discourses continue a long tradition of making Africans into the "other", 
suggesting that ethnocentrism is a key factor in the sometimes purposeful maintenance 
of ignorance about contemporary US genital surgeries (126). 
Implied by Chase's opening critique is her belief that FGC and intersex surgery should 
be considered as analogous, rather than fundamentally different. While one might 
expect the following text to focus on both sets of practices and draw out the links or 
similarities that may exist between them, the article never makes any explicit case for 
why FGC and intersex surgery should be considered analogous. While Chase's article 
provides a sophisticated and compassionate critique of intersex surgery, the link she 
suggests (rather than establishes) between intersex surgery and African FGC is 
predominantly no more than rhetorical. In this sense, it could be argued that while 
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Chase, as an intersex person, speaks from a relatively marginal Western position, her 
text nevertheless functions to shore up dominant geo-political relations of power 
because she appropriates FGC as a tool to critique various aspects of 'Western' culture. 
Through such a discursive move, critical attention is once again turned back on the 
Western `self and the fetishised figure of the African 'victim of female genital 
mutilation' may be reified rather than displaced as the surface of her text suggests. 
Returning to Gunning's use of empathy, she claims that in linking contemporary 
African practices of FGC with nineteenth century American clitoridectomies, her 
intention is not 'to suggest that because Western women have confronted and 
"overcome" the specific problem, the practice of genital surgery is a "phase" cultures 
pass through; that whatever was done in Western societies just needs to be done in 
African societies' (1991:226). Yet the language she uses to call for empathy from 
Western women - 'It is part of our own history' (italics mine) (211) — suggests that 
Western women are being asked to develop empathy on the basis of experiences they 
have apparently already worked though. As such, it risks preserving particularly 
problematic notions of cultural difference related to assumptions of advancement and 
progress. In this case it may be that, as Sara Ahmed articulates in another context, 
`empathy sustains the very difference that it may seek to overcome' (2004a:30). 
Earlier, I suggested that Gunning's analogue approach might not be faithful to, or 
compatible with, Lugones' original world-travelling method. However, in addressing 
the relationship between empathy and privilege, we may also want to consider whether 
Lugones' methodology has its own potential weaknesses. Her playful approach to 
travelling seeks to encourage identification between divergently situated women 
through enabling an awareness and respect for each other's differences, rather than the 
establishment of inherent or essential similarities. Yet, her notion that world-travelling 
enables one to 'see oneself in other women who are quite different from oneself' opens 
itself to a rather different interpretation (393). It may risk enabling a problematic 
projection of the self onto the other, in ways that maintain the privileged self's status as 
the one who is always imagining, seeing, and contemplating her own subjectivity 
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through others, and hence moulding others in her own image. As Adrianna Cavarero 
argues, 'To recognise oneself in the other is indeed quite different from recognizing the 
irremediable uniqueness of the other' (italics in original) (2000:91). 
As a strategy for establishing anti-cultural essentialist commonality, empathy may be 
limited to the second stage of Margrit Shildrick and Raia Prokhovnik's strategy for 
disrupting essentialist binaries. In aiding the 'Western self' to see hidden similarities 
between herself and the 'non-Western other', this approach may collapse into a 
`sameness' which, in flattening histories of embodied differentiation, simply reifies the 
essentialist differences identified as problematic in the first place. Histories of othering 
and violence through which particular embodied identities and practices have been 
(re)constituted, such as slavery, colonialism and racism, are again effaced and the 
cultural and historical context in which particular practices are constructed can be 
forgotten. 75 
Conclusions: Ways Forward 
An alternative model of empathy might seek to develop understanding, awareness and 
compassion by tracing the processes through which embodied and cultural differences 
are relationally constituted. In this vein, I would like to think further about how 
empathy might be more effectively grounded in an embodied politics of location which 
emphasises political and epistemological accountability within feminist transnational 
and cross-cultural contexts. This focus suggests the need to explore how empathy in 
relation to embodied practices might further upset geo-political hierarchies of power 
and involve more mutual or dialogic processes. As I indicated earlier, my analysis 
raises questions about how cultural context and social location may affect the operation, 
effects and reception of empathy as a discursive strategy. While my critiques have 
75 Karen Engle and Ranjana Khanna have similarly critiqued the ways in which empathy is used as a tool 
in transnational politics in Alice Walker's novel Warrior Marks (1993). They suggest that in linking 
African practices of FGC, gum surgery and her own eye injury as a child by her brother with a bb gun as 
comparable forms of patriarchal 'mutilation', Walker employs a 'particular transnational empathy' which 
`suggests that the cultural context of wounding is irrelevant' (Engle and Khanna,1997:69). 
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centred around the potential for reifying problematic discursive hierarchies associated 
with 'Western' feminist perspectives, it would be interesting and vital to consider how 
specificities and complexities within the category 'Western feminist theorists' play out 
in this context. It would also be useful to examine how the employment of cross-
cultural techniques by feminists working within other geo-political locations may raise 
different issues or concerns. For example, what difference would it have made to 
centralise the ways in which 'African women' both in Africa and the West, or Black 
(African-identified) women in the West, either as migrants of settlers, have discussed 
such issues? 
Looking at the bigger picture, my critique of the continuum and analogue approaches 
underscores the imperative, suggested in Chapter One, to think about how to theorise 
the relations between self and other differently. The original FGC/cosmetic surgery (or 
FGC/intersex surgery) binary holds these two practices and their imagined subjects 
apart in a hierarchical relationship of difference (A/not-A). While purporting to disrupt 
the binary structure, the continuum and analogue approaches end up either stretching 
out the binary but keeping its extreme poles of self and other intact, or merging the two 
sides of the binary together through collapsing self into other. Both models fail to 
interrogate the social and historical embodied processes through which self and other 
have been constructed as oppositional. As I have suggested here and in the previous 
two chapters, one way to think about the self/other dynamic differently in this context is 
to theorise self and other relationally. In the context of this analysis, a relational 
perspective would ask: How are the figures of 'the cosmetic surgery consumer' and 'the 
victim of female genital mutilation' constituted (in part) in and through one another? 
What social and historical processes of saming and othering are involved in their 
ongoing (re)construction? I take up these questions in Chapter Six. In the next chapter, 
I examine a third cross-cultural model, the subset approach, which is used to link 
various embodied practices as 'similar' or 'universal'. Through my discussion of the 
ways in which the subset approach is employed to group together different practices of 
passing in feminist and other critical literatures, I also seek to further develop a focus on 
relationality as an alternative to commonality-oriented, cross-cultural models. 
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Chapter Four: 
Race, Gender, Sexuality and the Politics of Passing 
A Critique of the Subset Approach 
Just as the ontology of race exposes the contingencies of the categories "white" and 
"black", so the ontology of gender exposes the essential inauthenticity of "man" and 
"woman"... Further, like race passing, gender passing creates category crisis. 
Elaine Ginsberg, 1996:13 
In her introduction to the collection Passing and the Fictions of Identity (1996), Elaine 
Ginsberg compares the passing narratives of Edmund Kenney, a black slave who 
escaped from a Virginia slave owner through disguising himself as white, and Brandon 
Teena, an American teenager born with female anatomy who moved to Nebraska to live 
as a man, later to be raped and murdered by two men who discovered his 'true' identity. 
On the basis of these examples, she argues that both 'race passing' and 'gender passing' 
involve the negotiation of identities that are simultaneously socially constructed and 
biologically inflected and operate within an economy of specularity (2). Moreover, and 
fundamentally for Ginsberg, both forms of passing represent acts of boundary crossing 
which produce 'category crisis' and hence the possibility of disrupting essentialist 
bodily binaries. 
Within gender, postcolonial, queer and cultural studies, links between practices of 
passing in relation to race and passing in relation to gender have been highlighted by a 
number of critical theorists. For example, linking the case of Susie Gilroy Phipps who 
took the State of Louisiana to court in 1981 for refusing to change her birth certificate 
(which recorded her racial designation as 'colored') to read 'white', and Sean O'Neill, a 
teenager from Colorado who, like Brandon Teena, was born with female genitalia but 
passed as a man, Catherine Squires and Daniel Brouwer (2002) compare news media 
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coverage of 'race passing' and 'gender passing'. They note similarities between 'Black 
and queer coverage' of the two types of passing, such as 'community consternation 
about the passer', as well as differences, including 'disparate focus on civil rights rather 
than identity issues' (283). Kathy Davis (2003a) suggests that all practices of cosmetic 
surgery, whether to alter perceived 'racial or ethnic features' or to enhance 'femininity', 
should be understood via a model of 'surgical passing'. 76 She maintains that 'the desire 
to become "ethnically invisible" resonates with the wish to become "normal", "just like 
everyone else"', expressed by many (white) female cosmetic surgery patients (89). 
Moreover, Marjorie Garber (1992) argues that transvestism has in common with other 
types of crossing or passing (such as those centred around categories of race, class, or 
religion) the ability to create 'category crisis': 'a failure of definitional distinction, a 
borderline that becomes permeable, that permits border crossing from one (apparently 
distinct) category to another' (16). Comparisons have also been made between race 
and/or ethnicity passing and passing in relation to sexual identity or sexual preference. 
Linda Schlossberg (2001) notes the ways in which experiences of passing have been 
seen as comparable for Jews and homosexuals in that they 'share the dubious honor of 
being largely invisible or unreadable' (2). Due to anxieties surrounding physical 
intelligibility, both groups have been subject to a barrage of pseudo scientific literature 
devoted to identifying the 'Jewish' and 'homosexual' body (2). Furthermore, Amy 
Robinson (1994) suggests that both race and sexuality passing depend on 'a skill of 
reading' on the part of African American and/or gay and lesbian spectators (716). 
Unlike the feminist theorists who compare 'African' female genital cutting with 
`Western' body modifications, authors who link various folins of passing are not, on the 
whole, seeking specifically to disrupt culturally essentialist First world/Third world, 
West/non-West binaries. The particular styles, arguments and motivations of authors 
who make such passing comparisons vary. However, in common with the previous 
case study, they are all interested in the possibility of disrupting essentialist notions of 
76 Davis draws on the work of Sander Gilman who, in Making the Body Beautifid: A Cultural History of 
Aesthetic Surgery (1999b), argues that 'the model of "passing" is the most fruitful to use in examining the 
history and efficacy of cosmetic surgery' (22), 
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embodied identity categories. They all seek to assess whether (or not) passing 
represents a critical practice capable of radically resignifying bodily binaries. 
The term 'passing' describes an individual (or group of people) regarded by others as 
belonging to an embodied identity group (i.e. race, gender, sexuality, class 77 etc.) which 
is not their `own'. 78 Thus, a person who considers herself to be, or has habitually been 
labelled by others as, 'black' may, in particular circumstances, pass for 'white'. 
Historically associated most commonly with discourses of racial difference and the 
legacies of slavery and segregation, the practice of passing is often represented as a 
deliberate strategy on the part of light-skinned blacks to gain improved social status 
and/or political and legal rights and privileges (although in many cases it would more 
accurately be described as a matter of life and death). This 'social mobility framework' 
has also been applied to interpret acts of passing on the basis of gender. For example, 
when 1920s American jazz pianist and saxophonist Billy Tipton (who was married with 
three adopted sons) was discovered to be a 'woman' upon his death in 1989, his long-
terin practice of 'gender passing' was interpreted by many as a means to pursue a career 
as a musician in the male-dominated world of jazz. However, as I argue in this chapter, 
social mobility frameworks are often reductive. Passing may be motivated by a wide 
range of overlapping (and conflicting) concerns, from safety and social mobility to 
erotic excitement and pleasure and may be deliberate or unintended, permanent or 
temporary. 
From one perspective, the very possibility of 'passing' depends on the essentialist 
assumption that there exist discrete, natural identity categories which people inhabit 
from birth and may subsequently transgress. Yet passing is complex and does not 
always refer to the category one is assumed to be passing into. For instance, Judith 
Shapiro argues that 'transsexuals commonly believe that it is when they are trying to 
77 While class may at first not appear to be an 'embodied' category in the same way as race or gender, 
critical theorists of class have argued that the body is the most prominent location for the materialization 
of class tastes (Bourdieu, 1984) and that 'the body and bodily dispositions carry the markers of social 
class' (Skeggs, 1997:82). 
78  Passing has also been discussed in relation to other identity categories, such as for example, religion 
(Schlossberg and Sanchez, 2001) ethnicity and culture (Melman, 1992; Lewis, 2004; Zayzafoon, 2005). 
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play the role of their anatomical sex, as opposed to their subjectively experienced 
gender, that they are trying to pass as something they are not' (1991:256). Furthermore, 
passing is not always (if ever) associated with a simple binary (i.e. black/white, 
male/female, heterosexual/homosexual). It is often intersectional, involving movement 
within and articulation between multiple identity categories. Several theorists have 
noted, for instance, how within African American literature, 'race passing' is often 
combined with 'sexuality passing' and/or gender-oriented cross-dressing (Garber, 1992; 
Ginsberg, 1996; Somerville, 2000; Schlossberg, 2001). 
One of the greatest complexities of passing is the paradox that defines it as a critical 
practice. While the logic of passing involves convincing some other(s) that one belongs 
to a particular embodied group that, 'in reality', one does not, it is only through 
detection — through the failure to pass — that passing becomes intelligible as a critical 
act. As Carole-Anne Tyler comments, 'passing can only name the very failure of 
passing, an indication of a certain impossibility at its heart, of the contradictions which 
constitute it' (1994:212). Judith Butler's theory of perfonnativity depends critically on 
what we might refer to as the strategic failure of passing. This paradox of passing is a 
point to which I return later in the chapter, relating it to concerns of intelligibility and 
visibility. 
The politics of passing are highly relevant to the concerns of relationality, embodiment, 
intersectionality, (anti)essentialism, identity politics and visibility that I explore in this 
thesis. However, a significant amount has already been written about passing within 
feminist and other literatures and, as such, I do not seek to offer original historical, 
social or cultural analyses of passing practices per se. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore how the linking of embodied cultural practices works within this particular 
dynamic, whilst highlighting some of the similarities and differences with the 
comparisons made in the previous chapter. Through my analysis of the literature on 
passing, I also further develop my approach to relationality as a conceptual tool. A 
number of key questions arise: Through which processes and models is 'race passing' 
linked to 'gender passing' and 'sexuality passing' in these texts? How are the 
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relationships between various axes of embodied differentiation represented and 
theorised within such models? How can we understand the motivations of different 
authors for making such links and what are the potential effects of these comparisons? 
How might passing be theorised as a relational, performative practice? 
All the authors discussed in this chapter seek to call attention to, or disrupt, the 
problematic constructions of race, gender and sexuality (among other categories) as 
natural, ontological categories, which often underscore problematic identity politics. 
While some employ versions of the continuum and analogue models discussed in 
Chapter Three, others adopt a slightly different linking strategy which I refer to as the 
`subset model'. The subset approach involves grouping together a number of different 
passing practices which, on the basis of various criteria, are seen to fall within the same 
performative sphere. Through subsuming an array of embodied cultural practices in the 
realm of 'the same', however, the subset approach often fails to theorise effectively the 
relational, intersectional nature of passing and the important historical, contextual and 
political distinctions between different passing practices. 
In the first part of this chapter, I examine a slippage which occurs within several texts 
from comparisons between specific passing practices to much more generalised claims 
about the nature of all passing. I consider how authors who use the subset approach 
also often employ problematically reductive thematic models, such as the social 
mobility framework, as a means to link various acts of passing. In the second part, I 
identify and evaluate two key claims made by advocates of the subset approach: 'the 
passing as subversive' and 'we are all passing' arguments. Both claims risk flattening 
critical political, historical and embodied distinctions between passing practices. I also 
examine how, due to a problematic reliance on registers of visibility, the linking of 
passing practices through the subset model can result in the fetishisation of transgender, 
transsexual and mixed-race subjects. I conclude by suggesting that an approach which 
historicises the relational construction of particular passing practices may provide a 
more effective framework for theorising the constitutive links between passing 
formations without occluding or fetishising their particularities. 
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Passing and the Subset Model: Too Wide, Too Narrow 
The theorists discussed in this chapter indicate varying political agendas for linking 
different passing practices. Some authors who connect race passing with gender 
passing seek specifically to interrogate problematic constructions of race and gender 
which pose one as ontologically prior to, or more fundamental than, the other. As such, 
they aim to illustrate the ways in which race and gender operate as similarly structured 
identity categories in passing and crossing narratives. For example, contesting Henry 
Louis Gates' assertion that race is 'the ultimate trope of difference', Ginsberg argues 
that in relation to passing, gender 'is a trope of difference that shares with race... a 
similar structure of identity categories whose enactments and boundaries are culturally 
policed' (1996:13). 79 For Amy Robinson (1994), it is a desire to interrogate 'the 
inadequate dichotomy of visibility and invisibility' that motivates her complex linking 
of race and sexuality passing. She seeks to develop 'a vocabulary of passing... in terms 
of the spectatorial positions produced in response to the pass' (723) that disrupts the 
construction of race and sexual preference 'as binary opposites in a visual economy of 
readable identity' (717). Other theorists, such as Judith Shapiro (1991), who comments 
that 'addressing gender issues through sex change surgery is a bit like turning to 
dermatologists to solve the race problem' (262), make links between different forms of 
passing in order to deny specificity to transsexuality as a sexual (and political) identity, 
in part, as a means to preserve 'sexuality' or 'queer studies' as an umbrella category. 
Many of the authors make links between various passing practices through the use of a 
model I call the 'subset approach'. As discussed in the previous chapter, the continuum 
model imagines particular procedures on a broad spectrum of embodied practices 
deemed similar to varying degrees and the analogue model involves making specific 
links between two or more practices deemed alike. The subset model operates through 
79 Ginsberg's objection to the ontological privileging of one axis of embodied differentiation (race) as 
more fundamental than another (gender) reflects concerns similar to my own expressed in Chapter Three 
where I criticised the repeated privileging of gender and sexuality (to the exclusion of race) in feminist 
linkings of FGC and body modification. However, unlike Ginsberg, I would not advocate establishing 
race and gender as analogous as a means of ameliorating the problems with accounts or models which 
privilege one axis of differentiation. 
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drawing a permeable boundary line around a group of practices seen, on the basis of 
various commonalities, as belonging to the same performative sphere. My 
understanding of the subset model has been aided by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's (2003) 
discussion of `periperformative utterances'. In her study of performative language, 
Sedgwick names `periperfoiniative' those sentences and sentence complexes which do 
not fall into the category of explicit performative utterances (as delineated by J. L. 
Austin in How To Do Things With Words) but instead allude to such utterances: 
Teriperformative utterances aren't just about performative utterances in a referential 
sense: they cluster around them, they are near them or next to them or crowding against 
them: they are in the neighbourhood of the performative' (2003:68). This idea of 
particular utterances or acts clustering together within the same 'neighbourhood' is 
what the subset model seeks to convey as an approach to linking different passing 
practices. 
In the examples discussed in this chapter, the subset model is employed to link practices 
seen to be in close proximity to one another because they are constituted by identity 
categories, namely race, gender and sexuality, which are seen to be structurally similar 
and which often intersect. Race and gender are both understood to be socially 
constructed and (re)produced through regimes of visibility, as well as being biologically 
inflected and legally constrained. Furthermore, both categories are articulated through 
dominant binaries (white/black and male/female) in which the so called 'inferior' or 
`not-A' terms (`black' and 'female') often stand for the category as a whole (i.e. black 
is constructed as a metonymy for race while female is produced as a metonymy for 
gender). These marginalised categories are also frequently read into one another (i.e. 
race, read as 'black' or 'non-white', is often either effeminised or hyper-masculinised). 
Furthermore, and crucially, race and gender (as well as sexuality) are understood as 
performative categories that may be interrogated, disrupted and potentially 'constructed 
differently' (Butler, 1999/1990:11). For many of the theorists discussed in this chapter, 
the subset model serves as a tool for linking passing practices understood to be 
potentially subversive in their ability to disrupt 'natural' identity categories and 
deconstruct essentialist bodily binaries. In this respect, the subset model is itself 
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periperfoirnative because it yokes together various performative acts or processes 
through making statements about their shared structural similarities and potential social 
and political effects (Sedgwick, 2003:79). 80 
In this vein, I want to consider some of the similarities between Judith Butler's work on 
performativity and texts that link passing practices through the subset model. Like 
those authors who include race passing and gender and/or sexuality passing within a 
single subset of subversive acts of embodied disruption, Butler claims commonalities 
between 'a set of parodic practices... that disrupt the categories of the body, sex, gender 
and sexuality and occasion their subversive resignification beyond the binary frame' 
(1999/1990, xxxi). She is also interested in exploring how performative practices which 
transgress binary categories of gender and sexuality may be linked to those that 
negotiate and disrupt racial boundaries (1999/1990, 1993, 1997). For example, (in a 
pertinent footnote) Butler acknowledges a similarity between her theories of gender 
perfointativity and those of the postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha, who explores the 
possibility of disrupting the categories of race, ethnicity and culture through the practice 
of mimicry. 
Bhabha's work on the mimetic splitting of the postcolonial subject is close to mine in 
several ways: not only the appropriation of the colonial "voice" by the colonized, but 
the split condition of identification are crucial to a notion of perfonnativity that 
emphasizes the way minority identities are produced and given at the same time under 
conditions of domination (1999/1990:192, note 11). 
For Butler, what links the categories of gender, sexuality and race is their own 
inadequacy. Like heterosexual gender norms, rigid racial boundaries are 'continually 
haunted by their own inefficacy, hence the anxiously repeated effort to install and 
augment their jurisdiction' (1999/1990:237). 81 Performative acts such as drag, racial 
mimicry and passing can thus all function as resignificatory practices which achieve 
subversion through 'working the weakness in the norm' (237). In this sense, we might 
80 'Though not themselves performatives', periperformative utterances 'are about performatives' 
(Sedgwick, 2003:68). 
81 In Bodies that Matter (1993) Butler is particularly interested in how performative practices involve 
complex articulations of gender, sexuality and race. She explores how, in Nella Larsen's novel Passing, 
practices of passing disrupt the claim 'that sexual difference is more primary or more fundamental that 
other kinds of differences, including racial difference' (1993:181). 
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see Butler as pursuing a strategy comparable to the subset approach in her linking of 
different parodic practices on the basis of their similar subversive potential. 82 
Expansion and slippage 
A crucial feature of the subset model is that its circumferences are not fixed. Sedgwick 
explains that 'like the neighbourhoods in real estate ads, periperformative 
neighbourhoods have prestigious centres (the explicit performative utterance) but no 
very fixed circumferences' (2003:68). Indeed, the subset model is in part defined by its 
ability to expand its performative reach, subsuming within its boundaries an increasing 
array of perfoimative practices. While it usually starts on a small scale by describing a 
specific passing practice or theorising the similarities between two particular passing 
narratives, it often then moves on to encompass a wider host of practices and 
experiences which may be peripheral to the initial explicit comparison or object of 
analysis. For example, Davis (2003a) jumps from making a specific comparison 
between cosmetic surgery to enhance 'femininity' and surgery to alter 'ethnic markers' 
to claiming that all forms of cosmetic surgery can be subsumed within a model of 
passing: 
I raise the question of how such ethnic cosmetic surgery might differ from other types 
of cosmetic surgery (such as breast augmentations for "enhancing" femininity or face-
lifts to eliminate signs of aging) and, more generally, whether ethnic cosmetic surgery 
raises different nonnative or ethical issues (73). 
7 
Passing is the basic motivation for any form of cosmetic surgery, whether ethnically 
marked features are involved or not... In short, cosmetic surgery is a form of "surgical 
passing" (78). 
82 Butler is at pains to emphasise in Bodies that Matter and in the 10 th anniversary volume of Gender 
Trouble (1999), however, that, contrary to the ways in which her arguments in the 1990 text were widely 
interpreted, performativity should not be confused with the deliberate act of performance on the part of a 
voluntarist subject (1993:225). 
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Similarly, we can note a move in Ginsberg's text (1996) between a specific comparison 
of 'race passing' and 'gender passing' and generalised claims about all fauns of 
passing: 
The very real possibility of gender passing — cross-dressing — thus is likely to threaten 
not only the security of male identity, as race passing threatens the security of white 
identity, but also, as does race passing, the certainties of identity categories and 
boundaries (13). 
7 
Whatever the rationale, both the process and the discourse of passing interrogate the 
ontology of identity categories and their construction. For the possibility of passing 
challenges a number of problematic and even antithetical assumptions about identities... 
(italics mine) (4). 
We might also observe how within Garber's analysis of cross-dressing, the category of 
`the transvestite' stretches to include any situation in which 'any person of one sex is 
clad in any form or any part of the other's dress, in life or in art, for any length of time, 
and under any circumstances' (Hollander, 1992:34). As Anne Hollander comments in 
her review of Vested Interests, within Garber's text, 
[The transvestite] can be both Cary Grant momentarily wearing a frilly negligee in 
Bringing up Baby and also Dr. James Barry, inspector general of the Medical 
Department of the British aimy, who, after serving for more than forty years as a 
physician and surgeon, was discovered to be a woman on her death in 1865 (34). 
Through such expansion and slippage, these subset approaches produce various 
generalised periperformative utterances: 'all recipients of cosmetic surgery can be 
interpreted through a model of passing', 'the process of passing is inherently 
subversive', 'all forms of cross-dressing represent transvestism'. In this sense, the 
subset model can be problematic in that it is often impossibly wide. While it may be 
argued that abstracting from specific distinctions in order to make more general claims 
is precisely what theory does, my argument is that the subset model's tendency to 
encapsulate an increasingly expansive array of practices within its boundaries makes it 
prone to theoretical overextension, which can lead it to lose its value as an analytic. The 
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problem is not with generalisation per se in this context, but rather with the effects of 
particular, repeated generalisations. My focus is on tracking those marginal practices, 
bodies and subjectivities which are repeatedly elided and/or problematically fixed 
through various entrenched generalisations about passing. In this respect, I want to 
argue that while the subset model can be too wide, it is also often problematically 
narrow. 
Particularity and the 'social mobility framework' 
Elaine Ginsberg (1996) argues that the social mobility framework is relevant to the 
majority of (if not all) practices of passing in the American cultural experience. For 
her, 'the cultural logic of passing suggests that passing is usually motivated by a desire 
to shed the identity of an oppressed group to gain access to social and economic 
opportunities' (3). Ginsberg acknowledges that 'the rationale for passing may be more 
or less complex or ambiguous and motivated by other kinds of perceived rewards' (5). 
She makes clear, however, that the assumption underlying her text 'is that critical to the 
process and discourse of "passing" in American history and in the American cultural 
imaginary are the status and privileges associated with being white and being male' (5). 
Later she asserts that, 
Given the asymmetry of privilege and power in most societies, it is not difficult to 
understand the rationale for most female cross-dressing. When women cross-dress, 
they usually do so to gain access to professional and economic opportunities or to 
experiences seen as available only to men. (13). 
As these extracts illustrate, for Ginsberg, passing within the American context operates 
primarily through female to male or black to white trajectories and is engaged in 
deliberately on the part of the passer as a means to gain perceived social and/or material 
privileges or rewards. This type of social mobility framework is certainly applicable to 
many historical acts of passing. 83 But can passing be viewed solely through a social 
mobility framework? What does the model leave out or obscure from view? 
83 As discussed, social mobility has been central to some experiences of 'race passing' within the context 
of slavery in the United States. Furthermore, people who identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual may choose 
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Contrary to the social mobility framework, passing may not represent a conscious or 
deliberate strategy on the part of the passer. The passer may not intend to pass or even 
realise that s/he is indeed passing. For example, in Nella Larsen's novel Passing 
(1997/1929), the female protagonist, Clare, a light-skinned black woman, is read 
`mistakenly' as a white woman by a foliner acquaintance who fails at first to recognise 
Clare as she sits in a café unaware she is being watched. In this sense, passing gains 
significance primarily through the visual reading(s) of its spectator(s) (Robinson, 
1994:718). Furthermore, passing does not always involve an individual from a 
disadvantaged or stigmatised social group seeking to be viewed as a member of a more 
privileged class as a means to gain social status and privileges or to avoid 
discrimination and abuse. For instance, transsexuals born with male anatomy who 
undergo hormone treatment and/or surgery to pass as women may find themselves 
facing gendered discrimination and oppression they did not before experience as they 
move from the relative social privilege of the embodied identity category 'male' to the 
subordinate status 'female'. In such cases, passing may not be about social mobility but 
rather about feeling that one's physical embodiment is consistent with one's 
psychosocial identity. 
Pointing to the importance of employing an intersectional approach to interpreting 
diverse practices of passing, Ginsberg acknowledges that passing is 'not always 
associated with a simple binary' (1996:3) and that passing narratives often involve 'the 
complex imbrications of race and gender' (12). Historical analysis suggests that an 
intersectional perspective is indeed necessary to understand the complex nature of 
various passing practices. In slave narratives, such as William and Ellen Craft's 
Running a Thousand Miles for Freedom, for example, escaping slavery plantations and 
travelling to seek freedom in Northern states involved not only passing as white, but 
also transforming gender and class identities in order to make the presentation of 
to pass as straight in particular contexts as a means to avoid stigmatism and/or violence. As Schlossberg 
(2001) comments, 'because an accurate reading of the queer body can, in many social and political 
contexts, result in obviously terrible consequences (even unto death), passing becomes a form of passive 
resistance, one that protects the gay subject from hostile interpretations' (3). 
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`whiteness' more credible (Garber, 1992:282). 84 Furthermore, in Western women's 
nineteenth century travel narratives from the Middle East, cultural cross-dressing was 
often combined with gender passing, partly because women were denied access to 
various public spaces on account of their sex, but also because passing as men allowed 
female travellers to explore other traditionally circumscribed practices or desires. For 
Isabelle Eberhardt, a European woman who travelled through the Maghreb as an Arab 
man at the turn of the nineteenth century, wearing a cross-cultural, cross-gender 
`disguise' not only enabled her to gain access to sites and communities forbidden to 
Westerners and women but also to fantasise about expressing her sexual desire for other 
women (Zayzafoon, 2005:51-2). 
Despite Ginsberg's acknowledgement that passing is intersectional, however, it is not 
clear that she analyses effectively the complex articulations which structure and 
differentiate various passing practices. As suggested above, for some subjects in some 
contexts, passing may be engaged in, not exclusively or primarily as a means towards 
social mobility, but rather as an experience of pleasure and/or erotic excitement. As 
Schlossberg (2001) notes, passing can be interpreted 'as a uniquely pleasurable 
experience, one that trades on the erotics of secrecy and revelation' (3). Passing may be 
experienced 'as a source or radical pleasure or intense danger; it can function as a badge 
of shame or a source of pride' (3). 85 In this respect, it is particularly interesting, given 
Ginsberg's advocacy of intersectional frameworks, that her generalising model 
repeatedly elides sexuality and erotic pleasure as relevant to passing. I mentioned in the 
84 Dominant class and gender regimes in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century meant that it 
would be much more common (and hence believable) for a white, male slave owner (rather than a white, 
middle or upper class female) to be travelling 'alone' with a black male slave. Ellen Craft's lighter skin 
enabled her to more easily 'pass "up" into the class of slave holder — male slave owner' (Garber, 
1992:283). 
85 Joseph Boone argues that for many male colonialist travellers to the Middle East, putting on 'Arab 
drag' provides a disguise 'that allows for the play of sexual and gender ambiguity' and the expression of 
homoerotic desire 'that lurks in Western fantasies of Eastern decadence' (Boone, 2001). Particular 
instances of passing may also be linked with erotic desire or pleasure on the part of spectator(s) of the 
pass. As Judith Butler (1993) points out, in Nella Larsen's Passing, 'it appears that the uncertain border 
between black and white' is precisely what is eroticised by Bellew, husband of the female protagonist 
Clare who passes as 'white'. This bodily ambiguity is 'what he needs in order to make Clare into the 
exotic subject to be dominated' (172). Moreover, in Uncle Tom's Cabin, when Eliza Harris cross-dresses 
as a young, white man, her 'sexual appeal for her husband is enhanced in this moment by her male 
disguise as well as by the danger in which escape will put them both' (Garber, 1992:285). 
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introduction that jazz musician Billy Tipton's 'gender passing' has been widely 
interpreted through a social mobility framework. Ginsberg herself suggests that Tipton 
`lived his professional life as a man, presumably because his chosen profession was not 
open to women' (italics mine) (3). Through imposing a social mobility framework to 
explain Tipton's passing, Ginsberg interprets his 'transvestism' in 'the register of socio-
economic necessity', and hence normalises it (Garber, 1992:68). From Garber's 
perspective, social mobility or 'progress' narratives, which routinely avoid 'any 
mention of sexuality', function to smooth over 'whatever discomfort is felt by the 
reader of audience' in encountering what may be an experience of 'an erotic pleasure 
and play space' (69). Making a similar point in regards to transgender subjects, Judith 
Halberstam argues that 'too often...the histories of women who pass as men, or the 
narratives of transgender men, attempt to rationalize rather than represent transgender 
lives in the glory of all their contradictions' (2001:22). In this view, social mobility 
frameworks such as Ginsberg's are problematic 'because they ignore the complex and 
often unconscious eroticism of such self-transformations and masquerades' (Garber, 
1992:69). 86 Thus, if, in the previous case study, the privileging of gender and sexuality 
in models for linking FGC and cosmetic surgery meant that the significance of race, 
national and cultural difference was problematically effaced, in this example we find 
that emphasis on making links between race and gender results in an elision of sexuality 
and the related concepts of eroticism and pleasure. Such elisions function predictably to 
reify heterosexuality and elide non-normative sexualities. 
The effects of the social mobility framework's repeated occlusion of sexuality and 
erotic pleasure are significant, not least because of the ways in which erotic pleasure 
and racial difference articulate and mutually (re)produce one another. In the literature 
on cross-cultural passing, for example, the libidinal excitement involved in passing for 
the native 'other' is often both produced by, and serves to reify, racial distinctions. Gail 
Ching-Liang Low (1996) suggests that in the colonial era novels of Kipling and 
Haggard, passing in native costume on the part of the white protagonists always 'returns 
86 Jackie Kay's novel Trumpet (1998) takes up Billy Tipton's narrative fictionally primarily in terms of 
sexual desire (rather than socio-economic progress). 
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to a fundamental racial and cultural fault line' (211). In Kipling's novel Kim it is 
precisely Kim's knowledge of his white skin beneath the disguise that heightens the 
pleasure of wearing an exotic native costume. As Low argues, 'it is only through a 
fetishisation of Kim's whiteness that the colonial text is secured and the reader is 
enabled to participate in the pleasurable fantasy of cultural/racial metamorphosis' (215). 
Similarly, Reina Lewis (2004) has discussed the intersections of sexual desire, race and 
nation in the travel narratives of Grace Ellison, an English woman who stayed in a 
Turkish harem at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ellison's thrill in wearing 
exotic Turkish dress — which was linked to 'the imagined affinity it allowed her with the 
observed and fantasied luminosity of Ottoman female sexuality' (248) - was 
underscored by her own security in her white racial identity. As Lewis suggests, Ellison 
`could enjoy the pleasures of cultural transgression without having to give up the racial 
privilege that underpinned her authority to represent her version of Oriental reality' 
(217). As these examples show, attention to sexual pleasure and erotic desire within 
passing narratives can be crucial to mapping the way in which racial and cultural 
distinctions are (re)produced. To be clear, the point here is not that that sexuality 
should be privileged above and beyond other axes of differentiation in this example or 
that every analysis of passing should focus on sexuality. Rather, as I have suggested in 
the previous two chapters, my argument is that a critical intersectional analysis needs to 
account not only for that which may be repeatedly excluded by its terms of analysis, but 
also the potential effects of such exclusions. 
Furthermore, while Ginsberg spends a significant portion of the text trying to establish 
the ways in which race and gender passing are analogous, the very terms of her 
comparison (race passing is similar to gender passing) assume that each practice is, to 
some extent, bounded and discrete. Race and gender are, for the most part in her 
analysis, seen as parallel rather than intersecting axes with mutual effects. As such, 
Edmund Kenny's practice of passing is understood as one predominantly about racism 
and racial transgression. It is interpreted as 'a movement that interrogates and thus 
threatens the system of racial categories and hierarchies established by social custom 
and legitimated by the law' (1996:1-2). Brandon Teena's passing experience, like that 
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of Billy Tipton, is in turn read fundamentally as a story about gender transgression. 
Brandon's murder is interpreted as 'a tragic consequence of a female's transgression 
and usurpation of male gender and sexual roles' (Ginsberg, 1996:2). What Ginsberg's 
parallel construction elides are the ways in which both passing nanatives are 
constructed through multiple intersecting vectors which effectively disrupt any neat 
division of 'race passing' and 'gender passing'. 
Reading Brandon Teena's experience of passing (including his murder) exclusively 
through the nexus of gender/sexuality, as Ginsberg and the vast majority of 
commentators on his case have, obscures the role of race and racism in this narrative. It 
seems pertinent, in this respect to note that Brandon was one of three young people 
murdered by Thomas Nissen and John Lotter in 1993, including Brandon's friend Lisa 
Lambert (a white woman) and her friend Phillip Devine (a black, disabled man). Yet, in 
nearly all media coverage and dramatic representation of the case, including both the 
Hollywood film Boys Don't Cry and the documentary The Brandon Teena Story, 
Phillip's existence has been either completely obliterated or 'given little airplay' 
(Halberstam, 2005:29). The omission of Phillip's presence from 'the Brandon archive' 
appears increasingly problematic in light of his killer's links with a white supremacist 
group, the 'White American Group for White Americans' (Jones, 1996, cited in 
Halberstam, 2005:154). 87 While it is difficult to ascertain how relevant these details 
might be to the murder of these three young people, they do suggest that an 
intersectional (rather than a linear) analysis of Brandon's story (and those of his friends) 
is necessary. As Judith Halberstam argues, 'while Nissen's flirtation with brutally racist 
and white supremacist groups need not surprise us, it does nonetheless flesh out the 
particular nexus of hate that came to focus on Brandon, Lisa and Phillip' (29). 
By this same token, interpreting Edmund Kenney's experience, and other African 
American passing narratives, within a linear framework of race misses the ways in 
which such narratives are also constructed through other vectors, such as gender and 
87 Aphrodite Jones provides information that situates Nissen's tattoo as a symbol of white supremacy 
politics (Jones, 1996:154, cited in Halberstam, 2005:29). 
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sexuality. As Vikki Bell points out, for example, in the passing narrative of Jazz by 
Toni Morrison, 'acting black' is presented by Henry, the father of the male protagonist, 
Golden as a 'question of gender': "pull your manhood up"' (1996:226). Moreover, 
Siobhan Somerville (2000) argues that in the work of both James Weldon Johnson and 
Pauline E. Hopkins, two key figures within the early twentieth century African-
American genre of passing narratives, the disruption of racial binaries is constructed in 
and through the disruption of essentialist boundaries of gender and sexuality. For 
instance, while Johnson described his novel, The Autobiography of an Ex-Coloured 
Man, as a text which concerns 'some colored man who has married white' (Johnson, 
cited in Somerville, 2000:111-2), Somerville argues that `the pursuit of interracial 
(heterosexual) marriage is hardly the main trajectory of desire in the text' (111). In fact, 
she stresses, 'it is both integral to and subordinated by, another form of desire figured as 
"perverse"... that of male homosexuality' (111-2). Constructing both homosexuality 
and interracial desire as deviant sexual object choices, the text produces 'the (hybrid) 
mulatto' as a figure of gender inversion (125). As Somerville illustrates, in sexological 
texts of this time the figure of `the mulatto' was often seen as 'analogous to the invert: 
the mixed-race body evoked the mixed-gender body' (2000:80). These examples 
indicate that separating 'race passing', 'gender passing' and 'sexuality passing' as 
discrete and/or analogical modes of practice risks occluding the ways in which race, 
gender and sexuality (among other vectors) intersect and articulate in complex 
narratives of passing. 
The Politics of Passing 
Passing as subversive 
As mentioned earlier, in several of the texts, 'race passing' is seen to reside within the 
same performative neighbourhood as 'gender passing' and/or 'sexuality passing' on the 
basis that all such practices involve acts of bodily ambiguity which can disrupt 
essentialist binaries (i.e. man/woman, straight/gay, white/black). For example, 
Schlossberg (2001) argues that 'passing wreaks havoc with accepted systems of social 
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recognition and cultural intelligibility' and 'blurs the carefully marked lines of race, 
gender, and class, calling attention to the ways in which identity categories intersect, 
overlap, construct and deconstruct one another' (2). Similarly, Ginsberg (1996) 
contends that while the boundary anxiety created by particular acts of passing may be 
experienced as 'either liberating or threatening' depending on the context, the process 
of passing is itself subversive in that it interrogates essentialist categories of identity and 
`discloses the truth that identities are not singularly true or false but multiple and 
contingent' (4). In this vein, she is keen to emphasise the 'positive potential of 
passing': 
In its interrogation of the essentialism that is the foundation of identity politics, passing 
has the potential to create a space for creative self-determination and agency: the 
opportunity to construct new identities, to experiment with multiple subject positions, 
and to cross social and economic boundaries that exclude or oppress (16). 
Moreover, for Marjorie Garber, the category crises instigated by cross-dressing have 
`extraordinary power' to 'disrupt, expose, and challenge... the very notion of the 
"original" and of stable identity' (1992:16). She claims that 'transvestism is a space of 
possibility structuring and confounding culture: the disruptive element that intervenes, 
not just category crises of male and female but the crises of category itself(italics in 
original) (17). 88 Finally, Judith Butler's vision of a 'set of parodic practices' 
(1999/1990:xxxi) linked to the categories of gender, sexuality and race, which function 
similarly to 'work the weakness in the norm' (1993:237) may also be seen to figure 
various acts of passing and other performative practices as subversive. 
While I firmly support the project of disrupting essentialist identity categories which 
motivates the use of the subset approach on the part of many of these authors, there are 
several problems with the 'passing as subversive' claim that this model constructs. If 
88  It is important, however, to make a distinction between passing and cross-dressing in many contexts. 
While cross-dressing (which has been described as the act of wearing clothing commonly associated with 
another gender within a particular society) can constitute a form or element of passing, not all cross-
dressers intend to 'pass'. For example, unlike passing, drag is often a deliberate means of calling 
`attention to the act of impersonation and foregrounds its status as imitation' (Robinson, 1994:727). 
However, passing and drag can be seen to converge within the 'passing is subversive' argument on the 
basis that, in order to be understood as transgressive, both practices require a spectator privy to the 
`artifice' of the embodied performance. As such, the subversive logic of both practices 'depend on the 
primary intelligibility of the anatomical body of the performer' (730). 
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passing is read as a fundamentally subversive process, attempts to distinguish between 
performative acts (or aspects of acts) which reinforce dominant relations of power and 
those which threaten to subvert such systems become increasingly problematic. 89 This 
is not to claim that it is always easy or indeed possible to make distinctions between 
`subversive' and 'regressive' acts of passing, or that subversive and regressive acts exist 
in binary relation to one another. Particular passing practices may be dissident in some 
ways and conservative in others and the political effects of specific performative acts 
always depend on the cultural context and frameworks) available for interpretation. 
Furthermore, it is clear that 'subversive actions always signify in unexpected ways' 
(Lloyd, 1999:207) and we cannot know, in advance, what all the effects of a particular 
performative act or practice will be (Butler, 1999/1990:187). 90 Yet, as Moya Lloyd 
(1999) argues, 'even if we accept that there are incalculable effects to all (or most) 
statements of activities, this does not mean that we need to concede that there are no 
calculable effects' (207). Nor does it mean that we can make no distinctions among the 
various performative acts that may be employed to disrupt bodily and/or cultural 
boundaries. The recognition that bodily ambiguities are often recuperated into 
oppressive political systems underscores the importance of being able to make such 
differentiations. 
For example, Ginsberg's claim that 'passing has the potential to create a space for 
creative self-determination and agency' and 'to cross social and economic boundaries 
that exclude or oppress' (16), downplays the ways in which dominant hierarchies of 
power may be secured through the destabilisation of embodied identity categories 
which passing can invoke. In this vein, Sara Ahmed (1999) contends that the 'dis-
organizing of social identities' triggered through passing practices 'can become a 
mechanism for the re-organizing of social life through an expansion of the terms of 
surveillance' (91). Ambiguous bodies which blur existing criteria for identification can 
`keep in place, or are even the condition of possibility for, the desire to tell bodies apart 
89 This is a criticism of performativity which has been made by several theorists in recent years. See, for 
example, Lloyd, 1999; Fraser, 1995. 
90 Subversion/regression models of action also do not encompass the wide range of embodied political 
action and subject positions (Mahmood, 2005). 
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from each other through the accumulation of knowledge' (92). Furthermore, whilst 
Garber emphasises the 'extraordinary power' of transvestism to 'disrupt, expose, and 
challenge... the very notion of the "original" and of stable identity' (1992:16), she 
places much less emphasis on the ways in which such disruption may serve 
conservative social, political and financial aims. This seems particularly relevant in the 
context of global capitalism 'where formal fluidity, fragmentation and marketing 
through difference are central elements' (McClintock, 1995:68). As Epstein and Straub 
(1991) comment, 'capitalism allows marginalized or stigmatized forms of social 
behaviour and identity to filter into consumer culture packaged in disguised forms 
which take away the edge of the political threat posed by those sexualities' (10). 
Subsuming different passing practices within a single subset on the basis of their 
subversive potential can thus lead to a rather uncritical celebration of ambiguity and 
disruption which fails to explore and theorise effectively 'how power is distributed 
through that disruption or ambiguity' (Epstein and Straub, 1991:23). 91 
It should be acknowledged that some of the theorists who consider the subversive 
possibilities of passing make important qualifications. Garber points out that cross-
dressing can function as a mark of privilege in particular contexts: 'To cross-dress on 
the stage in an all-male context like the army or the navy is a way of asserting the 
91 While these examples suggest that there is no necessary link between passing and transgression, we 
might further ask whether transgression itself is necessarily socially transformative. Elizabeth Wilson 
(1993) contends that, as a political strategy employed within gay, lesbian and bisexual politics (as well as 
other critical projects), transgression implies 'a flouting of the rules, or a rule, behaviour agnostic to what 
is established, the opposite, a radical challenge to what is prescribed' (109). She points out, however, that 
`just as the only true blasphemer is the individual who really believes in God, so transgression depends 
on, and may even reinforce, conventional understandings of what it is that it to be transgressed' (109) (see 
also Wiegman, 2005:97). Wilson's criticisms resonate in respect to arguments that construct the process 
of passing as fundamentally transgressive. It has been argued, for example, that passing is only legible as 
a critical practice if underscored by the belief that there exist identity categories that might be 
transgressed in the first place. Moreover, passing can only be subversive politically if it ultimately fails. 
In order to disclose 'the truth that identities are not singularly true or false but multiple and contingent' 
(Ginsberg, 1996:4), the 'artifice' of any particular act or practice of passing must, at some point, be 
disclosed. Yet does this necessary exposure of 'artifice' not in fact function to shore up (rather than 
disrupt) normative identity categories? In this vein, Carole-Anne Tyler (1994) argues that passing, or 
`mimicry' as she calls it, is similar to other performative practices such as 'coming out' in that both 
processes actually serve to reify essentialist identities. Rather than representing similarly subversive 
strategies, both mimicry and coming out, she contends, involve the desire for 'an essence', a 'proper 
name' (236) and 'a natural sign' (238). 
133 
common privilege of maleness. Borderlines like officers/"men" or gay/straight are both 
put into question and redrawn or reaffirmed' (1992:60). As I have discussed, however, 
the thrust of Garber's argument remains the positive potential of category crises. 
Providing a more sceptical assessment of the subversive possibilities of passing, 
Schlossberg acknowledges that 'passing can be fundamentally conservative: although it 
may often represent social progress for an individual, it generally holds larger social 
hierarchies firmly in place' (3). Passing, she points out, may also 'seem to result in the 
disappearance or denial of a range of "minoritized" or queer identities' (1). 
Butler makes similar qualifications regarding the transgression achieved through 
parody, clarifying (but also gradually revising) the position on performativity she 
argued for in Gender Trouble in her subsequent texts. In Bodies that Matter (1993) she 
acknowledges that 'drag is not unproblematically subversive' (231) and in a revised 
preface included in the 10 th anniversary reprint of Gender Trouble, concedes that 
[g]ender can be rendered ambiguous without disturbing or reorienting normative 
sexuality at all... Sometimes gender ambiguity can operate precisely to contain or 
deflect non-noimative sexual practice and thereby work to keep normative sexuality 
intact' (1999/1990:xiv). In Undoing Gender (2004a) Butler reworks her position 
further, this time appearing to reverse her original claim regarding the subversive 
potential of performativity. 92 She writes, 'the point to emphasise here is not that drag is 
subversive of gender norms, but that we live, more or less implicitly with received 
notions of reality, implicit accounts of ontology, which determine what kinds of bodies 
and sexualities will be considered real and true, and which kind will not' (214). Butler 
92 	• 	- Thi s shift takes place in Butler's work in part because, in her later texts, she seeks to clarify her 
position on intentionality and voluntarism in response to readers of Gender Trouble who sought to 
reinstate the voluntarist subject that she disavows (particularly through analysis of Butler's discussion of 
drag). As Lloyd argues, such readings were 'partly the result of the ambiguity of Butler's own account 
for the distinction between performance and performativity in Gender Trouble' (1999/1990:199). She 
writes: 'Butler endorses Derrida's contention that both ordinary speech acts and theoretical performances 
are underpinned by the same citational practices (Butler, 1995:134-5). This means that an easy separation 
between a performance and the performative is difficult to uphold since both reiterate the same 
conventions' (201). 
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admits 'that resignification alone is not a politics, is not sufficient for politics, is not 
enough' (223). 93 
Yet despite these acknowledgements that the 'category crises' produced by passing and 
other performative practices may be appropriated to serve dominant interests, the 
problem remains that the subset model does not seem to be capable of theorising, in any 
depth or sustained manner, the social and political distinctions between various passing 
practices which such acknowledgements suggest are crucial. 94 The subset model often 
functions simply to subsume various passing practices within its performative 
boundaries and does not enable any complex mapping of the contexts or circumstances 
in which particular forms or acts of passing might produce subversive or socially 
transformative effects or, in turn, those in which they might have regressive and socially 
conservative outcomes. Nor does it provide an adequate framework for theorising the 
specific similarities that these scholars suggest various practices of passing may share as 
structural formations. Left unanswered by this model are several critical questions 
about the politics of passing. 
`We are all passing' 
Linked to the argument that race, gender and sexuality passing all interrogate the 
naturalness and stability of embodied identity categories is the claim that explicit 
passing practices illuminate the extent to which we are all passing. In exposing the 
artificiality of binary identity categories, various passing practices are said to similarly 
reveal the extent to which all subjects 'pass' in their daily lives in order to assume 
various constructed identities. For example, Schlossberg (2001) argues that 'the 
93 Nancy Fraser (1995), among others, had previously critiqued Butler for suggesting that resignification 
is inherently positive: 'In Butler's usage the term "resignification" carries a strong, if implicitly, positive 
charge....Since Butler's term carries no implication of validity or warrant, its positive connotations are 
puzzling. Why is resignification good? Can't there be bad (oppressive, reactionary) resignifications?' 
(68). As a better alternative, Fraser suggests the term 'critique'. 
94 Butler does, however, point to the necessity of making distinctions between various performative 
practices: 'There must be a way to understand what makes certain kinds of parodic repetitions effectively 
disruptive, truly troubling, and which repetitions become domesticated and recirculated as instruments of 
cultural hegemony' (1999/1990:177). 
135 
passing subject's ability to transcend or abandon his or her "authentic" identity calls 
into question the very notion of authenticity itself (2). Passing, 'threatens to call 
attention to the performative and contingent nature of all seemingly "natural" or 
"obvious" identities' (italics mine) (2). 
This 'we are all passing' narrative crops up in several texts which focus on passing 
and/or crossing and sexual identity. These texts often position transsexuals and/or 
transgender subjects as those who reveal passing as a function of all embodied 
identities. For example, Judith Shapiro claims that 'transsexuals make explicit for us 
the usually tacit processes of gender attribution' (1991:257). Following Harold 
Garfinkel, she suggests that 'the transsexual reveals the extent to which the normally 
sexed person is a "contingent practical accomplishment" (Garfinkel 1967:181). In other 
words, they make us realize that we are all passing' (italics mine) (257). Garber argues 
that the social critique performed by 'transvestite magazines for readers who are not 
themselves cross-dressers is to point out the degree to which all women cross-dress as 
women when they produce themselves as artefacts' (italics in original) (1992:49). 
Moreover, in a controversial statement (which she later revises in Female Masculinity 
(1998)), Judith Halberstam asserts: 
In a way, I claim, we are all transsexuals... We all pass or we don't, we all wear our 
drag, and we all derive a different degree of pleasure - sexual or otherwise — from our 
costumes. It is just that for some of us our costumes are made of fabric and material, 
while for others they are made of skin; for some an outfit can be changed; for others 
skin must be resewn. There are no transsexuals' (1994:212). 95 
In different ways, these thinkers deny or downplay specific or exclusive links between 
transgender and transsexual subjectivities and practices of passing, instead framing 
passing as a universal experience. 96 
95 In her later text, Halberstam (1998) revisits her earlier 'universalist' construction of transsexuality and 
passing. She writes: 'We are not all transsexual, I admit, but many bodies are gender strange to some 
degree or another, and it is time to complicate on the one hand the transsexual models that assign gender 
deviance only to transsexual bodies and gender normativity to all other bodies, and on the other hand the 
hetero-normative models that see transsexuality as the solution to gender deviance and homosexuality as 
a pathological concern (153). 
96 This is in part because these authors do not want to see the field of queer studies weakened and 
dissipated through excessive fragmentation. Like Butler, they argue for queer studies as an umbrella 
discipline. Other theorists, such as Jay Prosser (1998), however explicitly challenge these approaches. 
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There are clearly some positive effects of the 'we are passing' argument, particularity 
its success in calling attention to the constructedness of embodied categories like 
maleness, heterosexuality and whiteness, which are so often presumed to be 'natural'. 
However, through subsuming so many different passing practices within the realm of 
the same, and denying specificity to particular acts of passing, the 'we are all passing' 
discourse threatens to efface critical distinctions between passing practices. It routinely 
glosses over the ways in which the meanings and effects of passing practices are 
determined by cultural, social and historical context as well as the embodied locations 
of both the passer(s) and the spectator(s). As such, the 'we are all passing' argument, 
like the 'passing as subversive' claim, often fails to theorise effectively the politics of 
passing. 
It seems important, on both historical and political grounds, to make some critical 
distinctions between various practices of passing on the part of differently located 
subjects. For example, because passing 'involves the re-opening or re-staging of a 
fractured history of identifications' (Ahmed, 1999:94), the act of passing as a member 
of an embodied identity group of which one is already assumed to belong is different 
from passing for a member of an identity group which one is not assumed to inhabit. 
As a person born with female anatomy who has identified as, and been labelled by 
others, as 'white' and 'female' throughout the course of my life, surely the various 
stylised embodied acts and rituals I have learned and (more or less loyally) repeat each 
day to pass as a 'white woman' (i.e. having my hair long, speaking in a particular tone 
of voice, wearing certain styles of clothing etc.) signal a somewhat different political 
relationship to the practice of passing than those I would go through to pass as a 'white 
man' or as a 'black woman'. Furthermore, would the act of passing for a 'white 
woman' not represent a different politics of passing for my friend, who has consistently 
identified (and been interpreted by others) as 'female' and 'black' throughout her life? 
In this vein, Sara Ahmed (1999) has argued that it is possible (and necessary) to 
Prosser criticizes how framing queer studies as an umbrella discipline often depends on constructing 'the 
gender-ambivalent subject' as 'the lever for the queer movement to loosen the fixity of gender identities 
enough to enable affiliation and identification between gay men and lesbians' (5). In other words, 'queer 
studies' is constructed as open and inclusive through fetishising 'the transsexual'. 
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differentiate between a black subject who passes for white and a white subject who 
passes for white: 
[O]ne's relation to whiteness as something which is passed through depends on a prior 
history of self-identification and identification by others. Would one worry, would one 
fear being caught out, if one did not already perceive oneself as passing for white? 
Would there be danger, would there be death? In other words, passing for something 
that one is not already assumed to be makes a difference to the politics of passing 
(italics in original) (93). 
Ahmed maintains that the argument that 'passing constitutes a general logic of 
assuming an identity' (i.e. the 'we are all passing' claim) involves a refusal 'to 
recognize the constraints which temporarily fix subjects in relations of social 
antagonism' (95). The legacies of colonialism, slavery and racial segregation mean 
that, in attempting to pass for a 'white woman', my friend may face risks or dangers 
which I do not in my everyday passing as a 'white'. Furthermore, if I attempt to pass 
for a 'black woman', I might face accusations of appropriation, fetishisation or 
exoticization which are not experienced by my friend in her habitual 'passing' as black. 
Downplayed by the 'we are all passing' claim are complex historical and political 
questions regarding embodiment, power, appropriation, pleasure and danger, which 
remain pertinent to the task of mapping differentiations and discontinuities among 
various passing practices. 
Through figuring passing as an act inherent to all identity formation, the subset model 
also often fails to acknowledge and theorise the significance of embodied social 
location of, and inter-subjective relations among, various participants in the pass. Via 
its universalising tone, the 'we are all passing claim' downplays the fact that the 
meaning of particular acts of passing is dependent on the cultural and geo-political 
context in which they occur. In other words, passing only becomes visible — we only 
see it - under certain conditions and circumstances. Robinson argues, for example, that 
because sexuality is so often laminated to visible codes of gender (in the absence of 
gender, sexuality is presumed to be invisible), 'the readability of sexuality differs across 
racial and cultural contexts because gender signifies differently in these contexts' 
(1994:718). What might be read as 'gender "abnormality" in one class or racial context 
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may simply confirm the hegemonic spectator's presumption of heterosexuality in 
another' (718). Similarly, discussing how in the early 1990s in London 'the skinhead 
look' was read as a 'politically affiiinative' identity for gay men that challenged 
(through parody) the idea that all 'masculine' men are 'straight', Lloyd (1999:199) 
points out that, 'the deployment of certain signs by gay (white) men may be read by 
others, particularly black gay others, in an entirely different way to that intended' (207). 
Embodied identity categories are constructed differently in different spaces and in 
relation to other categories. Sweeping readings of the effects of performative practice, 
elide questions about 'when, where and to whom gendered performances are either 
"passable" for straight or readable as queer' (Walker, 1995:71 cited in Lloyd, 
1999:207). 97 
Moreover, passing never simply involves one body operating within an isolated sphere. 
It always involves complex embodied encounters with multiple embodied subjects, each 
of whom will be located differently in relation to the politics of passing. In this vein, 
Robinson suggests that many textual narratives of passing are structured around a 
`triangular' model of relationality: 'Three participants — the passer, the dupe, and a 
representative of the in-group — enact a complex narrative scenario in which a 
successful pass is performed in the presence of a literate member of the in-group' 
(1994:723). Within this dynamic, the passer's 'real' identity is constructed as an effect 
of the lens through which it is viewed. For instance, in order for an 'in-group 
clairvoyant' to see drag she must observe a successful pass — 'she must see the 
hegemonic spectator earn the title of dupe if she is to regard the spectacle of passing 
through the lens of drag' (727). Passing thus 'emerges as a discursive encounter 
between [at least] two epistemological paradigms' (723, see also Somerville, 2000:83). 
97 It should be acknowledged, however, that some authors who link passing practices are careful to avoid 
uncritical assertions of commonality. Schlossberg, for instance, points out that 'the notion that identity is 
performative... has different consequences for the passing subject' (6). Highlighting differences between 
race passing and sexuality passing, for instance, she asserts that, 'the dominant social order often 
implores gay people to stay in the closet (to pass), while subjects who pass for white are encouraged to 
"come out" or reveal themselves as authentically "racial" subjects — at times by both minority groups and 
the dominant social order' (6). As we have seen, however, other authors (such as Ginsberg, Davis and 
Garber) place a much greater emphasis on establishing congruity between various passing practices and 
on making claims regarding the nature of all forms of passing. 
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In other words, passing always represents a relationship between a judgement and that 
which is judged. From this perspective, rather that figuring passing as a practice which 
retains common contours and/or effects across time and space, we might more 
productively conceptualise passing in terms of embodied relationships or encounters 
which are enacted and (re)produced in and through particular historical contexts. 
This analysis of the 'we are all passing' claim calls attention to the subset model's 
inefficacy as a theoretical tool — its tendency to collapse under its own discursive 
weight. As the model's boundaries continue to expand, becoming increasingly 
petmeable and subsuming more and more practices within its circumference, it 
increasingly loses its heuristic value. As we reach a point where anything and 
everything represents an act of passing, the subset model's theoretical relevance 
dissipates. What is not passing? What is not performative? So many practices have 
been subsumed within one single model that it becomes increasingly difficult to make 
such critical distinctions. The necessity for a framework which enables mapping and 
theorisation of the embodied, social and political particularities of specific (relational) 
passing processes is thus underscored. In the next section I explore further problems 
associated with the subset model's 'we are all passing' claim, focusing on issues of 
visibility and fetishisation. 
Passing, (in)visibility and fetishisation 
As I have suggested, passing is closely linked to discourses of visibility. The 
relationship between visibility and the construction of passing as a subversive practice 
is often a problematic one. In many versions of the 'we are all passing' claim, 
particular subjects (namely transsexual, transgender and mixed race) are 
problematically fetishised as figures 98 who function to reveal the constructedness of all 
98 Following Sara Ahmed in her discussion of 'stranger fetishism' (2000), I am employing the term 
`fetishise' derived from the Marxist account of 'commodity fetishisim' (4). As Ahmed argues, Marx's 
theory suggests that 'the process of fetishisation involves, not only the displacement of social relations 
onto an object, but the transformation of fantasies onto figures' (5). For Ahmed, fetishism thus signifies 
`the displacement of social relations of labour through the transformation of objects into figures. What is 
at stake is the 'cutting off' of figures from the social and material relations which over-determine their 
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embodied identity categories, precisely because of their presumed (in)visibility. In 
other words, their bodily 'ambiguity' enables them to be both 'invisible' (i.e. to pass) 
and 'visible' (i.e. to be detected as a 'fake'). 
The key argument structuring Garber's text is that 'cross-dressing or transvestism, is 
looked through rather than at in critical and cultural analyses' (italics in original) 
(1992:389). She objects to 'how often, indeed how insistently, cultural observers have 
tried to make it mean something, anything other than itself(389). Yet it could be 
argued that Garber produces the very effect she objects to through continuously 
constructing 'the transvestite' as a theoretical tool, 'figure', 'index', or 'effect' (16). To 
provide just two examples: 
The transvestite... is both terrifying and deductive precisely because s/he incarnates and 
emblematizes the disruptive element that intervenes, signalling not just another 
category crisis, but — much more disquietingly — a crisis of "category" itself (32). 
What it points toward is the centrality of the transvestite as an index of category 
destabilization altogether. We are speaking of an underlying psychosocial, and not 
merely a local or historical, effect. What might be called the "transvestite effect" 
(italics in original) (37). 
Similarly, while Shapiro (1991) seeks to downplay the specificity of transsexuality as a 
sexual identity (distinct from other non-normative or 'queer' sexual subj ectivities), it is 
`the transsexual' who is fetishised in her text as the figure who, through the 
performance of passing, 'reveals' for others the artifice of all identity: 
Transsexuals reveal to the more detached and sceptical observer the way in which such 
a natural attitude is socially and culturally achieved (italics mine) (228). 
The way in which transsexuals go about establishing their gender in social interactions 
reminds us that the basis on which we are assigned a gender in the first place (that is, 
anatomical sex) is not what creates the reality of gender in ongoing social life (257) 
We might also note that within many texts that focus on 'race passing', it is the mixed 
race subject who (light skinned enough to pass as 'white', yet ambiguous enough to risk 
detection) is constructed as the figure who reveals the instability of all racial 
existence, and the consequent perception that such figures have a "life of their own"' (italics in original) 
(5). 
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boundaries. For instance, in Ginsberg's text (1996) it is the fact that the escaped slave 
Edmund Kennedy's 'physical appearance made it obvious that his legally invisible 
white ancestors likely outnumbered the African' which enables him to pass, signalling 
`a transgression not only of legal boundaries...but of cultural boundaries as well' (1). 
Furthermore, in the literary genre of the passive narrative, 'the mulatta heroine' 
functions frequently as a figure who disrupts racial (as well as sexual and gender) 
divisions (Somerville, 2000). 99 
In this vein, we can consider how Butler's work on performativity may similarly 
fetishise particular subjects as figures. In much of Butler's writing, it is the transgender 
and/or the cross-dressing subject who engages in the parodic 'repetition of heterosexual 
constructs' hence illuminating the artifice of the categories of gender, sex and sexuality. 
As she explains: 
Drag and transgender enter into the political field...by not only making us question 
what is real, and what has to be, but by showing us how contemporary notions of reality 
can be questioned, and new modes of reality instituted (italics mine) (2004a:217). 
The construction of transgender as a privileged signifier within Butler's work, and 
queer theory more generally, has been noted by a number of critical theorists. Clare 
Hemmings comments that `transgender performances assumed an almost mythical 
position within queer theory and politics in the early 1990s as the manifestation of 
discontinuity between sexed body and gender role or identity' (italics in original) 
(2002:118). From Jay Prosser's perspective, 'nowhere is the pivotal function of 
transgender in queer studies more evident and more intricate' than in Butler's work 
(1998:5). We can compare the ways in which 'the transgender subject' is constructed 
as a trope within such texts to the ways in which 'the victim of female genital 
mutilation' and 'the cosmetic surgery consumer' in the previous case study, and 'the 
99 It could also be argued that within Homi Bhabha's (1994) work on colonial mimicry, it is the mixed 
race (Indian) subjects who become mimic men, the vehicles of colonial ambivalence (`almost the same 
but not quite', not white) (122) and who thrust into focus the uncertainty of colonial discourse, hence 
disrupting its authority (126). In mimicking the colonizer the mixed race colonial subject demonstrates 
the artifice of colonial privilege (it is constructed and can be copied), and as such produces a space for 
resistance. 
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anorexic' and 'the veiled woman' in the next chapter, are installed as metaphors for 
their respective cultures. 
The fetishisation of particular subjects as figures within these texts is problematic for a 
number of reasons. On the one hand, through repeated characterisations of transgender 
subjectivity as 'subversive' or 'illuminating', the assumed contours of the transgender 
subject can become fixed, deteimining a reductive image of transgender as the figure of 
boundary crossing. As a result, the diversities, complexities and contradictions of 
transgender subjectivity and embodiment are covered over. This fixing and 
fetishisation can, in relation to transgender, transsexual and mixed race subjects, involve 
exoticization as well as problematic assumptions of `knowability' (Ahmed, 1999:98). 
On the other hand, repeatedly constructing particular subjects as tropes or theoretical 
tools can also invest these subjects with an excess of (often conflicting) meanings. 
Halberstam (1998) argues in this respect that `transsexuality... seems burdened not only 
with an excess of meaning but also by the weight of competing discourses' (165). 
Transsexuals are 'represented as "empire" and the subaltern, as gender dupes and 
gender deviants, and as consolidated identities and fragmented bodies' (166). 
Furthermore, it could be argued that through constructing particular figures as symbols 
of boundary crossing, perfonuativity repeatedly requires the same 'ambiguous' or 
`transgressive' bodies to do the work of interrogating and destabilising binaries, while 
other 'normal' bodies once again remain invisible. Passing and parody may thus 
function to reify, rather than disrupt, problematic or essentialist constructions of 
embodied 'difference'. In this vein, passing can also be seen as an exclusive critical 
strategy, in that it may only be taken up by particular subjects. It would seem that some 
bodies (in some contexts) are more able or willing to participate in political strategies 
which depend on visibility and/or recognition than others. As mentioned in Chapter 
Two, Gayatri Gopinath argues that Western ideals of queer visibility and embodiment 
are not often available to lesbians in South Asia, where it may be in the private sphere 
10° Although, as suggested earlier, Halberstam's own theoretical approach to transsexuality might also be 
seen as problematic in its simultaneous rejection of transsexuality as a privileged signifier and 
construction of 'the transsexual' as a theoretical tool. 
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of home that bodies can explore homo-erotic pleasures (Gopinath, 2003, cited in 
Ahmed, 2004a:151). In her study of white, working class women in the UK, Beverly 
Skeggs (1997) suggests that, for many of her subjects, passing as middle class 'does not 
involve ironic mimicry...because it wants to be taken seriously; because it speaks from 
a position of powerlessness and insecurity' (87). Those who are middle class find it 
easier to play with passing as a form of ironic mimicry because 'playing at not being 
middle class does not jeopardize their ability to use and capitalize upon their cultural 
capital' and because those 'who can judge their failure to pass have little impact and 
little social power' (87). From this perspective, Mariam Fraser (1999) contends that 'it 
is important to consider those who choose not to be (made) seeable and who may 
therefore be excluded from a politics that lends itself to visibility' (italics in original) 
(124). Passing, and other performative practices which rely on visual identification in 
order to achieve their subversive potential, may thus problematically fetishise certain 
subjects whilst excluding a wide range of 'others'. 
For Butler, performativity can be seen to entail the strategic failure of passing, a failure 
that is premised on visual identification. In her framework, as in the other texts which 
argue for the subversive potential of passing, passing is only transgressive to the point 
where it reveals the constructednesss of 'reality' by being perceived or seen as very 
close to 'the real', yet not quite 'the same'. As Butler explains: 
The repetition of heterosexual constructs in non-heterosexual frames brings into relief 
the utterly constructed status of the so-called heterosexual original. Thus gay is to 
straight not as copy is to original, but, rather, as copy is to copy (italics mine) 
(1999/1990:41) 
We can note in both this passage and the previous one Butler's use of language (`brings 
into relief , 'showing us') to imply the importance of visuality to performativity as a 
strategic critical practice. As Hemmings puts it, 'queer transgression of heterosexual 
presumption is marked by its visible closeness to and difference from the dominant... 
Thus, queer subversion occurs only when passing is incomplete, when the drag 
performances can in effect be read as gay drag performances' (2002:119). It is 
important to ask how this necessity of visual identification in relation to passing may 
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function to reaffirm (rather than challenge) problematic notions of bodily authenticity. 
Robinson points to the 'critical function of the real' in performative acts that attempt to 
deconstruct nonnative categories. She argues that while theorists of performativity may 
insist that 'the disjunction between inside and outside that enables drag performance 
"effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender 
identity", the logic of drag seems to depend on the primary intelligibility of the 
anatomical body of the performer' (1994:729-30). From this perspective, passing is not 
a strategy which 'evades the dominant terms of representation and the necessities of 
referential claims of identity' (730). It would seem that while performative bodily acts 
can upset or bring into focus regimes of visibility, they can also just reassert the power 
of those 'telling the difference' (Ahmed, 1999). Linking back to the importance of 
conceptualising passing in terms of relationships within specific contexts, the question 
of who has the authority and power to 'tell' the 'real' from the 'unreal' in relation to 
particular parodic acts seems crucial. 
Conclusions: Thinking relationally 
As a model for linking various experiences of passing, the subset model can 
problematically occlude embodied, historical, and political distinctions between passing 
practices as well as the ways in which passing is produced through relational, 
intersectional encounters which shift across time and space. Moreover, like Butler's 
theory of performativity, the subset model of passing sometimes functions to fetishise 
particular figures through its problematic reliance on visual identification. The subset 
approach can thus thwart the possibility of distinguishing between socially regressive 
and socially transfonuative aspects of particular passing acts, whilst downplaying the 
contextual relations of power through which social and political effects are produced. 
Through failing to theorise difference and complexity in passing narratives, the subset 
approach may reify (rather than interrogate or disrupt) dominant discourses and systems 
of power linked to perceived embodied differences. 
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How then might we theorise more effectively both the relationships between various 
experiences of passing and their individual particularities? How can we conceptualise 
passing in terms of relationships of power and proximity which are always 
intersectional, embodied and context-bound? Extending the argument I made at the end 
of the previous chapter, I suggest that rather than illustrating how particular practices 
are fundamentally similar or how they have universal effects, we might more fruitfully 
examine the ways in which specific forms of passing are relationally connected. In 
other words, instead of showing that 'race passing' is similar to 'gender passing', that 
`the process of passing is inherently subversive' or that 'we all pass in our daily lives', 
we could productively explore the ways in which particular experiences of passing are 
linked temporally and spatially and, as such, are (in part) mutually constituted. 
Returning to Eve Sedgwick's (2003) analysis of 'the periperformative' is useful in this 
respect. I drew on Sedgwick's framework at the beginning of this chapter to illustrate 
how, through seeking to house an increasing array of practices within a single 
performative neighbourhood, the subset model produces overly generalised 
periperformative utterances which lead it to lose its value as an analytic. Sedgwick's 
notion of the `periperformative' is also helpful for thinking about how, and through 
which historical processes, particular performative modes of practice have become 
lodged in close proximity to one another. For example, Sedgwick's own aim is to 
explore the dynamics of the potent 'Victorian periperformative topoi' which 'yokes 
together the performative acts and scenes that constitute marriage among British 
subjects, with the performative acts and scenes thought to characterize the institution of 
chattel slavery of Africans and their descendants in the New World' (79). Rather than 
focusing on the ways in which marriage and slavery might be understood as analogous 
in this context, she traces how discourses surrounding the two institutions have been 
constructed relationally because of, and through, their temporal and spatial proximity to 
one another in nineteenth century Britain and America. Slavery constituted such a 
`complex and protracted historical crime', that it inevitably 'gored its mark (highly 
differentially) on the modes of meaning that were possible for anyone in its 
performative ambit' (89-90). Moreover, abolitionist discourses about slavery and 
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suffragist rhetorics regarding marriage were not only articulated alongside one another 
at this time, but also actively appropriated one another's discursive repertoires, thus 
becoming intertwined in complex ways. 
Siobhan Somerville (2000) provides a similar relational analysis of the ways in which 
the 'crisis of homo/heterosexual definition' in America during the late nineteenth 
century intersected with and was shaped by 'concurrent conflicts over racial definition 
and the presumed boundary between "black and white"' (3). Examining the temporal 
proximity (and mutual effects) of three legal trials in the United States and Britain at 
this time — those of Homer Plessy in 1892 who defied a Louisiana law requiring railroad 
companies to enforce racial segregation among passengers; Alice Mitchell who in the 
same year was tried for the murder of her female lover Freda Ward; and Oscar Wilde 
who was charged with 'gross indecency' between men following the imposition in 
England of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in 1885 — Somerville suggests that 'the 
formation of notions of heterosexuality and homosexuality emerged in the United States 
through (and not merely parallel to) a discourse saturated with assumptions about 
racialized bodies' (4). All three trials were set against a background in which intense 
programmes directed towards 'telling the difference' between various bodies, including 
sexology and other expert discourses, had emerged: 'the heightened surveillance of 
bodies in a racially segregated culture demanded a specific kind of logic which...gave 
coherence to new concepts of homo-and heterosexuality' (4). Similar to Sedgwick, 
Somerville shows how the modes of discourse and utterance relating to bodies and 
embodied practices available during a particular historical moment in the United States 
were closely linked to and made possible by the wider social, legal and political 
processes which structured that cultural context. Like the periperformative utterances 
produced in respect to marriage and slavery during this period, discourses surrounding 
racialised, sexualised and gendered categories of embodiment often reflected, and in 
fact (re)produced one another, in part because of their spatial and temporal proximity. 
In their focus on the historical and social processes through which particular 
performative categories and formations have become naturalised, Sedgwick's and 
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Somerville's analyses articulate with Butler's critical genealogical approach. 
Moreover, like Sedgwick and Somerville, Butler is interested in exploring how one 
category 'becomes the condition of the other, how one becomes the marked background 
of action of the other' (Bell interview with Butler, 1999:168). What Sedgwick's 
periperformative framework adds to (or draws out from) Butler's focus on 
performativity's 'temporal complexity' is an emphasis on the spatiality of performative 
acts and utterances (Sedgwick, 2003:68). Furthermore, Somerville's approach may 
complement Butler's framework in providing a rich, intersectional model for 
historicising particular formations in relation to wider social, cultural and political 
frameworks, as opposed to simply locating particular practices historically (Hennessey 
cited in Fraser, 1999:116-7). 
Employing this type of framework to think about passing could enable us to trace the 
relational connections between particular formations of passing without recourse to a 
discourse of 'sameness'. Both Sedgwick and Somerville's analyses may aid us, for 
example, in thinking about how discourses about and experiences of 'race passing' in 
the United States were linked to and constituted via those pertaining to 'gender passing' 
and 'sexuality passing' during the `Jim Crow' period — a historical context in which the 
legacy of slavery and segregationist imperatives to 'tell the difference' between 
racialised bodies were intertwined with anxieties about the epistemological 
uncertainties surrounding sexualised and gendered bodies. While such anxieties were 
articulated in close temporal proximity during this period, they were also related 
spatially. In seeking to legislate the proximity of racialised bodies, for example, 
segregationist policies were simultaneously articulated through 'a discourse of panic 
around sexual mobility' (Somerville, 2000:35). 1°1 Through fleshing out the social 
particularities of this context in American history, it becomes possible to trace how the 
discursive repertoires available for constructing embodied acts (such as passing) which 
threatened to disrupt fledging categories of sexuality and gender were informed by, and 
101 As Somerville's analysis of the Plessy, Mitchell and Wilde cases indicates, fears about inter-racial 
desire and the proximity of 'black' and 'white' bodies were linked to those surrounding homosexual 
desire. 
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thus often articulated as analogous to, those pertaining to transgressions of 'the color 
line'. 
It is important to emphasise that while a relational approach traces the ways in which 
discursive formations such as 'race passing' and 'gender passing' are constitutively 
linked, it remains interested in `the often starkly irreconcilable aspects of their cultural 
deployment' (Somerville, 2000:7). Indeed, through historicising the discursive 
production of particular practices and figures, and linking such histories to the processes 
through which they are constituted and enacted in contemporary contexts, a relational 
approach may provide an effective framework for making the types of social, political 
and embodied distinctions between particular formations and practices of passing that 
my analysis in this chapter has suggested are crucial. As the constitution and effects of 
particular performative acts always depend on 'context and reception' (Butler, 
1999/1990:177), the object here is not to construct a fixed typology, but rather to 
provide a historically grounded framework for tracing the regimes of visibility and the 
(power) relationships between bodies that constitute formations of passing or crossing 
within particular contexts. On the one hand, the process of tracing the ways in which 
particular passing narratives have been discursively constructed and historicising 
particular embodied identity categories disrupts the 'naturalness' of bodily boundaries 
in a way that material practices of passing may fail to do. On the other hand, without 
assuming that it is possible to map 'the range or reach of all the forms of subversion 
emanating from specific discourses, acts, practices' (Lloyd, 1999:207), this process may 
provide us some insight into sketching which performative acts (or aspects of acts) have 
the potential to be transformative and which are more likely to be regressive. 
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Chapter Five 
Tracing `the Anorexic' and 'the Veiled Woman' 
A Relational Account 
Both anorexia and the veil reflect inner conflict and convey distress, symbolic of 
struggle that looks like resignation, rebellion that takes the shape of conformity and 
resistance that is dressed in complicity. 
Mervat Nasser, 1999:409 
The solution is to refuse...to be dragged into the binary opposition between East and 
West in which so many arguments are mired. However, the most powerful way to do 
this is to fearlessly examine the process of entanglement. 
Lila Abu-Lughod, 1998a:16 
The 'new' Muslim veiling phenomenon represents a contemporary 'equivalent' to the 
growing epidemic of anorexia in the industrialised West, Mervat Nasser has argued 
(1999). Like anorexia, she contends, the new veiling, signalled by the growing number 
of young Muslim women wearing Islamic dress within universities, workplaces, urban 
centres and political organisations around the world, responds to multiple pressures felt 
by women globally including 'conflicting cultural messages and contradictory cultural 
expectations' (407). 102 Both embodied practices 1°3 function as foul's of problem 
solving which, in the absence of real power or control, help women cope with the 
competing demands of ambitious professional goals and pressure to maintain a 
102 'Veiling' is an English word used to refer to a very wide array of women's Islamic dress around the 
world, such as the turban in Turkey, the chador in Iran, the hijab in Britain, the burqa in Afghanistan (and 
the many internal variations of Islamic covering in all of these and other locations). As such, while the 
term 'veiling' has wide currency in Western industrialised nations, it problematically homogenises a 
diverse collection of practices. As Egyptian feminist Fadwa El Guindi points out, there is no one Arabic 
term equivalent to the English 'veil' (1999, xi:7). Moreover, it should be acknowledged that veiling is 
not exclusively a Muslim practice, but is also associated with Jewish, Christian and Hindu traditions. 
103 Anorexia is today the object of various competing discourses. It is constructed simultaneously in 
terms of physiological dysfunction, genetic predisposition and cognitive deficits or biases, as a 
consequence of familial dysfunction, social ideals of thinness and of patriarchal oppression (Malson, 
1998:98). 
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traditional female identity. And both, she suggests, ultimately lead to the reproduction 
of tradition and the reinforcement of gender inequality. 
The establishment of 'the anorexic subject' as a counterpart to 'the veiled woman' 
within cross-cultural comparisons draws on a significant strand of feminist literature 
(now pervasive in mainstream cultural discourse). Against constructions of 'the West' 
as the land of gender equality, liberation and freedom, feminist commentators have 
inaugurated the figure of the anorexic as a metaphor for the continuing embodied 
oppression associated with gendered power relations in industrialised Western countries 
(Orbach, 1993/1986, 2006/1978; Wolf, 1990; Bordo, 1993). 104 Within these texts, and 
comparisons between veiling and anorexia which employ their terms, 'the anorexic' 
serves as a generalised figure representing the widespread subjugation of the female 
body within the West's patriarchal, capitalist beauty system — a system that impels 
women and girls to discipline their bodies in pursuit of an unachievable ideal. As 
Nasser comments, 'weight phobia, fear of fatness and pursuit of thinness are modern 
Willis that are now used interchangeably to refer to anorexia nervosa' (1997:1). She 
adds, 'If eating disorders are indeed metaphors... it is likely that what they symbolize 
now encompasses this social disruption and cultural confusion' (97). A general 
message these cross-cultural comparisons impart is that when it comes to gender and 
the body, 'the West' is no less patriarchal or oppressive, and may in fact be more so, 
than 'the Muslim East'. 
Several other theorists have made comparisons between Muslim veiling and embodied 
practices linked to the Western 'beauty system'. 105 Nancy Hirschmann (1998) suggests 
104 Such feminist writers have argued that while women have made professional, economic and legal 
gains since the second wave of feminism in the West in the 1970s and 1980s, claims to universal equality 
and female empowerment are undercut by the rising epidemic of anorexia and other forms of disordered 
eating and bodily discipline which point to the conspicuous operation of Western culture to 'keep women 
down'. 
105 In this chapter, as in Chapter Three, I employ terms such as 'Western' and 'non-Western', 'Eastern' 
and 'Muslim' to indicate the types of distinctions made in the literature I am analysing. The 
generalisations they imply, however, are often problematic. For example, labelling Muslim veiling `non-
Western' obscures the wide practice of veiling in Western industrialised countries by women who may 
consider themselves both 'Muslim' and 'Western'. In turn, labelling 'anorexia' as 'Western' similarly 
effaces the growing number of women who experience eating disorders in locations outside the 
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that Western feminists need to ask themselves whether the veil is more oppressive than 
Western fashion trends such as Wonderbras, miniskirts and blue jeans (361). Similarly, 
Sheila Jeffreys (2005) argues that beauty practices prevalent in the West such as 
makeup, dieting and cosmetic surgery should be understood as 'harmful cultural 
practices' comparable to procedures typically thought of as non-Western, such as 
female genital mutilation and veiling. She suggests that makeup and the veil represent 
`two sides of the same coin of women's oppression' - both have been seen as voluntary 
practices through which women can express their agency, yet both arise from pressures 
linked to male dominance (37). These types of comparisons are now increasingly 
echoed within mainstream media and cultural discourse. For example, an article 
exploring veiling practices in the UK in The Observer argues that 'the veil and the bra 
top are really two sides of the same coin' (Anthony, 2005:17). The premature 
recognition of female sexuality implicated by the veiling of girls as young as seven or 
eight, the author contends, 'is every bit as significant, and disturbing, as dressing a child 
in a high-street approximation of Britney Spears, all bare midriff and attitude' (17). 
As in the comparisons between female genital cutting and body modification examined 
in Chapter Three, the theorists who make links between veiling and anorexia and/or 
`Western' beauty regimes differ in their social locations, perspectives and political 
agendas. Most, however, frame their comparisons with a concern to interrogate 
ethnocentrism, racism and cultural essentialism. They seek to deconstruct the 
ubiquitous self/other binary of the 'liberated, uncovered Western woman' and the 
`oppressed, veiled Muslim woman'. This dualism can be traced back through the 
centuries to representations created within early Western travellers' narratives, proto-
feminist colonial discourse, nationalist and anti-Western idiom and, most recently, the 
rhetoric of the American-led post-9/11 'War on Tenor'. In the midst of a second 
Western-initiated war in Iraq, such culturally essentialist portrayals of 'free, skin-
showing, Western women' and 'downtrodden, covered Muslim women' once again 
industrialised West. It is also clear that so called 'Western' beauty procedures are practiced all over the 
world. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the ways in which practices such as veiling and anorexia are 
socially and discursively produced through relational encounters which criss-cross boundaries of East and 
West, fundamentally imbricating the two poles. 
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dominate the mainstream Western socio-political consciousness. In different ways, 
theorists who link veiling with anorexia and/or Western beauty practices aim to contest 
enduring Orientalist images of Muslim and Arab women as 'other' against a privileged 
`Western self. 
Some theorists have attempted to interrogate the Western/Muslim binary by reversing it 
(valuing veiled Muslim woman as empowered and devaluing Western women as 
oppressed). For example, Fadwa El Guindi (2003) discusses how veiling and Islamic 
religiosity are seen to offer women true emancipation, in contrast to the false freedom 
of Western women, exploited and sexualised in Western consumer culture. Similarly, 
several young Muslim women, primarily through Muslim websites and publications, 
argue that, unlike the rising numbers of Western women beset by eating disorders and 
body image disturbance, veiled Muslim women 'don't suffer from insecurities about 
their bodies, because the philosophy and clothing of their culture discourages it' 
(Knight cited in Dixon, 1999:2). 106 Such strategies correspond to the second stage of 
Shildrick and Prokhovnik's three-step process for deconstructing and resignifying 
binaries. 
Other theorists, pursuing what I have previously described as an attempt to realise the 
third step of this deconstructive process, have sought to resignify the terms of the 
Western/Muslim binary though establishing fundamental similarities between 'Western 
women' and 'Muslim women' that transcend the self/other distinction. Randi 
Gressgard (2006) argues that, on a structural level, the figures of `the veiled woman', 
`the anorexic' and 'the transsexual' reveal a 'striking similarity' (325). Through using 
their 'freedom of choice to choose submission' (336), all three figures display an 
ambivalence between 'transcendence' and 'immanence' attached 'to the notion of 
woman, within a hierarchical order' (336). Articulating a different perspective, 
although also emphasising similarities between veiling and other embodied practices, 
Homa Hoodfar (2003) argues that the veil 'may be worn to beautify the wearer...much 
in the same way Western women wear makeup' (11). In her keynote address at the 
106 See also Franks, 2000; Ali, 2000; Chopra, 2002; Yusufali, 2002; Hoodfar, 2003 and Rahman, 2004. 
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Feminist and Women's Studies Association (UK and Ireland) Nineteenth Annual 
Conference in Bradford in July 2006, Haleh Afshar compared Muslim girls wearing the 
hijab at school to non-Muslim girls sporting short-skirts or body piercings. Pointing out 
that she does not object to the latter forms of bodily presentation, Afshar asks why it is 
that 'when someone puts a veil on her head the whole institutional guard comes down'. 
We are, she maintains, 'ascribing different identities to almost identical dress codes' 
(my transcription) (Afshar, 2006). Similarly, Linda Duits and Liesbet van Zoonen 
(2006) suggest that both girls wearing headscarves and those dressed in 'porno-chic' are 
`submitted to the meta-narratives of dominant discourse' which define their everyday 
practices as inappropriate and deny them the power to define their own action (103). In 
this vein, Hirschmann (1998) understands veiling and 'Western' fashion trends as 
similarly combining the potential for agency and the reification of patriarchal relations 
of power, Jeffreys (2005) sees veiling and makeup as harmful cultural practices which 
both mark women as unequal citizens and Nasser (1999) conceives of both veiling and 
anorexia as problematic bodily practices women pursue to deal with conflicting 
gendered cultural messages. 1°7 
In this final case study, I illustrate some of the similarities between comparisons of 
veiling, anorexia and beauty practices and linkings of embodied practices made in the 
previous two case studies. In the first part of the chapter, I provide a mapping of the 
literature, showing how, in employing the analogue, continuum and subset approaches 
to link Muslim veiling with anorexia and/or 'Western' beauty practices, authors risk 
producing some of the problematic effects noted in the previous chapters. In the second 
part, I push my analysis further, employing my relational framework. This relational 
107 The diverse groups of feminist theorists I have listed above are located differently in relation to nation, 
ethnicity, religion and political perspective, among other axes of differentiation. While the majority of 
the proponents of cross-cultural approaches I discussed in Chapter Three identified as 'Western' feminist 
theorists, some of the scholars cited above work in locations outside the industrialised West and identify 
in as 'Middle Eastern', 'Egyptian', 'British-Iranian' etc. These theorists' varying social locations of 
enunciation raise interesting questions, which I do not have space to address adequately in this thesis, 
regarding how the potential social and political effects of the comparisons they make may differ. How, 
for example, might a comparison between veiling and make-up made by the white, Australian radical 
feminist Sheila Jeffreys be interpreted or received differently by various audiences than a similar 
comparison made by the British Iranian postcolonial feminist critic Haleh Afshar, or Homa Hoodfar, a 
feminist of Iranian origin currently working in Canada? How might we examine and trace the complex 
relations of power structuring such political and cultural enunciations? 
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approach serves as both an alternative means of interrogating essentialist bodily binaries 
and a framework for theorising the links and disjunctures among particular gendered 
cultural practices. Exploring historical and contemporary literature within three key 
overlapping themes, Orientalism, women's travel writing and cross-cultural 
comparison; Colonialism, (proto)feminism and `westoxification'; and Body image, 
cultural difference and politics, I trace a series of encounters across East/West borders 
which are relevant to the relational construction of the contemporary figures of 'the 
anorexic' and the 'veiled woman'. 
The comparison between veiling and anorexia is particularly relevant to my project for 
a number of reasons. While links between anorexia and veiling are not (yet) made as 
frequently as those between female genital cutting and cosmetic surgery or intersex 
operations, the comparison is timely in the context of the current social and political 
climate in which 'differences between Muslim and non-Muslim women are constructed 
as posing insurmountable cultural differences' (Brah and Phoenix, 2004:79). The 
veiling and anorexia example also represents the point at which I began this project in 
my Masters dissertation, which explored the ways in which 'Muslim' and 'non-Muslim' 
female subjectivities are differentiated in the realm of body image and eating pathology. 
In this chapter, moving on from the analogue approach which I concluded with in my 
dissertation, I hope to shift my theoretical analysis in a different direction. In the next 
section, I focus on the texts of three theorists, Sheila Jeffreys, Nancy Hirschmann and 
Mervat Nasser, who link veiling and anorexia and/or beauty practices in different ways. 
Veiling, Anorexia and Beauty Practices: Comparisons and Critiques 
Cross-cultural comparisons 
In Beauty and Misogyny: Harmful Cultural Practices in the West (2005), Sheila 
Jeffreys argues that the United Nations' concept of 'harmful cultural practices' is 
helpful for analysing 'Western' embodied practices, as well as those in other parts of 
the world Importantly for Jeffreys, this concept situates 'traditional' gendered 
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practices within the culture of male domination, rather than linking them exclusively to 
notions of individual choice. In making her case, Jeffreys clearly couches her analysis 
in the language of anti-cultural essentialism. She explains that her book was motivated 
by a 'growing impatience' with the 'Western bias' of the United Nations' conceptual 
categories which currently interpret practices in the West as 'emanating from consumer 
"choice" from "science" and "medicine" or "fashion"', rather than culture, which 'may 
be seen as something reactionary that exists in the non-west' (34). Using a subset 
approach, Jeffreys includes within the category of 'harmful cultural practices' a wide 
range of 'Western' and 'non-Western' procedures such as labiaplasty, female genital 
mutilation, veiling, dieting, transsexual surgery, piercing, cutting and branding, 
depilation and the wearing of high heels and makeup. She maintains that if Western 
beauty practices are also recognised as harmful cultural practices, 'governments will, as 
required by the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Fauns of Discrimination 
Against Women, need to alter the social attitudes which underlie them' (45). Jeffreys 
also employs continuum and analogue models to draw more specific links among 
particular practices. Acknowledging that the wide range of procedures she names 
involve 'different degrees of harm to women', she argues that 'a continuum of Western 
beauty practices from lipstick on the one end to invasive cosmetic surgery on the other, 
fit the criteria set out for harmful cultural practices in United Nations understandings, 
although they may differ in their effects' (28). She also argues that while veiling and 
makeup are often seen as opposites, they are in fact analogous in that both mark women 
as subordinate, revealing their 'lack of entitlement' in patriarchal cultures (38). Like 
other advocates of the analogue approach discussed in Chapter Three, Jeffreys 
maintains that, 'Western feminist criticisms of harmful cultural practices in other 
cultures need to be founded on a profound critique of such practices within their own' 
(35). 
In 'Western Feminism, Eastern Veiling, and the Question of Free Agency' (1998), 
Nancy Hirschmann seeks to move beyond essentialist and ethnocentric Western 
feminist portrayals of Muslim veiling. She frames her article as a critique of Western 
privilege and cultural essentialism, arguing that 'many Westerners tend to associate 
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veiling with extreme gender oppression, even seeing the veil as the ultimate symbol of a 
unified, monolithic Islam' (357). Invoking a continuum argument to counter 
essentialist portrayals of patriarchy as a problem unique to Muslim cultures, she argues 
that 'from fashion shows to domestic violence, Western women participate in a myriad 
of practices that can be seen as deeply patriarchal' (360). 108 Like Jeffreys and others 
discussed in this thesis, Hirschmann emphasises the importance of a cross-cultural 
approach 'that includes the recognition of the need for Western theorists to be self-
critical' (italics in original) (354). Rather than condemn veiling, she argues, 'the need 
to attend to contexts within which choices are made should make Western feminists ask 
whether the veil is any more oppressive than Western clothing trends such as 
Wonderbras, miniskirts, or even blue jeans' (361). While Jeffreys dismisses feminist 
analyses of the ways in which veiling and other embodied practices may enable women 
to express their agency in particular contexts, Hirschmann is more interested in 
`understanding veiling as a complex practice within which women's agency functions 
in similarly complex ways' (348). She suggests that the practice of 'veiling can be used 
as a vehicle' (349) for developing 'a cross-cultural feminist understanding on agency' 
(360). 
In 'The New Veiling Phenomenon — is it an Anorexic Equivalent? A Polemic' (1999), 
Mervat Nasser employs an analogue approach to link 'the Western anorexic position 
and the new veiling' (407). She suggests that while the new veiling may appear 
`completely different, if not alien to the anorexic position' it is necessary to trace their 
commonalities as a means 'to go beyond the traditional Orientalist definition and 
perception of the veil and to depart from the Western static vision of women of the 
Orient' (408). Throughout the article, she seeks to illustrate the social and 
psychological similarities shared by anorexic and veiled subjects. Drawing on Arlene 
Macleod's (1991) concept of 'accommodating protest', she argues that both practices 
are types of 'veiled resistance' undertaken by women who are torn between tradition 
108 It is interesting that both Jeffreys and Hirschmann employ continuum approaches specifically to 
suggest a range of 'Western' practices, rather than an integrated spectrum of 'Western' and 'non-
Western' procedures as in the FGC/body modification case study, a point which I address later in the 
chapter. 
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and modernity (411). She also points to the 'social contractibility' of both practices, 
represented by the phenomenon of 'me-too-anorexics' and the wide spread of veiling 
among young women (409), and to the (in)visibility of both subjects, who seek to hide 
behind anorexia or the veil, yet are 'paradoxically conspicuous in any group setting' 
(409). Nasser's central argument is that, as both practices are 'are derived from 
tradition and affuniative of it', anorexics and veiled women both 'obstruct the potential 
for real change' in regards to gender roles and relations of power (411). She hopes that 
the 'cultural confusion/cultural lag' symbolised by both practices can lead finally to 'a 
proper formulation of gender roles' (411). 
As with the previous two case studies, there are several potential benefits to these 
comparative cross-cultural approaches. They can disrupt ethnocentric and essentialist 
assumptions that 'Western' and 'non-Western' practices are essentially different, 
generate greater awareness and critical thinking about 'culture' (as well as race and 
gender) and promote productive cross-cultural dialogue. Moreover, providing a counter 
discourse to post-feminist perspectives which 'assume female sexual agency and desire 
to be inscribed in the visibility and openness to view of the body' (Macdonald, 
2006:12), such comparative constructions highlight the ways in which women's and 
girls' bodies regularly function across cultural contexts as carriers for wider political, 
cultural, economic and nationalistic imperatives and the surfaces onto which political 
positions are etched (McClintock, 1995; Narayan, 1998). Analysis of the gendered 
oppression involved in Western beauty practices also interrogates simplistic notions of 
personal choice and individual agency and emphasises that 'the personal is political'. 
Nasser's and (particularly) Hirschmann's analyses are useful for thinking critically 
about conceptions of agency and subordination within particular social and historical 
contexts and relations of power. Hirschmann asks important questions about how 
agency can be theorised in ways which do not simply assume and project Western, 
liberal conceptions and frameworks. 
Furthermore, Jeffreys' argument can be seen as serving a valuable political purpose, 
linked to a well-established trajectory of radical feminist critique. A key argument of 
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the widely held sexist ideology to which radical feminist models in the 1970s and 1980s 
protested, and which Jeffreys seeks to interrogate further, was the assumption that 
women alone — and not men's desires or patriarchal culture - bore responsibility for 
their suffering in regards to matters of beauty and the 'bodily tyrannies of fashion' 
(Bordo, 1993:21). As Susan Bordo argues, 
Tthe insistence that women are done to, not the doers, here; that men and their desires 
bear responsibility; and that female obedience to the dictates of fashion is better 
conceptualized as bondage than choice — was a crucial historical moment in the 
developing articulation of a new understanding of the sexual politics of the body (21-
22). 
While Bordo acknowledges that such radical feminist models 'may have been 
insufficiently attentive to the multiplicity of meaning, the pleasures of shaping and 
decorating the body, or the role of female agency in reproducing patriarchal culture' she 
emphasises that these discourses offered 'a systemic critique capable of rousing women 
to collective action' (31). 
As I have argued in the preceding chapters, despite these advantages, the analogue, 
continuum and subset approaches are problematic in several ways, not least because 
none of them succeeds in transcending the essentialist Western/Muslim, self/other 
binaries originally identified as in need of redress. I have discussed the problems at 
length in the past two case studies and will not therefore offer a comprehensive or in 
depth critique of the veiling and anorexia/beauty practices example here. I will, 
however, discuss a few examples to illustrate the ways in which the comparative 
approaches used by authors in this chapter run into traps similar to those identified in 
the FGC/body modification and passing case studies. 
Superficial sameness 
Through the establishment of superficial similarities based on uncritical assumptions, 
the comparative approaches used to link veiling and anorexia and/or Western beauty 
practices can paradoxically reify essentialist notions of cultural difference. For 
example, in including 'Western' beauty procedures alongside 'non-Western' practices 
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within the category of 'harmful cultural practices', Jeffreys unambiguously assumes 
that a variety of 'non-Western' practices, such as female genital cutting and veiling, are 
fundamentally patriarchal and haimful to women and simply seeks to have 'Western' 
practices measured by the same yardstick. Insisting that 'beauty practices are not about 
women's individual choice or a "discursive space" for women's creative expression 
but...a most important aspect of women's oppression' (2), she thinks less critically 
about the histories of production and contextual complexities of 'Western' and 'non-
Western' practices, placing them all within the same category of gendered oppression. 
Furthermore, it seems significant that Jeffreys, like Hirschmann, only employs a 
continuum approach to articulate the need to theorise distinctions between 'Western' 
practices (suggesting that some of such procedures may be more extreme or 'harmful' 
than others). The implication of this theoretical move is that similar distinctions need 
not be theorised with respect to 'non-Western' practices, which can be less 
problematically lumped together as 'oppressive'. Jeffreys also reinforces a divide 
between 'Western' and 'non-Western' procedures that downplays the ways in which 
these practices clearly cross-over national and cultural contexts. Thus, while Jeffreys' 
analysis is framed as one motivated by anti-cultural essentialist imperatives, one might 
ague that her model risks reifying ethnocentrism and essentialism by taking the 
oppressive nature of non-Western practices for granted. 
Furtherniore, Nasser seems to suggest that anorexia and veiling are mutually exclusive 
options available to women in the face of contradictory social pressures: 'They are 
forms of veiled resistance adopted by women who are torn between tradition and 
modernity. The reason however as why (sic) a young woman would choose the veil 
instead of the anorexic look is likely to be bound by a set of circumstances namely class 
and economic structures' (italics mine) (1999:411). In collapsing the Western/Muslim 
binary into an economy of sameness (insisting on the 'equivalence' of the two 
practices) only then to pull it back apart (separating veiling and anorexia as discrete 
either/or choices), Nasser's analysis functions paradoxically to reinstate potentially 
essentialist notions of cultural difference. She does not discuss the possibilities for 
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hybridity and cross-over in embodied practice and subjectivity; 109 for example, the 
likelihood that there are women who veil and who experience disordered eating or body 
image distress. 11° My argument here is not that generalisations or assertions of 
similarity can never be made but that, in these texts, an uncritical insistence on 
`sameness' or 'equivalence' easily slips into assumptions of the problematic 
(essentialist) cultural, national and racial differences that the authors claimed initially to 
want to overcome. This appears to be a problem in cross-cultural approaches which 
emphasise commonalities between embodied practices. 
Flattening intersections 
Through repeatedly privileging gender to the exclusion of race, sexuality and nation, 
some of the authors discussed in this chapter also do not theorise the intersection of 
multiple axes of differentiation as central to the meaning and experience of veiling, 
anorexia and various beauty practices. Jeffreys' analysis, in particular, relies 
predominantly on a model of universal patriarchy to link 'Western' and 'non-Western' 
practices. While she makes brief reference to feminist analyses of the ways in which 
veiling may enable Muslim women to 'alleviate the harms suffered by women as a 
result of male dominance' (2005:39), she (unlike Nasser) does not consider the ways in 
which veiling and anorexia may serve as adaptive strategies which respond to other 
oppressive systems such as racism and poverty. In her study of Muslim women living 
in Canada, Homa Hoodfar (2003) found that veiling has played a crucial role in helping 
some Muslim women adapt to the Canadian society in the face of cultural difference, 
exclusion and racism. 111 Becky Thompson (1992) has argued that, rather than relating 
1°9 See, for instance, Chantal Zabus's (2001) analysis of Sabrina Kherbiche's novel La Surture (1993), in 
which the female protagonist develops anorexia after a forced genital excision. As Zabus suggests, in 
Kherbiche's text, the concept of `surturing' reflects 'the suturing of disordered discourses, i.e. the 
collision of reconstructed virginity and self-starvation' (342). 'Usually defined as a Western ailment, 
anorexia nervosa here is simultaneously developed as a tortured response to being wedged between a 
Western and a non-Western culture' (344). 
110 In other publications, however, Nasser does acknowledge that veiled Muslim women are not immune 
from body image distress (see Nasser, 1997:xi, 21). 
111 Hoodfar explains, for example, how Somali refugees who had come to Canada to escape civil war and 
upheaval turned to Islam, the Muslim community and veiling for support upon their arrival, as 'for many 
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exclusively to the gendered 'culture of thinness' in the West, eating disorders such as 
anorexia represent ways in which women cope with a broader host of traumas including 
sexual abuse, racism, classism, heterosexism and poverty. Furthermore, Jeffreys does 
not consider the connections between veiling and anti-colonialism and a rejection of 
`Western' values, which are of course linked to indigenous patriarchies, but cannot be 
simply incorporated into a linear model of gender oppression (Ahmed, 1992; Gole, 
1996; El Guindi, 2003). 
Jeffreys' theoretical framework has implications at the level of intervention. In the 
context of her comparison of veiling and makeup she seems to suggest that simply 
deciding to not be concerned with wearing makeup or veiling can provide liberation for 
Western and non-Western women, insisting: 
Women can invent themselves anew outside the stereotypes of western and non-western 
patriarchal culture. Women can have access to the privilege possessed by men of not 
having to be concerned for appearance and being able to go out in public barefaced and 
bareheaded (2005:38) 
Jeffreys' language here veers dangerously close to the brand of 'unveiling for freedom' 
rhetoric employed by the Bush/Blair alliance to 'legitimise' the Western military 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq (as if simply going barefaced and bareheaded could 
produce gender liberation). It also ignores historical lessons from countries such as 
Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, which have shown that unveiling can be felt as just as 
oppressive to women as veiling, especially if coerced by government pressure (Ahmed, 
1992; Gole, 1996, Macdonald, 2006). These examples illustrate the inadequacy of a 
linear model of gender oppression in theorising the relationship between 'Western' and 
`non-Western' embodied cultural practices and point to the need for an intersectional 
analysis. 112 
Somalis emphasizing their membership and participating in the Muslim community is a means of coping 
with a new culture and social system' (13). 
112 For example, on the basis of her research that eating problems can develop as a response to a variety 
of forms of trauma, Becky Thompson argues that the prevention of eating disorders depends not simply 
on the reduction of elimination of patriarchy, but 'on women's access to economic, cultural, racial, 
political, social, and sexual justice' (1992:559). 
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Universalising embodiment 
Jeffreys' apparent desire for Muslim women to unveil themselves also suggests a 
problematic assumption of what constitutes a 'natural' body. In constructing the 'bare-
headed' Muslim female body as associated with freedom from 'harm' or oppression, 
she universalises one particular conception of embodiment as the feminist ideal. Yet, 
this implied equation of bare-headedness (and bare-facedness) and liberation risks 
reifying post-feminist assumptions that associate the visible display of the body with 
female sexual agency. 113 Furtheimore, in delineating both 'Muslim' and 'non-Muslim' 
women's embodied actions into the binary categories of (patriarchal) oppression or 
(feminist) resistance, Jeffreys may 'impose a teleology of progressive politics on the 
analytics of power' that makes it difficult to understand forms of embodiment and 
bodily action 'that are not necessarily encapsulated by the narrative of subversion and 
reinscription of norms' (Mahmood, 2005:9). As Saba Mahmood (2005) argues in her 
analysis of the Islamic piety movement, 'it is critical that we ask whether it is even 
possible to identify a universal category of acts — such as those of resistance — outside of 
the ethical and political conditions within which such acts acquire their political 
meaning' (9). This argument clearly underscores the problems with separating bodies 
and embodied subjectivities from the cultural contexts in which they are (re)constituted. 
Hirschmann's analysis is stronger in this respect, as she emphasises that `women's 
agency, resistance and freedom can be understood only by their location' (357). There 
is, however, still an implied link between 'agency' and 'resistance' in her formulation. 
Fetishising figures 
Due to their visibility, 'the veiled woman' and 'the anorexic' are made to stand as 
metaphors for their respective cultures. As Nasser explains, 
113 Moreover, in suggesting that feminist empowerment may be achieved through choosing to present a 
`visible' or 'open' body, Jeffreys' argument risks reproducing 'the disciplining and normalizing gaze of 
modem colonial disciplinary power', which, through 'the unveiling of the Oriental woman... ensures a 
"panoptic" position for the colonial subject' (Yegenoglo, 1998:111). 
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In anorexia, the cultural ideal of thinness was seen as a metaphor of woman's struggle 
against conflicting social definitions of femineity (sic), combining desirable qualities of 
the new woman namely control with the qualities required from the traditional woman, 
i.e. attractiveness, weaknesses and helplessness... The same metaphor is used here as a 
framework towards understanding this 'new veiling', arguing that it could in fact be a 
contemporary anorexic equivalent (italics in original) (1999:408). 
The figure of 'the veiled woman' has long been read within the West as a synecdoche 
for Muslim culture as a whole. 114 As mentioned earlier, the construction of 'the 
anorexic' as a symbol for Western culture can be traced (in part) to the work of feminist 
cultural theorists, such as Susie Orbach, Naomi Wolf, and Susan Bordo, who have 
understood anorexia as a 'metaphor for our time' (Orbach, 1993/1986). 115 I want to 
argue, however, that the construction of 'the veiled woman' and 'the anorexic' as 
cultural metaphors within these cross-cultural comparisons is problematic for reasons 
similar to those discussed in the previous case study. 
Constructed as generalised cultural representatives, the figures of `the veiled woman' 
and 'the anorexic' are extracted from the histories and processes of their discursive and 
social production and fetishised as objects (Ahmed, 2000). Through such fetishisation, 
the contours of anorexia and veiling and their imagined subjects can, like those of the 
`transsexual', `transgender' and 'mixed race' figures, become fixed in troubling ways. 
When anorexia is employed as synecdoche for Western culture's patriarchal, consumer-
driven oppression of women it is often constructed as a condition 'caused' exclusively 
by media ideals of feminine thinness and beauty. This dominant narrative of 'anorexia' 
not only functions to constitute anorexics as passive victims and/or cultural dupes, it 
also effaces the many other complex factors which may combine to produce anorexia in 
particular contexts, such as experiences of trauma and abuse (Brain, 2006). 1 16 
114 Western fantasies of 'penetration into the mysteries of the Orient' through looking behind 'the veil' 
are particularly relevant to the discourses around veiling in the context of French colonialism in Algeria 
(Yegenoglo, 1998:39-40; see also Fanon, 1965:42-44). 
115 Bordo comments that 'the anorectic thus appears, not as the victim of a unique and "bizarre" 
pathology, but as the bearer of very distressing tidings about our culture' (1993:60). Similarly, Orbach 
argues, 'Anorexia nervosa — self-starvation — is both a serious mental condition affecting thousands upon 
thousands of women, and a metaphor for our age' (1993/1986:4). 
116 In fetishising anorexia and 'the' problem facing women and girls in the West, such constructions also 
elide the diversity of other forms of disordered eating and body image distress which women (and men) 
face, not to mention the wide array of other areas in which women in Western industrialized nations 
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Similar problems with theorising women's agency occur when 'the veiled woman' 
becomes fetishised through such cultural comparisons. In Nasser's text, 'both anorexia 
and the veil demonstrate women's confusion about the seriousness of society's intention 
towards their progress' (1999:411) and, through both practices, 'women unwittingly 
obstruct the potential for real change' (italics mine) (411). She goes on to describe both 
anorexia and veiling as signs of 'cultural lag' which must be overcome to produce more 
appropriate gender relations: 
It is hoped, however, that this cultural confusion/cultural lag (symbolized in gestures 
like anorexia and the veil) would finally lead to a proper formulation of gender roles 
and a better development of a new identity for women that is more reconciled with 
itself and society (italics mine) (411). 
The connotations of the teim 'cultural lag' are clearly problematic, suggesting that as 
the primitive vestiges of particular cultures who have failed to assume proper gender 
roles, both anorexic and veiled women remain fixed in an atavistic state. 117 
It could be argued that 'veiled women' are valued predominantly within some of these 
texts as conceptual tools which provide insight to the West. Hirschmann offers a 
sophisticated analysis of how agency is constructed differently across cultural contexts 
in ways that disrupt or exceed any 'universal' Western model. Yet she does not 
interrogate how representing veiling as a mirror for Western consciousness and 
subjectivity may serve not to deconstruct Orientalist representations but rather to reify 
Western privilege. For example, in her analysis: 
Indeed, precisely because veiling is "other" to most Westerners, it may be able to reveal 
aspects of the West to which Westerners are often blind, such as assumptions about 
individuality, agency, and difference, as well as Western feminists' lack of self-
consciousness about our own practices, including our foiuis of dress (italics mine) 
(1998:349). 
continue to be disadvantaged, devalued, discriminated against and/or oppressed, from income inequality 
to domestic and sexual violence. 
"7 While Nasser draws on Macleod's (1991) analysis of the new veiling in Egypt and her concept of 
`accommodating protest' to frame her argument, Macleod herself criticises the concept of 'cultural lag', 
arguing that terms such as break, gap and lag 'disguise a lack of understanding of the actual dynamics of 
the moment of social and political change' and fail to grasp 'the concrete actions and concerns of 
subordinate groups in relations of power, the concrete struggles and negotiations which end at times in 
the reproduction of power relations and occasionally in real change in the terms of inequality.' (15) 
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Westerners must listen, if for no other reason than that more comprehensive 
understandings of our own experiences — including the way we dress and its 
significance for Western women's freedom — can occur with such attention (second 
italics mine) (364). 
One could argue that 'locating oneself in one's research' (England, 1994) functions here 
not to produce a more 'generous' view of 'the other', but rather to reflect the privileged 
`Western' gaze back to itself (Ahmed, 2004b:2). Thus, while Reina Lewis and Sara 
Mills comment that the veil 'is invested with the potency to hide or reveal the "truth" 
about the Orient which the West ultimately seeks' (2003:14), we might add that it is 
also apparently invested with the power to reveal the truth about the West to the West. 
From this perspective, the primary role of 'the veiled woman' in these examples is to 
help Westerners become more developed, aware and multifaceted subjects. The risk of 
such constructions is that veiled women themselves may, by contrast, remain fixed and 
voiceless. 
Through emphasising cross-cultural commonality, these comparative approaches all 
avoid theorising the ways in which the imagined figures of 'the anorexic' and the 
`veiled woman' are, and have been, constructed relationally. As suggested in Chapter 
Three, in collapsing 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman', or the 'victim of female 
genital mutilation' and 'the cosmetic surgery consumer', into an economy of sameness 
(which often slips back into problematic difference) these cross-cultural models can cut 
these figures off from their historical and contemporary trajectories of production. 
They may thus fail to interrogate the ways in which these figures have been constructed, 
in part, in and through one another. Yet, from my standpoint, it is precisely through a 
genealogical tracing of the relational power dynamics through which these figures have 
been constructed, that the discursive fibres of contemporary dualisms may be examined, 
unravelled and radically re-woven. In this sense, I share Lila Abu-Lughod's perspective 
that the most powerful way to refuse to be 'dragged into the binary opposition between 
East and West' is to 'fearlessly examine the processes of entanglement' (1998a:16). In 
the next section, I explore how such 'entanglements' might be mapped and theorised. 
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Towards a Relational Approach 
I aim to show that a relational approach focusing on tracing constitutive connections 
offers a more effective alternative to the commonality-based analogue, continuum and 
subset approaches. Thinking in terms of relationality provides a framework for 
theorising links and disjunctures between embodied practices without collapsing into 
sameness or fetishising difference. It also offers a means of interrogating and disrupting 
culturally (and other) essentialist constructions. In this section, I map some of the ways 
in which 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman' have been socially and discursively 
(re)produced relationally and, as such, are each 'always-already caught up in systems of 
meanings, symbolic representations and power relations' (Malson, 1998:6). Drawing 
on Judith Butler's concept of 'genealogical critique' (1999/1990, 1993), as well as Eve 
Sedgwick's notion of `periperformativity' (2003), I map some of the varying historical 
processes and relations of power through which the ontological status of particular 
binary constructions related to anorexia and veiling has been produced and secured. 
Anorexia and veiling are clearly different embodied practices with divergent and 
localised histories of construction and meaning. The discursive and social trajectories 
of production of these practices do, however, cross-over and flow into one another 
historically through particular moments of relational representation, embodied 
encounter and performative enactment. In tracing the relational constitution of 'the 
veiled woman' and 'the anorexic', I draw on material from both 'Eastern' contexts (i.e. 
Egypt, Turkey and Iran) and 'Western' milieus (i.e. North America and Western 
Europe), dating from the eighteenth century through to the present. I do this, in part, 
because these figures have been produced historically precisely through the (often 
indiscriminate) yoking together of customs and values rooted in divergent ethnic and 
cultural contexts. My objective is not, however, to reproduce such homogenising 
discourses by suggesting that the histories of construction associated with either veiling 
or anorexia are 'the same' across these diverse geo-political contexts. It is important, in 
this respect, to underscore that the Middle East, like the industrialised West, is and was 
a vast and ethnically diverse region 'where local differences seemed more vivid than 
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those between East and West' (Hoodfar, 2003:18). 118 Nor do I seek to underscore a 
fundamental continuity between past and present. My aim is to show that, as 
discursive-material constructions, particular cultural binaries, concepts and figures 
linked to anorexia and veiling have been produced via movement both within and 
across geo-political borders and boundaries. 119  As these constructions have 'travelled' 
across time and space they have retained some commensurable features, but have also 
been radically rearticulated and reproduced, and as such, cannot be fixed. 
My perspective pivots on the notion that we all operate M an inter-subjective social 
economy in which one's own sense of subjectivity is always caught up with, and 
constructed through, that of multiple others. As Linda Alcoff (1995) puts it, 'we are 
collectively caught in an intricate, delicate web in which each action I take, discursive 
or otherwise, pulls on, breaks off, or maintains the tension in many strands of the web in 
which others also find themselves moving' (109). I draw on Sara Ahmed's (2000) 
notion of inter-embodiment which acknowledges that embodied identities are produced 
asymmetrically through acts of `saming' and `othering' that differentiate between 
bodies on the basis of multiple intersecting axes of power such as gender, race, 
sexuality, class, nation, religion and culture. Embodied differences are understood 
within this framework to represent relations of power between different bodies. 
118 For example, discourses pertaining to Muslim veiling were linked to processes of Westernization in 
both Egypt and Turkey in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet in Egypt, western 
economic and cultural encroachment was tied to British colonialist occupation of the region, whereas in 
Turkey, 'westernization' was linked to the Ottoman reforms of the Tanzimat movement. Moreover, the 
discursive-material construction of veiling in twentieth century Iran differed in some significant ways 
from that in Egypt during the same period. In Iran, the Shah banned the chador as a means to Westernize 
the nation and the Islamic revolution in turn enforced wearing of the chador in order to indigenize 
tradition. Whereas in Egypt, Islamic dress worn after the mid 1970s by women was part of a grass-roots 
activist movement (El Guindi, 2003:587). 
119 While I aim to trace the ways in which discourses regarding femininity and womanhood emanating 
from 'the Muslim East' and 'the West' have been (re)constructed relationally across this border, my 
object here is not to suggest that the relationship between East and West is the only, nor necessarily 
always the prominent, axis of relationality relevant to the construction of 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled 
women' or other related imagined figures. It is clear that traces from other cultural locations, such as 
those emanating from Africa and 'the South', have also played a role in forming both 'Western' and 
`Eastern' notions of womanhood. 
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Orientalism, women's travel writing and cross-cultural comparison 
As Edward Said first catalogued in Orientalism (1978), there exists a long tradition of 
Western discourses which established the superiority of the West through 'othering' the 
Muslim East. From at least the fifteenth century onwards, European male travellers' 
accounts represented Muslim practices (such as polygamy, seclusion, female genital 
cutting and veiling) as backward, depraved and oppressive to women but 
simultaneously exoticised and sexualised veiled women and 'the harem' as symbols of 
Muslim libidinousness and objects of Western fantasy. In the eighteenth century, 
however, the publication of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's Turkish Embassy Letters 
(1763) 120 laid the groundwork for an 'alternative, gender specific discourse on the 
Middle East' (Melman, 1992:2). In this section, I examine the ways in which 'Western 
Christian' and 'Eastern Muslim' women positioned themselves and each other within 
female-produced travel writing on `the Orient'. Analysis of this literature reveals the 
seeds of a productive history of relational production of 'Western' and 'Muslim' 
femininities, which provides historical grounding for the later relational construction of 
`the veiled woman' and 'the anorexic'. 
Western women's tales of Muslim women and their practices gained notoriety because, 
unlike the narratives produced by men (who were not allowed access to women's living 
quarters or bath houses), they were seen as 'inter-subjective', eye-witness accounts 
(62).121 From a relational perspective, what is most interesting about these inter-
subjective travel narratives is that Western women travellers repeatedly employed 
descriptions of Muslim women and Muslim societies as a means to criticise European 
gender relations. Several writers were dissatisfied with male Orientalist representations 
120 Montagu's letters were written in Constantinople during the period of her husband's ambassadorship 
beginning in 1717. The letters published in 1763 were not in fact the real letters she wrote to friends, but 
a compilation of pseudo-letters dated and addressed to people either named or nameless. According to 
her granddaughter, she extracted these letters from a journal which she wrote during the Embassy visit 
(Montagu, 1965:xiv). 
121 As Billie Melman (1992) explains, many of these women travellers 'became engaged in the 
phenomena of people they described; they took part in the ordinary activities of Muslim women and in 
the rituals observed in harems'. As such, these women's accounts were characterised by 'inter-subjective 
relation', a communication, or exchange between the observer and her subjects (62). 
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of Muslim women, which they found inaccurate, essentialist and overly exoticised 
(Melman, 1992; Montagu, 1965). 122 In drawing links between Muslim women's 
practices and living conditions and those of Western women in order to make political 
arguments about Western society, their accounts operated in a similar way to 
contemporary feminist analogue, continuum and subset approaches. For example, Lady 
Montagu argues that Turkish women clearly have more sexual liberty than English 
women because their clothing protects them from both public recognition and male 
harassment on the street: 123 
Tis very easy to see they have more Liberty than we have, no Woman of what rank so 
ever being permitted to go in the street without 2 muslins, one that covers her face all 
but her Eyes and another that hides the whole dress of her head...You may guess how 
effectively this disguises them, that there is no distinguishing the great Lady from her 
Slave and 'Lis impossible for the most jealous Husband to know his Wife when he 
meets her, and no Man dare touch or follow a Woman in the Street...This perpetual 
Masquerade gives them entire Liberty of following their Inclinations without the danger 
of Discovery (328). 
Montagu offers a critique of British attitudes to women and broader Christian notions of 
femininity and sexual morality (92). Associating sexual freedom with economic 
independence, she suggests that the (upper-class) Ottoman woman is 'economically as 
well as sexually free' (Melman, 1992:88). 
Interestingly, in respect to the relational constructions of anorexia and veiling which 
would later emerge, Lady Montagu also highlights differences she perceives in Muslim 
and Western women's attitudes towards their bodies. Recounting a visit to a women's 
bath house (or bagnio), she describes walking in to see sofas covered with cushions 'on 
which sat the ladys, and on the 2 nd their slaves behind 'em, but without any distinction 
of rank by their dress, all being in the state of nature, that is, in plain English, stark 
naked, without any Beauty or defect concealed, yet there was not the least wont on (sic) 
smile or immodest Gesture amongst em' (Montagu, 1965:313). Her portrayal of the 
Turkish women emphasises their remarkable comfort and confidence in their own 
122 Of course, not all, and perhaps not most, Western women travellers took such culturally relativist or 
anti-essentialist perspectives. Many were content simply to reproduce the culturally essentialist and racist 
tone of dominant male Orientalist discourse (Mabro, 1991; Melman, 1992). 
123 The text is from a letter to Lady Mar (her sister) dated 1 April 1717. 
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naked bodies, which she presumably sees as worth noting for a Western audience 
unlikely to behave the same way if placed in a similar context. Montagu goes on to 
describe how the women tried to persuade her to join them in the baths until she was 'at 
last forced to open my skirt and shew them my stays' (her corset) (314). Contrasting 
the restrained form of her own corseted body with the free bodies of the Turkish women 
in 'the state of nature', she remarks that the sight of her corset `satisfy'd them very well, 
for I saw they believ'd I was so lock'd up in that machine that it was not in my power to 
open it, which Contrivance they attributed to my Husband' (314). As Billie Melman 
comments, in Montagu's juxtaposition of herself and the Turkish women, 'the Ottoman 
women are "natural", because they indulge their senses and bodies. It is the Western 
travellers, not the orientals, who need to be released from imprisonment in a tortuous 
"machinery"' (1992:92). 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were many other examples of 
cross-cultural 'self-criticism' on the part of Western women travellers. For example, 
after living in Egypt in 1862, Lucie Duff Gordon wrote that 'what most shocked 
Egyptian men about the English was... the way Englishmen talked about women among 
themselves, their hard and unkind treatment of their wives and women in general' 
(Mabro, 1991:34). In 1888 Emily Said-Ruete compared polygamy with 'the hypocrisy 
of Christian marriage' and maintained that 'the benefits of Muslim family life 
outweighed the evils of polygamy' (Lewis, 2004:99). In her travelogue, In the Shadow 
of Islam, published posthumously in 1920, Isabelle Eberhardt transformed Orientalist 
stereotypes of 'Muslim women' to criticise the ideal of domesticity in European society 
(Zayzafoon, 2005:32-3). Also in the early twentieth century, Grace Ellison contrasted 
male support for Ottoman feminism with the masculine hostility encountered by 
suffragists in England (Lewis, 2004:15). 
While these examples represent a cross-cultural comparison technique similar to the 
`reversal' step of Shildrick and Prokhovnik's deconstructive strategy, many of the 
authors also employed what we might classify as an analogue approach designed to 
emphasise, against the 'prevalent codification of the polygamous harem as a space of 
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sexual depravity and random cruelty' (Lewis, 2004:13), the fundamental similarities 
between European and Muslim societies and social values. For example, writing to her 
sister, Lady Montagu emphasises the underlying sameness between English and 
Ottoman women's morality, conduct and lifestyles: 
As to their Morality or good Conduct, I can say like Arelequin 'as just as `tis with you, 
and the Turkish Ladys don't commit one Sin the less for not being Christins' (sic) 
(italics mine) (Montagu, 1965:327). 
As Montague insists in this example, Turkish Muslim women are 'just like you and 
me'. 
These accounts point to a number of interesting observations regarding the relational 
construction of 'Western' and 'Muslim' femininities in this context. Firstly, they 
illustrate that an awareness of the problems with (what we would now refer to as) 
essentialist or Orientalist representations, and the employment of cross-cultural models 
to address such descriptions, are not something new or unique to the contemporary 
moment but are linked to a long history of comparative critique. It is also clear that, 
despite their efforts to interrogate Orientalism, such historical comparative approaches 
manifested some problematic effects similar to those produced by contemporary 
enactments of the analogue, continuum and subset models. While seeking to interrogate 
racialised notions of cultural difference, descriptions of 'Muslim women' in these 
eighteenth and nineteenth century examples function predominantly to tell Western 
readers something about themselves. Like the contemporary fetishised figures of 'the 
veiled woman' and 'the anorexic', 'Muslim women' are utilised to generate insight and 
knowledge about social life in the West for Westerners. They are surfaces onto which 
Western women travellers project their grievances, desires and ideals, and which reflect 
back to these authors the 'truth' about the authors' own social condition. Such 
processes of representation often function to re-centre 'Western' privilege. As 
Yegenoglo argues, 'by rendering visible the invisible space of the harem, Lady 
Montagu not only serves the purpose of fulfilling the Western voyeuristic pleasure, but 
also constitutes herself as the gazing Eye/I'(1998:90). Within this frame, she suggests, 
`the visibility of the other is the point at which the subject anchors [her] identity' 
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(90). 124 Similarly, in Eberhardt's text the Arab 'Muslim woman' functions as a 
`surrogate self' through which the author 'reflects her inner desire to reconstruct a 
European womanhood that is free from the prison house of gender' (Zayzafoon, 
2005:50). Constructing the Arab 'Muslim woman' as more independent and 
autonomous than the 'French woman', Eberhardt uses her as a tool to discuss and 
establish her own place and status in European society (56, 57). 
While appearing to centre primarily on issues of gender and sexuality, these cross-
cultural comparisons were underscored by particular constructions of race, class and 
religion. 'Muslim women' and 'European women' were produced as similar in such 
narratives only through the construction of other 'others'. In Lady Montagu's Letters, 
for example, it is through praising Muslim society as tolerant and progressive that the 
Protestant, anti-papist author reiterates her beliefs about the 'intolerance' of Catholics 
(Melman, 1992:94-5). Furthermore, Eberhardt's construction of `the Arab Muslim 
woman' as a liberated and autonomous surrogate self is set in opposition against 'the 
black Muslim' woman as a sexually promiscuous alter ego (Zayzafoon, 2005:49-57). 
Her construction of the black Muslim woman as 'harlot' mirrors her own practices in 
North Africa where she had many Algerian, Tunisian and French lovers (49) and 
reflects her 'desire to liberate herself from the sexual oppression imposed by bourgeois 
morality' (49-50). Through such relational representations, Eberhardt disrupts 
Orientalist and colonialist representations of Muslim women as downtrodden and 
oppressed victims and yet simultaneously reinforces racialised stereotypes of sexually 
promiscuous 'black' femininity The Arab Muslim woman is thus 'de-othered' in her 
text only through the 're-othering' of the black Muslim woman. Moreover, as all of 
these Western women travellers came from the middle or upper classes and wrote 
predominantly of the lives of elite, heterosexual Muslim women, it is also important to 
recognise that constructions of Western and Muslim women as similar in these texts 
124 Myra Macdonald argues that within Western Orientalist discourse the harem represented 'the lure of a 
sybaritic world where women could be imagined through the male voyeur's eyes as seductive, languorous 
and available for sexual fantasies, including those of lesbian dalliance' (2006:11). From this perspective, 
Montagu's voyeuristic pleasure in the Letters could also be read, I would suggest, as an expression of 
sexual desire. 
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were produced precisely through the othering or exclusion of working class and non-
heterosexual women's experiences in both Eastern and Western contexts. 
Thus, while Melman claims that within Western women travellers' texts, 'analogy led 
to self-criticism' which 'resulted in an identification with the other that cut across the 
barriers of religion, culture and ethnicity' and that 'Western women's writing on 
"other" women then substitutes a sense of solidarity of gender for sexual and racial 
superiority' (1992:8), I would argue that the use of analogue approaches in such writing 
often proceeds through reifying essentialist constructions of religion, race, sexuality and 
class. Through plotting similarities along the linear axis of gender, these historical 
comparisons risk shoring up racism, classism and religious and cultural essentialism in 
similar ways to contemporary cross-cultural strategies. 
Western women travel writers in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries were 
not working in a vacuum. The representational web in which they operated linked them 
both to male, Western Orientalist discourse, and to male and female authored 'counter-
discourses' emanating from the Muslim East. Muslim women living in Eastern 
countries were clearly often aware of and sought to interrogate stereotypes of Muslim 
women and Muslim society produced by Western Orientalists (see, for example, &Me, 
1996:27). As Reina Lewis (2004) has documented, one strand of female counter-
discourse was represented by a small collection of Ottoman Muslim women writers who 
were published in the West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These included 
Demetra Vaka Brown, Halide Edib, Zeyneb Hanim and Melek Hanim, all, like their 
Western counterparts, heterosexual women of the upper of middle classes. Lewis 
argues that the voices of these women 'illustrate how the West was never the sole 
arbiter and owner of meanings about the Orient... Orientalism was a discourse framed 
by the responses, adaptations, and contestations of those whom it constructed as its 
objects' (2-3). In the remainder of this section I employ Lewis's analysis of the 
Ottoman women's writing, and the ways in which these authors were 'connected 
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textually and socially' (4) to Western women writers, to highlight how images of 
Western and Ottoman femininity were produced inter-subjectively through discourse. I25 
While eager to contest Orientalist images of Muslim women such as 'the lascivious 
odalisque' and views of 'the Orient as a zone out of time locked in a pre-modern past' 
(Lewis, 2004:7), the Ottoman authors found they also had to performatively enact 
stereotypical constructions, both to market their publications successfully, and in order 
to subvert Orientalism. As Lewis explains, the Ottoman writers were acutely aware that 
`as a topic, the harem sold books' and they 'cannily entitled their books with the 
evocative words "harem", "Turkish", "Arabian", or "princess", and pictured themselves 
in veils and yasmaks on the front cover' (12). These discursive and visual 
representations served, in some ways, to reify dominant Western images of Ottoman 
women. When Western readers moved beyond the covers to engage with the texts, 
however, they often found descriptions of 'harem life' which contrasted sharply with 
Orientalist expectations. Thus, in many senses, the Ottoman women's interventions 
were transgressive. They 'were able to intervene in Orientalist culture with a self-
conscious ability to manipulate cultural codes that was not normally attributed to the 
inferiorised, silenced, woman or the harem stereotype' (7). Yet, as Lewis notes, this 
`perfoiniativity' did not always provide an effective means of resignifying Orientalist 
representations for the Ottoman authors. In some cases, the writers attempted to draw 
strategically on codes of femininity which, while perceptible to their Eastern audiences, 
were only partially comprehensible to a Western readership (166-168). In such 
instances, attempts at 'doing gender' parodically (Butler, 1999/1990) could break down, 
failing to achieve the desired subversive aim. 
Alongside redressing 'Western' views of harem life, these authors described Ottoman 
women's struggles for female emancipation and critiqued the ostensible liberation of 
Western women (Lewis, 2004:12). Keen, on the one hand, to show the ways in which 
Ottoman women and Western 'New Women' were similar, they also, on the other, 
125 Like most travel writing at the time, the texts of these Ottoman women writers was highly citational, 
engaging in 'textual dialogue' with each other, Western women (contemporary and historic, such as 
Montagu), and male writers from both East and West (Lewis, 2004:18). 
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employed cross-cultural comparisons to argue that, where they were different, Ottoman 
women were superior (102). Interestingly, these gendered cross-cultural constructions 
of Ottoman and Western 'sameness' and 'difference', often proceeded, like those of 
their European counterparts, through problematic processes of racial and class-oriented 
othering. Whereas Western women were produced as similar to Ottoman women in 
some respects and different in others, 'the black African woman' functioned within 
some of their texts as an ultimate 'other'. For example, Zeyneb Hanim employs a 
stereotype of 'the black African cannibal' to suggest that Muslim and European women 
may have different ideas of happiness, but also, simultaneously, to establish 
commonality among East and West through the exclusion of the African 'other'. 126 
Similar again to their Western contemporaries, the Ottoman women writers often 
constructed similarities between themselves and elite European women whilst insisting 
on their difference from the European working class. 127 
In addition to indicating the basis for a long tradition of relational representation of 
`Western' and 'Muslim' femininities (beset with its own problematic effects), this 
section highlights the fundamental ambivalence and fluidity of Orientalist discourse. A 
multiplicity of different, and often contradictory, images of 'Western women' and 
`Muslim women', have been produced and reproduced discursively through relational 
representations by various groups of actors, each occupying different social locations of 
enunciation. The long-established binary of 'the free and liberated Western women' 
and 'the oppressed and downtrodden Muslim woman' is in fact never fixed during this 
period, but always open to reversal and reconstruction, such as through the production 
126 Hanim wrote: 'When I was fifteen years old they made me present of a little native from Central 
Africa. For her there was no greater torture than to wear garments of any kind, and her idea of happiness 
was to get back to the home on the borders of Lake Chad and the possibility of eating another roasted 
European' (Hanim, 1913:186-8 cited in Lewis, 2004:126). As Lewis points out, the anecdote is intended 
as a joke 'that she and her Occidental readers can share' (127). The figure of the naked African cannibal, 
she explains, 'simultaneously exemplifies the non-universality of human happiness, thus naturalising the 
different aspirations of Turkish (Muslim) and English women, whilst also uniting the Turks with the 
Europeans thus separating them from the Africans' (127). 
127 For instance, it was 'clearly imperative for Zeyneb Hanim to be recognized as a lady and seen as 
distinct from a primitivised working class' (Lewis, 2004:133). 
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of the 'sexually and economically subordinate Western woman' and 'sexually and 
economically liberated Muslim woman' dichotomy. I28 
Through their repeated construction of racialised and classed other 'others', these 
women's cross-cultural narratives also illustrate the claim, central to Sara Ahmed's 
concept of inter-embodiment, that 'there is never simply an encounter between self and 
self or between self and other...there is always more than one and more than two in any 
encounter' (Ahmed, 2000:141). Within women's travel accounts emanating from both 
East and West, there are always other 'others' who intervene to subvert simple dialectic 
constructions of difference or to underscore assertions of sameness. 'The subject is not 
simply differentiated from the (its) other, but comes into being by learning how to 
differentiate between others' (24). Finally, as part of 'Eastern' counter-discourses, 
perfoiniative enactment provides a means to intervene in and potentially resignify 
Orientalist representations of women; however, Ottoman women's deployment of 
performativity is always limited by the boundaries of cultural translation and economic 
necessity. In the next section, I explore how such gendered cultural binaries are 
(re)produced during and after the height of European colonialism in the Middle East. 
Colonialism, (proto)feminism and `westoxification' 
The Muslim veil was first transformed into a substantive object of social, political and 
religious contention in the context of European colonialism in the Muslim East in the 
late nineteenth century (Ahmed, 1992:150; Hoodfar, 2003:7). During this period 
discourses between Western colonialists, native modernisers, religious conservatives, 
nationalists and feminists (among other groups) produced competing politicised images 
of 'the veil'. Each group sought to construct veiling in ways that supported their own 
social and political interests. Around this same time, anorexia nervosa was constituted 
as a feminine nervous disorder in a Western context in which social and medical links 
between 'women' and pathology were particularly salient, the 'hysterical woman' was a 
128 Of course, as has been argued by several postcolonial theorists, Orientalism established 'its unity 
despite the polymorphous nature of the texts that constitute it' (italics in original) (Yegenoglo, 1998:81). 
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prominent cultural figure, and feminists were challenging women's social and economic 
subordination (Malson, 1998:57, 67). It is within this socio-historical nexus that a 
dualistic construction of the 'weak, frivolous and appearance-obsessed Western woman' 
and the 'strong, pious and modest Muslim woman' emerges as a precursor to the 
contemporary anorexia/veiling comparisons. This binary was (re)produced as part of 
discourses around the 'new veiling' which emerged in various Muslim countries during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, and is linked to the rise of the 'anorexia epidemic' in the 
West. It is, of course, alongside and against other binary cultural constructions, namely 
the 'free and liberated Western woman' and 'the oppressed and downtrodden Muslim 
woman', that this dualistic construction is repeatedly (re)constituted. 
The topic of women and the veil as a political problem was first discussed publicly by 
Muslim intellectuals in countries such as Egypt and Turkey, both nations which were 
experiencing the beginning of processes of 'Westernization' (through British colonial 
occupation in Egypt and through the Ottoman reforms of the Tanzimat movement in 
Turkey) by the end of the nineteenth century. In these discourses, 'the woman question' 
was directly linked with issues of nationalism and the imperatives of national 
advancement and political, social and cultural reform (Ahmed, 1992:128). In The 
Liberation of Women (1992/1899), for example, Qasim Amin, the elite reformer 
considered by many as the 'father' of Egyptian feminism - although his 'feminist' 
credentials have been criticised in recent years by feminist historians (see Ahmed, 1992 
and Abu-Lughod, 1998b) - argued that 'the inferior position of Muslim women' is the 
`greatest obstacle' preventing Egypt's advancement as a nation (60). He maintained 
that 'if Egyptians have an interest in and a sincere desire for happiness, if they wish to 
preserve their existence and to strive toward security and survival, they should discard 
all unacceptable habits and eliminate every undesirable trait that hinders their progress' 
(64). Advocating women's partial de-veiling, he insisted that 'the veil as we know it is 
a great hindrance to women's progress, and indeed to a country's progress' (47). 
Modernisers such as Amin wrote in a colonial context in which the occupying British 
powers sought to legitimise their colonising mission by illustrating the essential 
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`backwardness' of Middle Eastern cultures visible through 'oppressive' practices such 
as veiling and polygamy. The British colonial official in Egypt, Lord Cromer, argued 
that Islam's oppression of women, expressed in the practices of veiling and seclusion, 
represented a 'fatal obstacle' to the Egyptian's 'attainment of that elevation of thought 
and character which should accompany the introduction of Western civilisation' 
(Ahmed, 1992:153). Colonialists like Cromer imagined a progressive continuum of 
`proper womanhood' in which Victorian femininity was positioned at the most 
advanced pole and Muslim womanhood towards the opposite pole. I29 It is clear that 
Egyptian reformists drew on and reified these hierarchical cultural distinctions. Amin 
insists that in arguing for a less rigid practice of veiling for women, he 'is not in any 
way requesting this change because we wish to imitate for the sake of imitation, 
Western nations and traditions and conditions' (46). Yet he proceeds to produce a 
cross-cultural comparison in which Western culture is 'strong', 'happy' and 'advanced' 
and Egyptian culture is 'weak', 'miserable' and has 'fallen back' (46). Praising the 
`benefits gained by Westerners in bringing up their daughters properly and accepting 
their place in the world of men' (59), he argues that a less extreme approach to veiling 
would 'greatly improve our way of life' (46). 
Ahmed's comparative approach also reifies notions of hierarchical embodied 
`differences' between Eastern and Western women. Measuring Egyptian Muslim 
women against a British Victorian feminine ideal, he constructs a figure of the 'ugly, 
obese and unhealthy Muslim woman' as 'other' to the 'attractive, slim and healthy 
Western woman'. He argues that Egyptians' preference for seclusion has even 
undermined our women's health...They have sick bodies and spirits, and never taste the 
joys of this earthly life' (51). The seclusion system, he maintains, 'causes many of our 
women to be afflicted with obesity and poor blood circulation' (51). Amin further 
proclaims that 'Most Egyptian women are not in the habit of combing their hair 
129 Attitudes of colonial officers towards Muslim societies relied on social evolutionary theories of race 
and culture, and models such as the 'Great Chain of Being', which elevated middle-class Victorian 
English society (including mores surrounding Victorian womanhood) as the pinnacle of evolutionary 
progress and civilization (Ahmed, 1992:150-51, Gilman, 1992; Young, 1990). Through such hierarchical 
frameworks, Muslim veiling could be portrayed as 'patriarchal' and 'backwards' against a white, British 
ideal of femininity, despite the fact that 'Queen Victoria, on many occasions, wore a veil herself' 
(Gressgard, 2006:330). 
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everyday', do not 'bathe more than once a week' and 'do not attend to what is attractive 
in clothing though their attractiveness and cleanliness strongly influence men's 
inclinations' (29). 130  Later, in Turkey, Eastern reformers similarly constructed the 
`Europeanized woman' as an ideal model for modern Turkish women (Gole, 1996:65). 
As Gole describes, in the early Republican era, 'the distinction between civilized and 
uncivilized began to influence the values attributed to aesthetics as well, and sources of 
the definition of beauty stated to be found on the European Continent rather than in the 
local milieu' (65). What is evident from these brief examples is that the arguments of 
Western colonialists and Eastern reformers regarding women and veiling were 
intimately linked and depended in part on comparative cultural constructions of 
feminine embodiment. It is through relational colonial and modernising discourses that 
the veil is constituted as a sign of Muslim backwardness and gender oppression and the 
binary of liberated Western women/oppressed Muslim women is (re)produeed. 131 
While these `proto-feminist' voices portrayed Western societies as 'advanced', 'strong' 
and 'happy' and constructed 'the Victorian middle-class woman' as an ideal to be 
emulated by Muslim women, an examination of Victorian notions of femininity points 
to a rather different story. Within nineteenth century Britain and North America, the 
link between 'women' and pathology was particularly evident. 132 A figure of the 
`hysterical woman' had gradually begun to emerge in nineteenth century medical 
literature, signified by characteristics such as suggestibility, narcissism, idleness, self-
indulgence, moral weakness, lack of will power and 'craving for sympathy' (Smith-
Rosenberg, 1972:659, 667). While hysteria was generally seen as linked to women's 
130 Constructions of 'Muslim women' as unattractive, unfit and somehow primitive in their knowledge 
regarding appropriate care of the body continue to be employed in more contemporary discourses. For 
example, an article published in a 1988 edition of the magazine Marie Clare entitled 'Arabia, Behind the 
Veil' describes Western women's experiences of 'seeing a collection of small dumpy women, covered 
from head to toe in what appears to be lined dyed blotchy charcoal, roaming slowly roaming through the 
department stores of capital cities' (Mabro, 1991:3-4). 
131 Of course, actors other than colonial officials, such as missionaries and European feminists, also 
participated in the construction of this Western/Muslim binary through their engagements veiling 
practices (Ahmed, 1992:154). 
132 Women, especially middle class married women with children, frequently complained of 'isolation, 
loneliness, and depression' (Smith-Rosenberg, 1972:657). Books written in the last half of the nineteenth 
century consistently 'assert that a large number, even the majority of middle class American women, 
were in some sense ill' (Douglas Wood, 1973:26). 
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inherently 'diseased' reproductive system, namely the womb, a wide array of 
symptoms, ranging from seizures, to headaches, to general fatigue and depression, were 
seen as indicative of the condition. Such medical discourses were reinforced by 
scientific ideas relating to women's evolutionary weakness (such as those of Darwin) 
and cultural notions of `the perfect Victorian lady' who combined 'total sexual 
innocence, conspicuous consumption and the workship of the family hearth' (Vicinus, 
1972:ix). 
Specific to middle class white women, these medical, scientific and cultural ideas about 
feminine fragility and pathology did not generally extend to working class and slave 
women who, consistent with Victorian economic and political imperatives, were 
thought to be healthy, robust and fit to work in the fields and wash-houses (Ehrenreich 
and English, 2005:125-6). When working class or black women were diagnosed with 
hysteria, it was seen as originating in their sensuality, indecency, and sexual excess 
(Smith-Rosenberg, 1972:670). Characterised as 'essentially asexual and not 
uncommonly frigid' (663), the figure of the white, middle class 'hysterical woman' was 
thus produced directly against representations of black and working class women's 
unrestrained sexuality. In this sense, we might also see the de-sexualised Victorian 
`hysterical woman' as constructed against the Middle-Eastern 'harem woman', 
represented within ubiquitous eroticized Orientalist representations at the time as overly 
sexualised and libidinous (Lewis, 2004). 
Assumptions regarding Muslim women's excessive (and yet hidden) sexuality were 
often linked with notions of their abundant appetites. As Melman argues, within 
Victorian culture and travel literature, food and eating as symbols had 'become 
inseparable from the image of the Orient as locus sensualis and that of orientals as 
generally lascivious' (italics in original) (1992:122-3). Muslim women were 
continually described during this period as consuming food with others and 'references 
to excessive, irregular eating are scattered in harem literature, particularly in 
descriptions at the harems of the elite' (123). Particular references were made to 
women in harems consuming 'rich and heavy' foods and digesting meat, which was 
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`universally believed to arouse sexual feelings, aggravate lust and cause somatic 
disorders' (126). Descriptions of Muslim women's communal and unrestrained eating 
were particularly significant in the Victorian context because they represented a marked 
contrast to pervasive gendered social norms in the West which constructed eating as 
`unfeminine' 133 For Victorian middle and upper class women (who were most likely 
to be diagnosed as 'hysterics'), food was linked to gluttony, which was in turn linked to 
lasciviousness. Denial of food thus 'became a form of moral certitude' and a means of 
`advancing in the moral hierarchy' (Brumberg, 1988:182). 
By the late nineteenth century, hysteria was a chronic and 'socially accepted sick role' 
for middle class Victorian women (Smith-Rosenberg, 1972:671). Ill health had become 
`positively fashionable' for women (Douglas Wood, 1973:26) and a 'morbid aesthetic 
developed in which sickness was seen as a source of female beauty' (Ehrenreich and 
English, 2005:119). As Ehrenreich and English argue, 'It was acceptable, even stylish, 
to retire to bed with "sick headaches", "nerves", and various unmentionable "female 
troubles"' (2005:118-9). These prominent links between womanhood, pathology, 
nervousness and hysteria (as well as discourses around 'unfeminine eating') formed the 
social and political context for the emergence of anorexia nervosa as an object of 
medical discourse in the last decades of the nineteenth century (Malson, 1998). As 
Helen Malson suggests, intimately linked to gendered notions of hysteria, 'anorexia 
figured as a political forum, as much as a medical one, in which to debate and therefore 
constitute and reconstitute feminine nervousness' (1998:49). It was not until the late 
twentieth century, however, that 'the anorexic' would come to figure as potent 
metaphor for Western femininity. 
The nineteenth century 'hysterical woman' can, as feminist historians have argued, be 
seen as 'both product and indictment of her culture' (Smith-Rosenberg, 1972:678). 
From Carroll Smith-Rosenberg's perspective, the 'hysterical woman' provided 'a stark 
caricature of femininity' (1972:671) in a Victorian context in which middle class 
133 The figure of the 'hysterical woman' emerged in a nineteenth century context in which 'invalidism and 
scanty eating commonly accompanied each other' and 'wasting was in style' (Brumberg, 1988:171). 
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women were consistently socialized to 'fill a weak, dependent and severely limited 
social role' (677). Feminist theorists have also pointed out that the figures of 'the 
hysteric', and later 'the anorexic', emerged as pathological gendered subjects precisely 
within social contexts in which feminists and other women sought to contest patriarchal 
oppression (Douglas Wood, 1973; Bordo, 1993; Malson, 1998). Indeed, just as 
colonialists such as Lord Cromer were espousing proto-feminist arguments about the 
need to liberate Muslim women in Egypt, British women were rising up to protest their 
own subjugation under patriarchy. As Leila Ahmed (1992) has discussed, however, the 
`feminist' views of British colonialists abroad certainly did not extend to women in 
their own countries. In England, Lord Cromer served as founding member and 
president of the Men's League for Opposing Women's Suffrage (153). Thus, while the 
morally refined and socially capable 'Victorian woman' was installed by colonialists 
and native modernisers as the ultimate ideal of femininity in Middle Eastern countries 
such as Egypt, the figure of the fragile, depressed and sickly 'hysterical woman' had 
come to, in many senses, define femininity in the Victorian Euro-American context. 
Historical evidence suggests that these prevalent images of Victorian women's debility, 
nervousness and 'inappropriate' fixation on fashion made the cultural crossing from 
Western nations to the Middle East. For example, in his travel memoir recounting his 
journey to a scholarly congress of Orientalists in Stockholm and his subsequent travels 
throughout Europe in 1889 (the same year that Amin's The Liberation of Women was 
published), the Ottoman author Ahmed Midhat described his travelling companion, 
Madame Millar, a Russian noblewoman, as often feeling ill, needing excessive 
amounts of sleep and spending some days without leaving the hotel (Findley, 1998:32). 
After Madame Giilnar's mother and son arrive to join the pair on their travels, Midhat is 
startled at her 'childlike submission to the will of her mother and her absent husband' 
(32). Such descriptions of fragile and subordinate Western femininity came at a time 
when Muslim conservatives and nationalists were concerned not only by European 
economic encroachment in Egypt, but also by the infiltration of Western social and 
cultures mores (Ahmed, 1992:142). It was in this context, I want to argue, that those 
who objected to the modernising projects of European powers and native reformers (in 
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Egypt as well as other nations such as Turkey and later in Iran) drew strategically on 
such images of Victorian womanhood to reappropriate a figure of the Muslim 'veiled 
woman' as strong, pious and modest against a construction of 'Western woman' as 
weak, frivolous and appearance obsessed. 
Those who opposed the Western modernising project in Egypt constituted not only 
nationalists and religious conservatives who sought to preserve Islamic and national 
heritage and did not want to be unseated from their positions of power and control, but 
also some Muslim feminists who were critical of colonial and reformist rhetoric 
regarding the liberation of women (Ahmed, 1992:147, 148, 179-181). 134 The dominant 
voices of Egyptian feminism in late nineteenth and early twentieth century, like their 
European feminist counterparts, supported the calls of Amin and others for un-veiling 
and 'promoted a feminism that assumed the desirability of progress toward Western 
type societies' (174). Upon returning from a meeting of the International Alliance of 
Women in Rome in 1923, the prominent feminist Huda Shaarawi and her colleagues in 
the Egyptian Feminist Union removed their veils to onlookers on the train platform in 
Cairo as a sign of protest against enforced veiling and the harem system (Shaarawi, 
1986:1). Other Egyptian feminists, such as Malak Hifini Nassef, however, were wary 
of reformist arguments for unveiling and pointed to the problems with abrupt demands 
on the part of male elites for women to unveil when women were accustomed to veiling 
(Ahmed, 1992:180). Arguing that women should 'bring a critical and discriminating 
eye to the issue of adopting Western customs' (181), Nassef commented on the 
phenomena of women on the streets of Cairo in European dress, 'congratulating 
themselves on being modern' (180). She describes these Westernized 'upper class 
women' as 'pre-occupied with fashion' and 'not motivated by a desire for liberty or 
persuaded that the veil hampered them in the pursuit of knowledge' (180). Such 
discourses draw on prevalent images of Victorian women within the era of 'the 
hysterical woman' as idle, lacking in agency, and obsessed with frivolous fashions 
134 This group also included lower and lower middle class people who were negatively affected or 
derived no benefits from Western occupation (Ahmed, 1992). 
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(even to the point of making themselves appear ill in order to be 'in style'), setting them 
against Muslim veiled women's greater political awareness, strength and sensibility. 
Contrasting representations of Eastern and Western femininity became even more 
pronounced, though with an arguably non-feminist spin, in the 1930s with the rise of 
popular nationalist groups in Egypt espousing strong anti-Western sentiments. For 
example, the Muslim Brethren (founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928) rejected Western 
women as a model for Muslim women, maintaining that the West 'used women and 
female sexuality to increase profits' and that 'advertisements with a beautiful secretary, 
model or saleswoman exploited women in the service of capitalism' (Ahmed, 
1992:194). Similar arguments were being voiced by conservative Islamist intellectuals 
in the years leading up the Kemalist revolution in Turkey. The scholar Said Halim 
Pasha argued, for instance, that 'the abandonment of veiling, women's companionship 
with men, and their beginning to live like 'Western' women, constituted social dangers' 
and that the liberation of women would result in a 'pleasure-oriented', hedonistic 
society rather than a society of 'decency and virtue' (Gale, 1996:41). Similarly, in his 
book Women and the Constitution, Mehmet Tahir referred to the denigration of Turkish 
women under the impact of the West and commented that 'the most defining 
characteristic of our women, dignity, has been replaced by love of lace and ribbon and 
or fashion and corsets' (43). As Niliifer Gole discusses, such Islamic traditionalists saw 
women's new freedoms and increasing 'Westernization' as signs of 'moral breakdown' 
and 'in their writings they brought forward examples of dignified and honourable 
Muslim women in contrast to unveiled, Westernized, flirtatious women' (1996:43). 135 
This dualistic gendered construction of the 'weak, frivolous and appearance-obsessed 
Western woman' and the 'strong, pious and modest Muslim woman' resurfaces in the 
context of nationalist conflict throughout the twentieth century in particualr Eastern 
contexts. A pertinent example is provided by a strand of political discourse and debate 
135 Furthermore, this sense of moral panic associated with Turkish women's adoption of European dress 
and manners was not limited to the discourses of Islamist writers and groups. A poster printed by the 
police in Istanbul in 1917, for instance, stated: 'In recent months, examples of some disgraceful fashions 
have been observed in the streets of the capital. Thus, all Muslim women are asked to lengthen their 
skirts, wear charshafs and not to have corsets' (Gole, 1996:48). 
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pervasive in Iran in the years leading up to the 1979 revolution, an event which 
profoundly reinforced existing identifications between radical Islamism and veiled 
women. In the early 1970s, the Iranian writer Jalal al' Ahmad published his famous 
critique of Iran's 'mindless' push towards Western modernization, entitled 
Westoxification (Sullivan, 1998:215). Ahmad employs the term `Westoxification' to 
symbolise all that is negative about the Western economic, political and cultural 
influence in the Middle East. He refers to 'being afflicted with "westisis"' as akin to 
`being afflicted with cholera' (215). In the wake of the 2,500 year celebration of 
Persian monarchy in Persepolis staged by the Shah of Iran, the radical thinker Ali 
Sharitati employed this controversial text to denounce the Western cultural influence on 
Iranian women who symbolised the moral crises produced through westoxification: 'the 
idle, made-up, consumerist Westernized "painted dolls"' (Ahmed, 1992:14-15). 
Despite their 'power to effect social change' Sharitati argued, Western women, and 
those Eastern Muslim women who seek to emulate their model, 'allow their desires to 
be so manipulated that they become vulnerable pawns in capitalist consumption and 
leisure' (Sullivan, 1998:218). Against these images of `westoxified' femininity, 
Sharitati (through his much celebrated text Fatima is Fatima) (re)constructs the figure 
of Fatima, the daughter of the prophet Mohammed, as a symbol of how Iranian women 
could 'enter modernity and remake themselves as neither Western nor traditional' (217). 
Once again, the strength and honour of 'the Muslim woman' is constructed relationally 
against the weakness and frivolousness of 'the Western woman.' 
It is interesting to note that Iranian representations of `westoxification' and 
Western(ized) women as inactive, appearance-conscious and consumerist emerged 
precisely at a time when the notion of an 'anorexia epidemic' had infiltrated public 
consciousness within the West. While the causes of and treatments for anorexia 
nervosa had been discussed and debated within medical, psychological and cultural 
journals since the late nineteenth century, knowledge of the condition did not cross the 
general public radar until the early 1970s with the publication of articles in more 
popular mediums such as psychiatrist Hilde Brunch's The Golden Cage: The Enigma of 
Anorexia in 1978 (Brumberg, 1988). By 1981 the International Journal of Eating 
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Disorders was founded and the (reported) incidence of anorexia in the United States 
increased more than 50 percent in the 1970s and 1980s (Gremillion, 2003:1). As Joan 
Blumberg argues, 'In effect, anorexia was the disease of the 1970s' to be eclipsed only 
by AIDS in the 1980s' (10). Within this context of a rising anorexia 'epidemic' in the 
West, al' Ahmad's concept of `westoxification', and Sharitati's application of the term 
to Iranian 'painted dolls', provide powerful metaphors linking Western culture, gender 
and disease. Western culture is imagined as a powerful contagion, poisoning women 
with its toxic bodily ideals and values. 
These representations of diseased Westernized) women were also employed at a 
moment when feminist critiques of Western culture's patriarchal, competitive and 
consumerist values as a breeding ground for the development of eating disorders and 
body image distress, such as Susie Orbach's Fat is a Feminist Issue (1978) and Kim 
Chernin's The Obsession (1981), were just beginning to come to the fore. From a 
relational perspective, Sharitati's image of 'the idle, made-up, consumerist Westernized 
"painted dolls"' (Ahmed, 1992:14-15) can be seen to combine images of both the 
nineteenth century idle, fatigued, middle class 'hysterical woman' and those of the late 
twentieth century 'anorexic' who grapples with the competing cultural pressures of 
capitalist consumption, individual competitiveness and the feminine imperative to 
remain always slim and 'beautiful'. Against toxic Westernized 'painted dolls', it is the 
image of the strong, 'fundamentalist' Muslim women marching en masse in black 
chadors that the Iranian revolution installed as a model of Muslim womanhood. Images 
of feminine hysteria were in turn deployed by Western media to describe the Iranian 
Revolution as the 'collective hysteria of frantic masses' (Gole, 1996:83). In this 
moment, Western 'hysterical femininity' is again re-appropriated to feminise and hence 
Other 'irrational' and 'pathological' Muslim fundamentalism. And so the cycle of 
relational representation continues. 
As this section has illustrated, the discourses employed to construct 'Muslim women' 
and 'Western women' as oppositional through the colonial and postcolonial periods 
were always relational and always open to reinvention. 'The anorexic' and 'the veiled 
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women' in the examples discussed above are (re)produced not through indigenous, 
culturally-bound discursive systems, but precisely through social and discursive 
interactions and encounters that reverberate across East/West borders. Such relational 
representations are not constructed exclusively along a linear plane of gender, but rather 
through the intersecting axes of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, religion, nation, 
and culture. Furthermore, the discursive reversal, reconstruction and resignification of 
`Western' and 'Eastern Muslim' femininities in these narratives highlight the ways in 
which 'difference' is produced as a relation between bodies, rather than existing as an 
essential property which can be read off particular bodies (Ahmed, 2000). This is not, 
of course, to say that embodied particularities do not exist, but rather to highlight the 
ways in which embodied 'differences' are socially and discursively (re)produced 
through particular relations of power, and as such, are not innate or natural, as culturally 
essentialist discourses often imply. 
Body image, cultural difference and politics 
In the contemporary moment, comparative constructions of 'the anorexic' and 'the 
veiled woman' have come to the fore. In a post 9/11 social and political context in 
which depictions of 'downtrodden' veiled Muslim women are wide-spread, contrasting 
images of the 'anorexic, body-image conscious Western woman' and the 'confident, 
secure, veiled Muslim woman' are (re)produced, in part, as a means to disrupt the 
resurgent 'liberated Western woman' and 'oppressed Muslim woman' binary. One 
significant stand of such comparative cultural discourse is voiced by young Muslim 
women (many of whom live in Western industrialised countries) in Muslim publications 
such as websites and magazines. The main argument expressed by such comparisons is 
that veiling, and the embrace of Islamic values that the practice represents, serves to 
empower Muslim women and increase their self-esteem by ensuring that they are not 
affected by the body-related 'cultural pressures' and experiences of disordered eating 
and body image distress that trouble non-Muslim, Western women. 
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Contrasting 'Muslim culture' with 'non-Muslim culture' in the realm of body image, for 
example, Makeda Knight claims that 'Muslim women don't suffer from insecurities 
about their bodies, because the philosophy and clothing of their culture discourages it' 
(Dixon, 1999:2). Similarly, Sehmina Jaffer Chopra argues that 
The Muslim woman does not feel the pressure to be beautiful or attractive, which is so 
apparent in the Western and Eastern Cultures... It is very different from the cruel 
methods that other societies subject women to, in that their worth is always judged by 
their physical appearance (2002:1). 
As opposed to popular representations of veiled 'Muslim women' as restricted and 
oppressed, Chopra asserts, veiling provides 'liberation from the shackles of male 
scrutiny and the standards of attractiveness' (2002:1). Moreover, as Sultana Yusufali 
explains, 
The concept of the hijab, contrary to public opinion, is actually one of the most 
fundamental aspects of female empowerment. When I cover myself, I make it virtually 
impossible for people to judge me according to the way I look. I cannot be categorized 
by my attractiveness or lack thereof (2002:1). 
She compares this vision of 'Muslim culture' to an image of 'non-Muslim culture' in 
which women 'are constantly sizing one another up on the basis of our clothing, 
jewellery, hair and makeup' (1). In her interviews with young Muslim women in 
Canada, Homa Hoodfar (2003) observed similar perspectives on the part of her 
respondents: 'They argued that Canadian societies and the Occident as a whole have 
turned women into sexual objects, their half-naked bodies used to sell everything from 
toothbrushes to sports cars....women preoccupy themselves with achieving these 
standards instead of improving their minds and becoming confident and useful members 
of society' (2003:29). From the perspective of Hoodfar's respondents, the veil, 'even 
with all its problems, removes women to some degree from these preoccupations. It 
relieves the emphasis on their bodies, enabling them to participate in public life as 
people rather than bodies' (29). 136 
136 Although, interestingly, other Muslim and Islamist discourses acknowledge that increasing numbers of 
Muslim women are suffering from anorexia and other eating disorders and blame this on the influence of 
Western culture. See, for example, Leila Ali (2001) 'Anorexia: A Product of Western Ideals?' 
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If the 'new veiling' is constituted relationally, so too is contemporary anorexia. Within 
the West, anorexia has long been constructed as a white and middle class (and of course 
female) 'culture-bound syndrome' (Prince, 1983; Swartz, 1985). As such, 'the 
anorexic' is constituted against 'other' femininities (as well as masculinities), 
particularly working class and black, but also Middle Eastern and Muslim. Such raced 
and classed constructions of anorexia are prevalent within the medical, psychological, 
sociological and feminist literatures. They may also be produced through dominant 
clinical approaches to treating anorexia. In her study of a North American anorexia 
treatment facility, for example, Helen Gremillion argues that within the centre 
`anorexia's "typical" clinical presentation is written through and against constructions 
of identity that appear to deviate from this normative picture' (2003:159). Clinical 
constructions of 'typical' or 'true' anorexia emerge in this context, in part, through 
`clinicians' justifications for excluding from full participation in the 
program...nonwhite and working-class anorexic patients' (160). Furthermore, through 
its association in mainstream media with white, affluent celebrities, such as Jane Fonda, 
Calista Flockhart, Victoria Beckham and Lindsay Lohan, 'anorexia continues to be 
raced and classed' (Brain, 2006:88). Constructions of anorexia as white and middle 
class are supported by, and in turn (re)produce, images of the raced and classed 'others', 
such as the corpulent black Mammy, the poor black welfare mother (Gremillion, 
2003:52) and, I would add, the body-confident Muslim woman. These constructed 
figures are excluded from the category of 'anorexic', and hence faun its constitutive 
outside. 
Within young Muslim women's comparative constructions of 'Muslim' and 'non-
Muslim' femininity, the veil is constructed as a visual symbol conveying Muslim 
women's honour, piety and Islamic beliefs. By defining themselves against the figure 
of 'the anorexic' and/or `the body conscious Western woman', they reappropriate 
images of Muslim women as secure in their bodies, robust in their eating habits and 
empowered by their religious and cultural beliefs, while simultaneously discarding 
images of Muslim women as 'unhealthy' and 'obese'. Confirming these young 
women's dignity and self-esteem, such comparative constructions also invert Orientalist 
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representations of veiled Muslim women's hidden sexuality and lasciviousness and 
emphasise their refusal to be viewed as sexual objects within a patriarchal, Western 
consumerist culture. Thus, as a particular mode of 'doing' Muslim femininity, the new 
veiling may be read as a strategic reappropriation of dominant cultural conceptions of 
`veiled women' as oppressed and downtrodden and a bringing together of old and new, 
traditional and modern, in ways which can create productive confusion and dissonance. 
The gap produced between these young, confident and outspoken Muslim women's 
`expected' and 'actual' embodied performances may therefore be seen, from one 
perspective, as creating space for the resignification of cultural essentialism. 
However, as a strategy to disrupt the oppressed Muslim woman/liberated Western 
woman binary, such counter discourses represent a second step 'reversal', which may 
risk remaining locked within the binary structure (and hence open to re-reversal). In 
homogenizing 'Muslim' and 'Western' femininities, they elide social, political, 
historical and embodied particularities and reify an essentialist 'packaged picture' 
(Narayan, 1998) of cultural groups in similar ways to some of the historical 
representations discussed above. Representations of Islamic culture as 'anti-
consumerist' against Western culture's rampant 'consumerism' (which is in turn 
associated with the 'anorexia epidemic'), for example, disavow the various ways in 
which Islam is mobilised for and intertwined with consumerist discourses and practices 
in specific contexts. In their analysis of consumption patterns in contemporary Turkish 
society, Ozlem Sandickci and Giilnez Ger (2001) argue that 'Islam, at least in the 
context of Turkey, does not seem to oppose consumption or offer an alternative to 
consumerism' (148). They discuss how, since the 1990s, as wealth among particular 
sections of the religious population has grown, a bourgeoisie class, 'conservative in 
values but avant-garde in consumption practices' (148) has emerged, heightening 
consumer demand for the '200 Islamic fashion companies now competing in an ever-
expanding market to serve women who want to look fashionable yet fulfil the 
requirements of Islam' (146). Similarly, Baris Kilicbay and Mutlu Binark (2002) note 
the rise of a `fashion for veiling' in Turkey which 'is inseparable from consumption, 
commodity, even pleasure patterns, and is stimulated by global and local trends in the 
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market economy' (499). Such analyses interrogate the notion of an essentialist divide 
between Islam and consumerism. They also disrupt rigid distinctions between 'Muslim 
femininity' and concerns regarding fashion, appearance and body image. As consumers 
of Islamic products such as luxury Islamic hotel resorts, middle and upper class 
`turbaned women are seen...doing aerobics or heard talking about dieting' (Sandickci 
and Ger, 2001:147). 
Moreover, it is clear that 'the veil' and other forms of Islamic dress (presented in young 
Muslim women's discourses as symbols of their empowerment and essential 
`difference' from mainstream Western culture) may easily be co-opted by 
Western/global consumer industry. An article from the fashion section the 
International Herald Tribune (2006) flagging up a trend towards the 'Muslim-iz-ation' 
of fashion points to this possibility: 
Various influences are pushing fashion away from bare-it-all vulgarity... thoughtful 
designers are putting the change of mood into a different context, as they talk about the 
"Muslim-iz-ation" of fashion. They are referring both to drawing, deliberately or 
unconsciously, on a culture of female sobriety. In a world clearly in turmoil, cocooning 
clothes are a response (Menkes, 2006:11). 
This example illustrates how susceptible identity politics which depend on binary 
reversals are to recuperation back into the very cultural and socio-economic relations of 
power they seek to counter or distance themselves from. The article also points again to 
the relational links between 'the anorexic' (this time symbolised through the ubiquitous 
image of 'the anorexic runway model') and `the veiled woman'. With the 'Muslim-iz-
ation' of fashion, the figures of 'the veiled woman' and 'the anorexic' flow into one 
another in a capitalist figure of cultural fusion or hybridity. 137 As much as the figures of 
the 'Western woman' and the 'Muslim woman', 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman' 
are contrasted, differentiated, and held apart, they are never stable or fundamentally 
fixed but rather always open to reversal, redeployment, or reconstruction in a different 
guise. 
137 I would also note the interesting phenomenon of 'Western' fashion designers such as Calvin Klein 
developing 'haute couture' hijabs. 
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What is also particularly interesting from the relational perspective I have been 
developing in this thesis, are the ways in which young Muslim women's comparative 
counter-discourses rely on and (re)produce a host of 'internal others' which exceed (and 
may potentially disrupt) the 'Muslim woman'/'Western woman' binary. Sandickci and 
Ger suggest that in Turkey, urban, middle-class women who wear the turban do not 
differentiate themselves exclusively from 'Western' women (or 'Westernized', secular 
Turkish women); 'they equally distance themselves from the traditional Islamic women 
who wear a headscarf out of habit in rural areas and small towns and from the newly-
rich Islamists' (2001:148). These young women, 'reject both the image of covering as a 
sign of cultural backwardness and as sign of extravagance and flaunting' (148). 
Similarly, pointing out how class differences are often glossed over in discourses on 
veiling which emphasise Muslim women's empowerment, Haideh Moghissi criticises 
the notion that that veiling fights consumerism and erases class distinctions among 
Muslim women. She stresses that 'even the material used for the chador itself varies 
considerably, signalling clear differences in class and wealth' (1999:45). From this 
standpoint, the figure of 'the pious, confident and self-secure veiled woman' is 
constructed in this context not only through producing 'the anorexic' or 'the body 
conscious Western woman' as a constitutive outside, but also through differentiation 
from (and between) multiple other 'others' (re)produced through the intersecting axes 
of class, religion, ethnicity, politics, culture and sexuality. 
Conclusions: Relational Interdependencies 
In this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate how a relational approach to theorising the 
social and discursive production of the figures of the 'veiled woman' and 'the anorexic' 
might work. Rather than stretching out or collapsing together the binary figures of 'the 
Western woman' and 'the Muslim woman' as the continuum, analogue and subset 
models often do, the relational approach allows us to imagine these two figures as 
interdependent, inseparable and dependent on one another for meaning. Rather than 
cutting 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman' off from their historical, social and 
discursive trajectories of production, the relational model teases out these processes, 
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situating them within specific contexts and relations of power such as colonialism, 
nationalism, racism, patriarchy and capitalism. Moreover, as a way of trying to resist 
fetishising women from 'Muslim' or 'Western' cultures as (passive) objects and 
vehicles for Western knowledge, it emphasises the ways in which women in different 
geo-political locations actively participate in the processes of discursive construction, 
relational representation and performative enactment through which particular 
embodied subjectivities are (re)constituted. Finally, from a relational approach, it 
cannot be assumed that all forms of performativity are inherently subversive. Instead, a 
relational methodology positions particular parodic modes of discourse within their 
contexts of production and assesses possibilities, limitations and potential effects within 
such located frameworks. 
In highlighting the ways in which the figures of 'the Western woman' and 'the Muslim 
woman' and 'the anorexic' and `the veiled woman' are always open to reformation and 
reconstruction, the relational approach deconstructs the ubiquitous 'liberated Western 
woman'/ 'oppressed Muslim woman' dualism, illustrating the problems with encasing 
these figures within binary categories. Furthermore, through tracing the production of 
other 'selves' and 'others' that function both to support and subvert cross-cultural 
constructions of 'sameness' and 'difference', this approach highlights how the 
relationships that link various subjects exceed both binary and dialectic structures. 
Pointing to the multiplicity of differently situated figures linked to any one binary 
construction, the relational embodied approach suggests the image of a relational web. 
In the final chapter I discuss how the 'web' provides a useful theoretical model for 
tracing the constitutive connections among multiple imagined subjects. 
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Chapter . Six 
Mapping Multiple 'Selves' and 'Others': 
Weaving a Relational Web 
Bodies-in-time are embodied and embedded entities fully immersed in webs of complex 
interaction, negotiation and transfoi 	illation with and through other entities. 
Rosi Braidotti, 2006: 154 
The alternative to relativism is partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the 
possibilities of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared connections 
in epistemology. 
Donna Haraway, 1990:191 
The concept of the 'web' has become a salient metaphor within contemporary critical 
theory. From Donna Haraway's 'webs of connections' (1990:191), to Linda Alcoff's 
`intricate, delicate web...in which others also find themselves moving' (1995:109), to 
Gilles Deleuze's web-like proliferation of binary terms (2004/1968), to Rosi Braidotti's 
`webs of complex interaction' (2006:154), the image of the web has been employed 
increasingly to indicate the necessity of theorising complex interconnections between 
various discursive-material entities. The web metaphor signifies complexity and 
multiplicity (rather than linearity, binarism or dialectism) as well as relationality (as 
opposed to 'sameness' or `difference'). It also signals the possibility for developing 
empathetic social connections across cultural and geo-political contexts. In this chapter, 
I explore how, beyond being a useful metaphor, the relational web provides a 
productive theoretical approach to mapping the multiple links between particular 
embodied cultural practices and their imagined subjects. 
I began this thesis by identifying some of the problematic effects associated with 
feminist approaches that rely on establishing similarities between embodied cultural 
195 
practices as a means to counter cultural essentialism. I maintained that, in their 
emphasis on 'commonality' or 'equivalence', the analogue, continuum and subset 
approaches often either efface crucial embodied, historical and political particularities 
or end up reifying culturally essentialist differences. As such, I argued, none of these 
approaches offers a satisfactory model for theorising the complex relationships between 
various gendered cultural practices, nor an effective means of disrupting and 
resignifying essentialist bodily binaries. My second chapter outlined the critical links 
between three conceptual areas, intersectionality, relationality and embodiment, that 
provide useful theoretical tools for developing a critical feminist framework within 
which to theorise the relationships between various embodied practices more 
effectively. 
In my three substantive case studies, I examined critically some of the ways in which 
the analogue, continuum and subset models are employed in various feminist (and other 
critical) literatures. In Chapter Three, I argued that feminist analogue and continuum 
approaches often privilege gender and sexuality above and beyond other axes of 
embodied differentiation and hence reproduce problematic linear models of gendered 
commonality. I also suggested that through employing such comparative models, 
Western feminist theorists often seek to develop cross-cultural empathy which, while 
well intentioned, can function troublingly to keep 'Western' privilege in tact. In 
Chapter Four, I argued that when the subset approach is employed either to group 
together various acts of passing as similarly subversive, or to figure passing as a 
universal practice common to all subjects, it does not enable rigorous analysis of the 
political and contextual distinctions between specific practices or the more complex 
ways in which they may be linked. In order to map and theorise particularities and 
connections in relation to various acts of passing, I maintained, a relational approach is 
required. In emphasising the ways in which passing always involves a relationship 
between a judgement and that which is judged, such a framework moves the focus away 
from 'practices' with generalised effects and towards analysis of embodied encounters 
and relations of temporal and spatial proximity within particular historical contexts. 
Chapter Five sought to build on this concept of relationality. I illustrated how we might 
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genealogically trace the relational constitution of 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman' 
to tease out the ways in which they are discursively and socially entangled. I argued 
that this relational embodied approach provides a means of disrupting culturally 
essentialist constructions of embodied cultural practices by highlighting the ways in 
which 'embodied difference' is (re)produced by relations between various figures. 
The key argument in this final chapter is that in order to move through discursive 
disruption and towards radical resignification, we need to theorise relationality beyond 
the self-other dialectic. This is possible through imagining each pair of mutually 
constructed cultural figures or practices as part of a larger representational economy. In 
other words, we need to theorise a relational web of multiple 'selves' and 'others'. In 
what follows, I draw on and extend various ideas that have been percolating in some of 
the critical literatures from which my project arises in order to propose a viable 
alternative to the analogue, continuum and subset approaches. In the first section, I 
employ examples from my case studies to illustrate how we might begin to build 
relational webs that map complex, intersectional relations among numerous, differently 
situated imagined subjects. I suggest that the web model offers a framework for 
theorising particularity and connection as well as disruption and resignification. In the 
second section, I discuss some of the theoretical and political groundings and effects 
associated with a relational web approach, focusing on the concepts of location, cultural 
translation and empathy. I also situate the web model in respect to relevant 
contemporary discourses pertaining to 'the human', emphasising its focus on 
constitutive connection, as opposed to fundamental commonality. 
Web Weaving 
The first step in constructing a relational web involves a genealogical tracing of the 
relational construction of a particular unit of embodied cultural practices. As illustrated 
in Chapter Five with the example of the relationship between 'the anorexic' and 'the 
veiled woman', this tracing process involves interrogating various points of comparison 
which make up a particular cultural binary (or, in this case, the revision or flattening out 
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of an original binary) 138 and showing how specific cultural and embodied 'differences' 
and 'similarities' are constituted relationally. I examined how 'the anorexic' and 'the 
veiled woman' have been historically (re)produced through particular moments of 
relational representation, embodied encounter and performative enactment. While 
anorexia and veiling remain divergent embodied cultural practices, my genealogical 
tracing revealed how the political and social trajectories of their production (and that of 
their imagined subjects) are imbricated in complex ways. 
We could conduct a similar genealogical tracing of the relational construction of 'the 
cosmetic surgery consumer' and 'the victim of female genital mutilation'. We might 
start by investigating the historical construction of 'black' and 'white' as morally and 
aesthetically invested `opposites'. 139 We could examine how, through such racialised 
constructions, particular notions of gender, sexuality and nation have been mobilised to 
mark the black African female body as abnormal, grotesque, diseased, libidinous and 
overly-sexualised against constructions of white, Western femininity as ideal, classical, 
pure, uncontaminated, virtuous and chaste (Carby, 1987; Roberts, 1994; Hall, 1995; 
Morgan, 2005; Stoler, 1995, 1997; Ahmed, 2002). We might then investigate how such 
divergent constructions of 'black African' and 'white Western' femininity and sexuality 
were both reified and disrupted by colonialist discourses which established African 
female genital mutilation as a backward, patriarchal cultural practice requiring 
eradication: Some scientific documents and travel logs depicted African women's 
`overdeveloped genitalia' and 'heightened sexual instincts' (in comparison with white, 
European women) as a legitimate 'rationale' for FGC, I4° thus reifying constructions of 
138 The anorexia-veiling unit is in fact already one step removed from the original binary which impelled 
it, representing a theoretical revisioning - an attempt to see the two figures as analogous - of the long-
standing 'liberated Western woman'/'oppressed Muslim woman' dualism. 
139 This is a long trajectory which ranges from the traditional associations of 'blackness' with death and 
sin in Christian symbolism, to the juxtaposition of black and white bodies in art, literature and travel 
narratives, to the institutionalisation of hierarchical constructions of black and white femininity in 'The 
Great Chain of Being', to the racialised gender roles enshrined in the 'cult of true womanhood', to 
contemporary representations of black and white women's bodies in popular cultural discourses. 
140 For example, David Gollaher describes how students of African cultures in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries concluded that 'the operation was performed only to lessen the extraordinarily active 
sexual instinct of women among the African tribes... or because so many African women had unusually 
large clitoral or labial bulges' (2000:196). From this perspective, it was because African women's bodies 
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black African women's 'abnormal' sexuality and/or their over-sexualised 'nature'. 
Other discourses, however, such as those produced by missionaries and colonial 
officials, constructed African women as the downtrodden and de-sexualised victims of 
barbaric traditional practices which had to be put to an end, ideally through native 
Africans' exposure to the more modern, enlightened and humane ways of their 
colonisers (Boyle, 2002; Njambi, 2004). 
We could, furthermore, consider how, while critical in drawing international attention to 
FGC, Western feminist efforts to eradicate such practices in the 1970s and 1980s 
extended colonial representations of African women as oppressed 'victims' (see for 
example, Daly, 1978; Hosken, 1981). They also galvanized a fundamental shift from 
images of 'African women' as stereotypically over-sexualised to constructions of 
African women as essentially de-sexualised. 141 In this context, images of 'African 
women' as helpless, mutilated and 'robbed of their sexuality' were, in part, necessary to 
reciprocally constitute Western feminists as their potential saviours. Indigenous and 
diasporic African, Middle Eastern and Asian women's campaigns against practices of 
FGC have been longstanding within a number of different national and cultural 
contexts. 142 Often more attuned to the local specificities of particular forms of FGC 
than some Western feminist critics, such discourses have, in many cases, produced less 
homogenising and ethnocentric depictions of FGC and the communities which practice 
such procedures, including more complex representations of women's sexuality (see, 
for example, Toubia, 1988). However, such initiatives have not obtained anywhere near 
were 'abnormal' and their sexual instincts 'overdeveloped' that FGC was 'necessary' as a corrective and 
repressive method. 
141 African opponents to FGC (in its various forms) had been present for some time before second wave 
feminist campaigns (Boyle, 2002:45). In 1960, at the United Nations seminar on the participation of 
women in public life, held in Addis Ababa, African delegates called upon WHO to undertake a study of 
the medical aspects of FGC (Kouba and Muasher, 1985:106). However, it was not until the better 
financed and institutionally supported Western feminist campaigns of the 1980s that international 
awareness of the practice and substantive support from WHO to eradicate it were achieved (Boyle, 2002). 
142 Campaigns and programmes directed at eradicating or reducing the health risks associated with FGC 
have been led by numerous groups including, Women Living Under Muslim Law, the International 
African Congress, Union Nationale des Femmes de Djibouti, the Somali Democratic Women's 
Organization, Le Mouvement Femmes et Societe (Senegal), Union Nationale des Femmes du Mali, the 
Babiker Bedri Foundation for Women's Studies and Research (Sudan), the Association of African 
Women in Research and Development, the Women's Group Against Sexual Mutilations (France), and 
RAINBO (UK) (Kouba and Muasher, 1985; Gunning, 1991; Obiora, 2000; Meyers, 2000). 
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the level of financial and institutional support, nor the media airplay, that Western-
based programmes have. As such, their potentially more nuanced and contextualised 
portrayals have not infiltrated public consciousness (in the West) to the same degree as 
the 'attention-grabbing horror stories' produced by Western media and 'generalised 
theories of patriarchal domination' offered by early (and some later) feminist critics 
(Meyers, 2000:471). 
Interestingly, where African and Arab women's engagements with FGC may have 
informed the FGC/cosmetic surgery binary more significantly is in reinforcing an image 
of the 'consumerist Western woman' as a highly sexualised subject. In an article 
(published in a collection of papers from the Arab Women's Solidarity Association 
Conference) comparing the health risks facing Sudanese women with those encountered 
by Western women, for instance, Nahid Toubia (1988) portrays women in the capitalist 
and 'consumerist' West as constantly being made to fill the role of 'seductress' and to 
`see themselves as objects of pleasure' (99). The contemporary Euro-American 
FGC/cosmetic surgery binary now depicts the African 'victim of female genital 
mutilation' as wholly unsexualised against constructions of the Western 'cosmetic 
surgery consumer' as actively choosing to increase her sexual desirability and pleasure 
through procedures such as labiaplasty or breast augmentation. However, traces of the 
historic sexualisation and fetishisation of the black African female body lurk beneath 
this veneer and are revealed, for example, through Westerners' often voyeuristic and 
prurient interest in images of circumcised girls and women. Wackuka Mungai argues, 
for example, that 'there is a heated and eerily prurient interest expressed over the Web 
in accessing documentary photos of girls and women who have undergone 
clitoridectomies, excisions, and infibulations' (Mungai cited in Weil Davis, 2002:19). 143 
We might pay careful attention to how, through various colonialist, indigenous 
nationalist and feminist discourses relating to practices of 'female genital cutting' 
within particular African and Middle Easter contexts, 'culture' and 'tradition' are made 
143 In a CNN news programme aired in 1994, for example, a young Egyptian girl's circumcised genitalia 
were displayed on video for ten minutes (Dawit, 1994, cited in Njambi, 2004:285, see also Boyle, 2002). 
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to stick to 'black' female bodies rather than (or in different ways than they are to) 
`white' female bodies (Narayan, 1997, 1998; Volpp, 2000; Walley, 2002). Returning to 
the example discussed in Chapter Three, we could ask how cosmetic surgery comes to 
be appropriated (through, for example, the exportation of early Indian surgical 
techniques) and constructed as belonging to the 'modern' West precisely through 
colonial models of racial and cultural othering' (Gilman, 1999b; Sullivan, 2001). We 
could also map the ways in which 'white Euro-American women' have been constituted 
as the subjects, consumers or beneficiaries of science and technology through relational 
historical processes which constructed black African and African descended women as 
the objects of scientific investigation and technological development. Here we might 
consider the nineteenth century European exhibitions of Saartje Baartman, 'the 
Hottentot Venus' (Gilman, 1992), the US gynaecologist J. Marion Sim's surgical 
experiments on slave women in the antebellum American South (Barker-Benfield, 
1975) and the use of poor 'Third world women' as guinea pigs for the testing of 
experimental (and unsafe) contraceptives. Pursuing each of these avenues for relational 
tracing (among the many others that may be relevant) would enable us to gain a much 
more complex, intersectional and historically anchored understanding of the ways in 
which the contemporary figures of 'the cosmetic surgery consumer' and 'the victim of 
female genital mutilation' have been mutually (re)produced. 
Rather than stretching out the binary figures (A and not-A) like the continuum 
approach, or collapsing them like the analogue and subset models, this relational 
approach allows us to imagine the two imagined subjects as conceptually and materially 
intertwined. 144 The transition from binary structure to relational connection which this 
tracing process achieves might be depicted as follows: 
144 We might think about the relationship between the two figures in each relational unit as akin to 
Elisabeth's Grosz's (1994:xxi) notion of the Möbius strip - an inverted three-dimensional figure eight: 8 . 
She employs this image to represent the necessary interdependence of psychical interiority and corporeal 
exteriority, thus upsetting the traditional philosophical mind/body dualism by depicting the relational 
existence of mind and body. 
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A/not-A (binary) 
0/0 
A-not-A (relational) 
0? 0 
Through tracing the ways in which the 'the cosmetic surgery consumer' and 'the victim 
of female genital mutilation' have been constructed in and through one another within 
particular relations of power, we can illustrate how each is implicated with and 
dependent on the other for meaning From this relational perspective it is possible 
neither to separate the two figures through the imposition of rigid boundaries nor to 
collapse one into the other because they remain constitutively intermeshed. It should be 
noted that this tracing process does not (and cannot) do away with the binary all 
together. Binaries, after all, are not just about separation, but also about hierarchical 
connection. Yet binaries operate precisely by concealing the relationship of 
interdependence between their A and not-A terms. Thus, illustrating how the A and 
not-A figures have been constituted relationally functions to dismantle the binary that 
holds them apart by exposing its mechanics and its historical trajectories of production 
and thus disrupting the power it commands Importantly, a relational approach also 
avoids binary reversals, which I have argued represent a problematic (and often 
paralysing) 'second step' in many deconstructive strategies. 
Linking numerous imagined subjects 
This first stage of relational tracing (while crucial) is not, however, sufficient to 
radically resignify the categories of self and other in this structure. Clearly, 'the 
cosmetic surgery consumer' and 'the victim of female genital mutilation' cannot be 
seen as insulated from all other embodied constructions and historical and cultural 
traces. They are not related only to each other and constructed exclusively through each 
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other, but rather, as the relational tracing in Chapter Five illustrated, they are 
historically, subjectively and materially linked to a host of other embodied 'selves' and 
`others' (Ahmed, 2000). As such, we need means of representing and theorising 
relationality in such contexts as complex and multiple. If we widen our field of analysis 
and imagine the binary in question as existing within a relational web of other binary 
relations we can think about resignification from an ontological starting point of 
multiplicity. Within such a web, 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman' or 'the victim 
of female genital mutilation' and 'the cosmetic surgery consumer' would be situated as 
simultaneously linked to numerous other imagined subjects or figures. Tracing some of 
the multiple links structuring such a relational web may therefore allow us to begin 
developing a relational approach to resignification that enables us to theorise 
relationality beyond the binary self/other dialectic, yet without effacing the relations of 
power that particular binaries produce and secure or disavowing the power of such 
binaries to endure. 
Let me try to show how we might begin to weave such a relational web, starting with 
the example of the binary relation of 'the cosmetic surgery consumer' and 'the victim of 
female genital mutilation'. If we take this relational unit, in which 'A' is the 'cosmetic 
surgery consumer' (csc) and `not-A' is the 'victim of female genital mutilation' (vfgm), 
what happens if we think about other imagined subjects which might be relationally 
linked to each of our original 'A' and `not-A' figures? Suppose that we draw a 
relational link joining the 'victim of female genital mutilation' to, for instance, the 
figure of the 'uncircumcised African woman' (uaw) as depicted below: 
(csc) 	(vfgm) 
0? 0 
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How does adding the imagined 'uncircumcised African women' (uaw) to the existing 
relational unit alter our relational web? In order to address this question, we need to 
begin tracing the relational connections between 'the victim of female genital 
mutilation' and 'the uncircumcised African woman' in much the same way that we 
interrogated the relational construction of `the victim of female genital mutilation' and 
`the cosmetic surgery consumer'. 
To start, we might acknowledge, as some feminist theorists who employ continuum and 
analogue approaches in this context do, that in some communities which practice FGC, 
the genital cutting or circumcision ritual is understood as a mark of virtue, cleanliness 
and/or proper femininity As Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf points out, 'the Arabic term 
for circumcision, tahara, also means purification' (2001:116). As such, negative 
attitudes may be exhibited towards uncircumcised girls and women in various African 
and Arab circumcising contexts. In her study of a circumcising community in 
Douroshab township in Sudan, for example, Abusharaf shows how many of the women 
she interviews understand FGC as a 'virtuous act' which morally, aesthetically and 
ethnically delineates those who have undergone the procedure from those who have not. 
Drawing on the responses of three women, she explains how within this Sudanese 
context, 'circumcised' and 'uncircumcised' women are constructed relationally: 
To Saadia, Aziza, and Zakia, circumcision is important because it gives voice to gender 
and collective ethnic identity, serving to distinguish the border between themselves as 
pure taharat and others as polluted nijsat women. The politics of conformity go beyond 
keeping clean; they have to do with one's character, sociality, and personal and 
collective identity (italics in original) (127). 
From this perspective, we can begin to see how posing the 'uncircumcised African 
woman' in relation to the 'victim of female genital mutilation' alters the presumed 
character of the latter. In this particular relation, the 'victim of female genital 
mutilation' is no longer seen primarily as a victim of patriarchal ideologies or barbaric 
cultural rituals, but rather becomes a 'virtuous circumcised African woman' (vcaw) who 
is defined hierarchically against 'the uncircumcised African woman'. Whereas in 
relation to the 'cosmetic surgery consumer', the 'victim of female genital mutilation' 
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was 'other' (the `not-A' term), in her new position as 'virtuous circumcised African 
woman' she becomes the `self (the 'A' 	 One's perspective within the relational 
web at this point becomes crucial. In the context of this new three-point linking, the 
status of vfgm/vcaw (the term highlighted in the diagram below) changes in relation to 
whether one is interpreting the relationship from the perspective point of csc or from 
uaw. Furthermore, as I address later in this chapter, one's own social, cultural and 
political location and perspective will shape how one constructs and views such a 
relational web. 
0 
(uaw) 
As such, vfgm/vcaw cannot be interpreted as either self or other, A or not-A. She is in 
fact both and/or neither. Consequently, neither the original relation nor the new one can 
be understood solely in terms of a binary model. They must instead be seen as fluid 
links within a web of multiple relationalities. 
As part of the process of tracing the relational construction of this new link between the 
`virtuous circumcised African woman' and 'uncircumcised African woman', we need to 
pay careful attention to the ways in which particular ideas about gender and sexuality 
have been socially and discursively (re)produced through the construction of particular 
notions of virtue, cleanliness and femininity Through which gendered social, cultural 
and/or religious processes has FGC been constructed as 'virtuous' within particular 
circumcising communities? Furthermore, how might such processes be linked, not only 
to gendered relations of power, but also to histories of slavery and/or to Western 
colonialism and concomitant indigenous nationalist movements of opposition to 
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colonial rule, in which gender and sexuality have intersected with race, ethnicity and 
nation? 
Moving on, we can continue thinking about how the nature of the relational web would 
change again if we added another imagined figure, for example, 'the cosmetic surgery 
rebel' (csr), this time linked to 'the cosmetic surgery consumer', csc. 
(c*) 
O 
(csc) (vfgm/vcaw) 
0? 0 
7 
O 
(uaw) 
While cosmetic surgery has largely been interpreted by feminist commentators as an 
`oppressive technology' employed to 'colonize' women's bodies (Negrin, 2002:21), 
some feminists theorists have advocated the use of cosmetic surgery for 'subversive' 
feminist purposes. Kathryn Pauly Morgan argues, for example, that 'healthy women 
who have a feminist understanding of cosmetic surgery are in a situation to deploy 
cosmetic surgery in the name of its feminist potential for parody and protest' 
(2003/1991:179). She suggests that women 'might constitute themselves as culturally 
liberated subjects through public participation in Ms. Ugly Canada/ America/ Universe/ 
Cosmos pageants and use the technology of cosmetic surgery to do so' (italics in 
original) (179). The French perfoiniance artist Orlan has enacted such radical 
experiments with cosmetic procedures. Her performative project, 'The Ultimate 
Masterpiece: The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan', initiated in 1991, has involved a series 
of televised surgical procedures 'designed to transform her face in ways that 
destabaliz[e] male defined notions of idealized female beauty' (Negrin, 2002:31). 
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Through this consciously political endeavour, she 'seeks to disturb the notion of the 
perfected, the fixed and the standardized, producing a result which is at odds with 
conventional ideals of beauty' (32). In Orlan's own words, she is 'not trying to 
conform, but refusing conformity' (Orlan cited in Featherstone, 2000:160). Thus, in 
contrast to the constructed figure of the 'cosmetic surgery consumer' who actively 
pursues cosmetic surgery as a means to achieve cultural ideals of feminine beauty and 
sexual desirability, the imagined 'cosmetic surgery rebel' undergoes such procedures 
precisely to resist and destabalise such ideals. 145 
As with the previous example, the addition of this new relational strand to the web will 
function to transform the assumed character of 'the cosmetic surgery consumer'. 
Through her relational linking with 'the cosmetic surgery rebel', the 'cosmetic surgery 
consumer' may now be interpreted, rather differently, as 'the cosmetic surgery victim.' 
(csr) 
O 
7 
(vfgm/vcaw) 
7 
0 
(uaw) 
When connected in binary relation to the oppressed and downtrodden 'victim of female 
genital mutilation', the 'cosmetic surgery consumer' could be constituted as liberated 
and self-determining, making her own 'free' choice to engage in cosmetic procedures. 
However, once linked to 'the cosmetic surgery rebel', the consumer's choices are no 
longer seen as free, but instead as reductively shaped by dominant cultural imperatives. 
145 'The Ultimate Masterpiece: The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan' was completed in 1996, yet Orlan's 
other artistic, performative and theoretical work in this area remains ongoing (www.orlan.net ). 
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Rather than being defined as autonomous and empowered, 'the cosmetic surgery 
victim' becomes the interpellated object of patriarchal, consumerist ideologies, the 
woman persuaded by 'the beauty myth' (Wolf, 1990), or even, the obsessive 'scalpel 
slave' (Balsamo, 1996:70). Thus, through the construction of the 'cosmetic surgery 
rebel' as subversive, the 'cosmetic surgery victim' is (re)constituted as conformist. 
It is important to interrogate the various intersectional and relational processes through 
which this subversive/conformist binary is produced and secured. The 'cosmetic 
surgery rebel' and 'the cosmetic surgery victim' can be posed as oppositional through a 
largely gendered narrative (through her parodic performance of femininity, the 'rebel' 
actively resists oppressive patriarchal ideals of beauty, whilst the 'victim' more 
passively embraces and embodies such norms). We need to explore however, how this 
particular gendered narrative might also be produced, for example, through various 
raced and classed relations of power. Is 'the rebel's' capacity for subversion via 
surgical measures secured precisely through her class and race privileges? As other 
critical theorists have argued, performative or parodic experimentation with cosmetic 
surgery is not a strategy that is equally available to all subjects (Bordo, 1993; Skeggs, 
1997; Ahmed, 1999). Llewellyn Nevin points out, for example, that 'it is only those 
who already have a secure sense of their own identity who can afford to entertain the 
possibilities of its dissolution' (2002:38). Drawing on Susan Bordo's analysis (1993), 
she argues that radical cosmetic surgery 'is a rather "aristocratic" form of revolt, which 
can only be engaged in by those who have the freedom from economic need to be able 
to contemplate and realize different forms of embodiment' (39). Christian Klesse 
suggests furthermore that `racialized bodies' cannot be 'reconstituted and made into a 
project' as easily as other bodies as 'there is always a problem of visibility and passing 
in which the incorporated histories of bodies weighs down the potential for action' 
(2000:21). 
In this vein, we might want to consider how the inclusion of an imagined 'ethnic 
minority cosmetic surgery patient' (Kaw, 2003), linked either to the 'cosmetic surgery 
rebel' or 'the cosmetic surgery consumer' would further transform the relational 
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dynamics of our web model. As discussed in Chapter Four, it has been argued that 
ethnic or racial minorities 'generally have less discursive space than their white 
counterparts for justifying their decisions to have cosmetic surgery' (Davis, 2003a:75). 
As Kathy Davis suggests, while surgery (perceived as being undertaken) to alter 'racial 
or ethnic features' elicits 'surprise and disapproval', procedures to enhance femininity 
`may seem so ordinary that they have become — more or less — acceptable' (2003 a:75). 
Moreover, Balsamo notes that many cosmetic surgeons, 'mindful of keloid foiniation 
and hyperpigmented scarring, routinely reject black patients' (Vaugn cited in Balsamo, 
1996:61). To what extent, then, does the inclusion of the 'ethnic minority cosmetic 
surgery patient' bring into relief the assumptions of whiteness through which both the 
`cosmetic surgery rebel' and the 'cosmetic surgery consumer' are constituted? 
We might also enquire into the effects of adding 'the male cosmetic surgery consumer' 
to our relational web. How, for example, is the (female) 'cosmetic surgery consumer' 
defined in part through the imagined 'male cosmetic surgery consumer' via the 
(re)production of traditional gender roles? Balsamo argues that the 'cultural meaning' 
of women's and men's 'gendered bodies already deteiniines the discursive rationale 
they can evoke to explain bodily practices' (1996:69). As 'their "essential" natures are 
defined differently, men must construct elaborate justifications for decisions for plastic 
surgery' (69). Such processes can in turn function to (re)produce rigid gendered 
identities that become materially expressed in particular ways. We could also ask how 
the addition of the `transgender' or the 'transsexual' cosmetic surgery consumer might 
further alter the web, and so forth. As I have tried to indicate, there are many different 
relational avenues we could pursue in building our web and we could continue adding 
relational links until we felt that we had a picture sufficiently complex and multiple. 
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Once fleshed out, what this particular relational web would illustrate most potently is 
that the 'victim of female genital cutting'/ 'cosmetic surgery consumer' binary 
represents only one constructed link in a much larger representational system, hence 
disrupting the insulated or dualistic framework that makes a more basic relational 
approach insufficient. As a theoretical model, the relational web shows that, within any 
particular embodied cultural binary, the 'self' is only the 'self, and the 'other' is only 
the 'other', from one particular nodal point within the web — as your point on the web 
(and hence your perspective) changes, so do the hierarchical categories (the relation is 
produced through one's perspective), and as such, they resist being fixed. 
We could also apply this web model to theorise the 'the anorexic'/'veiled woman' pair 
within a wider relational framework. In Chapter Five, I illustrated how the fluid 
self/other relationship between 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman' has been 
historically mediated through the construction of various other imagined figures, 
including 'the Arab Muslim woman', 'the black Muslim woman', 'the hysteric', 'the 
working class Victorian woman', the 'non-heterosexual Victorian woman', the 
contemporary 'porno-chic girl', the 'fashion-conscious Muslim girl' and the 'pious 
Muslim girl'. Continuing the project initiated in that case study, it would be productive 
to map the multiple histories of relational construction binding each of these other 
`selves' and 'others' to 'the anorexic' and 'the veiled woman'. How is the 'liberated 
and self-detennining Western woman' constructed against 'the oppressed and 
downtrodden Muslim woman'? How is 'the anorexic' defined both through her 
presumed opposition to 'the liberated and self-determining Western woman' and her 
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similarity to 'the veiled woman' and `the hysteric'? How is the figure of `the hysteric' 
(produced at the intersection of gender, sexuality and race), constructed through the 
othering of both 'the middle-class Victorian woman' and 'the radical Muslim'? How, 
through the articulation of sexuality, gender, religion and class, is 'the pious Muslim 
woman' defined against 'the anorexic' and `the fashion-conscious Muslim girl'? How 
does the addition of each new relational link alter the presumed character of the original 
relational unit, disrupting its self/other dialectic and the notion of essentialist categories 
of embodied identity? 
In relation to practices of passing discussed in Chapter Four, we might employ a version 
of the web model to trace some of the `periperfoimative' (Sedgwick, 2003) historical, 
social and political relationships among different passing practices grouped together 
within a specific performative subset. How, for example, does the historical 
construction of 'race passing' differ from that of 'gender passing' in the American 
context and how do such histories intersect? How were the figures of 'the mulatto' and 
`the invert' produced relationally within sexological frameworks and later in 
psychological discourses in the nineteenth century? (Somerville, 2000:32). How are 
such historical relational constructions related to the contemporary production of 
imagined 'passers' such as 'the transgender subject' and 'the mixed race subject'? 
Moreover, how are `transgender' and 'mixed race' figures constructed as subversive 
and transgressive precisely through the production of other figures, such as `the 
transsexual' or 'the ethnic minority cosmetic surgery consumer', as conservative and 
conforming? (Prosser, 1998; Hemmings, 2002; Halberstam, 2005). On a micro-level, a 
web approach also enables us to map the embodied relations between various subjects 
that converge to produce a particular act of passing within a specific context. How do 
context and embodied specificity condition the potential effects that various passing 
encounters may produce? Within both the 'macro' and the 'micro' incarnations, the 
web model provides a framework for interrogating the historical processes through 
which particular `fetishised figures' have been constructed and reified, rather than 
simply taking the nature of such figures for granted. 
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Theorising particularity, connection and disruption 
What does the web model offer to a critical feminist project of theorising cultural 
formations and binaries? Providing an alternative to the analogue, continuum and 
subset approaches, the relational web enables theorisation of particularity as well as 
connection. As such, it moves us away from the reification of essentialist embodied 
and/or cultural differences and the flattening or effacing of important specificities. It 
provides a theoretical framework through which the production of salient gendered 
cultural figures and practices can be genealogically traced with an emphasis on 
intersectional, historical and contextual relations of power. 
The concept of particularity is useful in this context because it departs from a colonialist 
`difference from' register which posits hegemonic axes such as 'the West', 'whiteness', 
and 'heterosexuality' as norms against which subordinate entities and embodiments 
reveal their 'difference'. In this sense, particularity does not 'belong' to the minoritized 
`other', but rather represents the specific intersection of multiple social and embodied 
axes through which each particular subject, practice or figure is constituted. Mapping 
the complex discursive-material processes through which various cultural practices or 
figures have been produced enables the development of a more fully-dimensional and 
historically-grounded view of embodied cultural practices than most analogue, 
continuum and subset approaches offer. Being attuned to the particularities of various 
practices is critical in preventing essentialist, ethnocentric and homogenising 
constructions. It may also aid comprehension of the complex reasons why particular 
forms of specific practices perpetuate in certain contexts (and not others). Furthermore, 
it could help determine whether intervention is necessary or appropriate in respect to a 
specific practice in a particular context, and if so, which kinds of localised interventions 
may be more effective than others. 
Crucially, in conjunction with theorising particularity, the web approach also maps the 
constitutive connections between various practices or figures. Connection is a 
productive conceptual tool because, unlike commonality, it does not imply the 
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`similarity' or 'equivalence' of various experiences, practices or subjects. Instead, it 
points to the ways in which such entities are constitutively linked, and as such, does not 
disavow the possibility of common ground. Connection underscores the ways in which 
processes of social and cultural differentiation and the production of embodied 
particularities are always relational, rather than bounded or discrete. The web approach 
acknowledges that the discursive-material links between various practices or figures are 
relationships of power which may function as modes of `othering' and exclusion. Yet, 
as I discuss in the second part of this chapter, it also suggests that such constitutive links 
represent relationships of mutuality which hold the potential for the development of 
transformative social links and interactions between differently located subjects. As 
such, it negotiates an important path between 'assimilating difference into identity' and 
`making difference into an unthinking fetish of alterity' (Butler, 1995:140). Moreover, 
in illustrating that 'there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which my words 
do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experiences of others' (Alcoff, 1995:108), the 
web model provides the basis for thinking (beyond the self/other dialectic) about 
multiple interdependencies between a range of differently located (and shifting) 
subjects. Rather than seeking exclusively to 'acknowledge a responsibility toward the 
trace of the other' (Spivak, 1999:198-99) (where both self and other are imagined as 
singular, fixed entities) the web model suggests the necessity to account for a wider 
network of subject positions in which one is implicated sometimes as a 'self, 
sometimes as an 'other', and perhaps other times as neither or both — yet always within 
specific structural relations of power. 
Through the process of genealogically tracing particularities and connections, the web 
model also offers the possibility of disrupting and resignifying essentialist binaries and 
identity categories. It acknowledges that embodied identity categories are not pre-given 
or fixed, but are rather the product of particular histories of discursive and embodied 
construction and, as such, retain the potential to be radically reconstructed. Indeed, 
within the network of dynamic, relational links that the web model constructs, there is 
`no way to "be" simultaneously in all, or wholly in any, of the privileged (subjugated) 
positions structured by gender, race, nation and class' (Haraway, 1990:193). Moreover, 
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as suggested above, within the relational web, the binary categories of 'self' and 'other' 
are shown to be unstable and untenable. I am aware that a reader might argue that the 
web model's emphasis on examining the production of essentialised figures (such as 
`the victim of female genital mutilation' or 'the anorexic') may function to reify or re-
fetishise such stereotypical constructions. The process of this relational approach, 
however, is geared precisely towards illuminating and unravelling the discursive-
material construction of these figures and interrogating the historical and political 
processes of their relational constitution. Indeed, its persistent focus on contextual 
relationality produces a shift away from thinking of set 'figures' and 'practices' and 
towards contemplating the relationships produced in and through particular encounters 
within specific contexts. 
Despite the ways in which the web model departs from the other comparative 
approaches I have critiqued, it should not be seen as completely divorced from these, 
but rather as a partial extension and (re)development of some of their more effective 
and productive elements. As Sara Ahmed (2004b) usefully points out, 'the work of 
critique does not mean the transcendence of the object of our critique; indeed, critique 
might even be dependent on non-transcendence' (italics in original) (11). For example, 
tracing a relational web may include theorising specific cultural analogues or 
similarities between practices or figures within particular contexts. The point is, 
however, that the establishment of such analogues does not represent the end-point of 
the web approach, but rather one integrated component of a larger genealogical process. 
On the whole, the relational web is a way of bringing together and potentially moving in 
a different direction various contemporary critical ideas relating to gender, cultural 
difference, relationality, anti-essentialism, intersectionality, embodiment and location. 
In the next section, I engage with such relevant literatures to consider the political and 
ethical groundings, effects and possibilities of the relational web model. This 
discussion enables me to return to some of the key critical themes, questions and 
debates raised in the preceding chapters of the thesis. 
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Political and Ethical Groundings, Effects and Possibilities 
As I have sketched it above, the relational web model may (at this stage) seem rather 
abstract, overwhelming or impractical. It is therefore important to address some of the 
questions and concerns that might be raised in relation to a web approach and to discuss 
in further depth some of its potential theoretical outcomes and practical possibilities as 
well as its , limitations. To start, I want to underscore that, while the web model suggests 
a particular understanding of the embodied subject, it is not designed to trace complex 
processes of subject constitution. Moreover, the web approach is not presented as an all 
encompassing framework which will be universally applicable, but rather an approach 
which may provide an effective means of tracing the discursive-material production of 
particular salient cultural binaries in specific contexts. It does not claim to represent 
any practice or figure 'fully' or to provide a 'comprehensive' analysis of the infinite 
social and discursive traces which could be mapped in relation to any particular cultural 
formation. Rather, the web approach seeks to identify and interrogate some of the 
points at which the discursive trajectories of particular cultural practices or figures 
cross-over and to theorise some of the potential effects of those articulations. 
Historical analysis is central to the web model in this respect. One might therefore ask 
whether I am advocating historicising as 'the answer' to the problem of cultural (and 
other linked) essentialisms. One of my key critiques of the analogue, continuum and 
subset models is that, in focusing on commonality, equivalence or universality, they 
often fall into a rather a-historical mode that elides the historical processes through 
which practices have developed and gained meaning in specific contexts. Within a 
relational framework, historical tracing provides an important means of addressing this 
problem. It focuses on the critical links between how practices are understood, 
represented and experienced in contemporary contexts and their discursive trajectories 
of production. However, historicising on its own is not sufficient to address the various 
problematic effects associated with commonality-based cross-cultural approaches. As I 
have argued, relational, historical analysis needs to be specifically genealogical. The 
object is not to uncover the 'hidden truth' of particular forms of cultural practice, but to 
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trace some of the processes through which specific cultural constructions and binaries 
have come to be understood as 'natural'. Furthermore, effective analyses of the 
relational constitution of salient cultural practices or figures need to map complex 
intersections between various axes of embodied differentiation, without taking these 
categories as fixed. Another question that might be asked in respect to the web model is 
whether all relational analyses need to historicise. In other words, must we all become 
historians? Within the web approach, historical grounding remains crucial to avoid 
cutting particular cultural figures (i.e. 'the veiled woman' or 'the cosmetic surgery 
consumer') off from 'the social and material relations which over-determine their 
existence' (Ahmed, 2000:5). Yet historical tracing may not be central to every 
relational analysis. For example, in some contexts, examining the spatial proximity of 
particular cultural formations (i.e. 'race passing' and 'gender passing') may be more 
appropriate or useful. In short, historical analysis is one among a number of important 
components of the relational web model. It may take more or less prominence 
depending on the practices or figures being traced and the approach taken by the 
individual tracer. 
Location, empathy and 'generous' encounters 
From the perspective of 'mainstream' social science, the relational web approach that I 
advocate would probably not be defined as either 'scientific' or 'objective'. There are 
no set rules governing the web weaving process, such as which binary to start with, 
which imagined figures to add, how precisely to map the relational links among 
particular figures, or when to stop adding links and declare any particular web 
`sufficiently complex'. The idea, however, is to start with a particularly contentious or 
problematic binary or unit of cultural figures or practices and weave in additional 
figures or practices which are salient within relevant literatures and/or mainstream 
discourses. Of course, embodied cultural practices or figures do not always have to be 
examined in pairs (or webs). Yet if the objective is to disrupt culturally essentialist, 
racist or ethnocentric representations of a particular practice or figure, identifying the 
relational processes through which that practice or figure has been constituted is crucial 
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and likely to lead to examining other practices and figures. Fundamentally, decisions 
about how to proceed in weaving any particular relational web will always be in the 
hands of the individual tracer(s), and, as such, will be subjective (shaped by individual 
social location and political perspective). Differently situated tracers will inevitably 
produce different relational webs. 
The web model's lack of normative objectivity need not, however, be interpreted as a 
fault or disadvantage. Rather, following the legacy of feminist writing on `the politics 
of location', 146 it could be seen as an opportunity to reflect critically on the links among 
location, embodiment, power and knowledge within cross-cultural and transnational 
feminist theory projects. In this vein, it is important to try to account for the ways in 
which the decisions one makes in constructing any particular relational web are shaped 
by one's specific social location. I have tried throughout this thesis to think critically 
about how my desires to choose certain paths, to develop specific arguments and to 
make particular connections have been influenced by my own located perspective. For 
example, the embodied practices which have been culturally salient to me as a feminist 
student living and working in the UK (such as 'veiling', 'female genital cutting', 
`anorexia', 'cosmetic surgery' and 'passing') and which I have opted to trace, are 
shaped by both my feminist lens and the multicultural Western context in which I am 
operating. Being an English speaker working in a London-based university has also, to 
a great extent, determined the types of historical and contemporary texts I have had 
access to and drawn on in my genealogical tracings. Moreover, my academic training 
has been primarily in poststructuralist and postcolonialist feminist methodologies and 
this has influenced my focus on discursive construction and the legacies of slavery, 
colonialism and imperialism in the (re)production of particular embodied practices and 
imagined figures. All of these factors play into the type of relational web I will produce 
in respect to any particular cultural foimations and thus need to be assessed reflexively. 
146 See Rich, 1986; Spivak, 1988; Haraway, 1990; Hill Collins, 1990; Frankenberg and Mani, 1993; 
Braidotti, 1994, 2002, 2006; Diprose, 1994; Kaplan 1994; Alcoff, 1995; and Brah, 2003. 
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While acknowledging the potential effects of my particular location on the type of web I 
may produce is a crucial step, it is also important to explore how and why my relational 
web might differ from a web produced by a theorist working from a different social 
location. For example, if the binary of 'the cosmetic surgery consumer' and `the victim 
of female genital cutting' had been traced by a theorist centred in an African or Middle 
Eastern context, it would possibly look quite different from my model, although there 
may also be some important similarities and overlaps between the two webs. 
Discussing (with subjects located differently than oneself) the cultural and historical 
specificities relating to particular gendered practices or figures (and the structures of 
assumptions that underlie various theoretical formulations) could provide an 
opportunity to work through some of the challenges cultural translation raises within 
specific critical frameworks. This process could help theorists in various locations to 
become 'accountable for [their] own investments in cultural metaphors and values' 
(Kaplan, 1994:139), whilst also developing a better understanding and appreciation of 
the ways in which others' cultural investments may differ from (as well as intersect 
with) their own. Ideally then, the process of weaving relational webs and tracing the 
construction of hierarchical cultural and embodied 'differences' would become a 
collaborative, inter-subjective, cross-cultural project. The time and effort needed to 
construct a relational web model are clearly great. As such, the web approach suggests 
`a politics invested more in its process than in its results' (Grosz, 2005:2). If this 
process could be undertaken as a shared endeavour engaged in by two (or more) 
differently-located subjects, perhaps this could be a way not only of sharing the labour, 
but also of facilitating discussion regarding the difference that location and perspective 
make to feminist theory, analysis and history as they relate to embodied cultural 
practice. 
By mutually tracing the ways in which particular embodied cultural, social and 
historical differences are constructed, it may be possible to engender cross-cultural or 
transnational empathy in ways that acknowledge asymmetries of power and privilege 
and avoid relying on uncritical assertions of sameness. One of the most powerful 
messages that the process of constructing a relational web imparts is how we are all 
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interconnected discursively, historically, socially and politically. Within the relational 
web framework, the subject is always inseparably linked though discursive and 
corporeal exchanges with multiple 'selves' and 'others' and hence is 'partial' (Haraway, 
1990) and 'non-unitary' (Braidotti, 2006). The embodied 'self, whether interpellated 
abstractly as 'the anorexic', 'the victim of female genital mutilation', 'the cosmetic 
surgery rebel', 'the fashion conscious Muslim girl', 'the mixed-race subject' or 
otherwise, is thus constructed not as a discrete, contained self, but rather as a 
`representational economy' (Battaglia, 1995:2). As Deborah Battaglia puts it, the self is 
`a reification continually defeated by mutable entanglements with other subjects' 
histories, experiences, self-representations; with their texts, conduct, gestures, 
objectifications' (1995:2). From this perspective, embodied subjectivity is never a 
completed or individual construction, but always unfinished, ongoing and mutual. 
Through identifying and understanding the constitutive links that bind us to (multiple) 
selves and others, perhaps we can develop empathy for those located at different nodes 
of the web, not because our experiences are fundamentally similar or because we share 
common 'cultural wounds', but rather on the basis of our fundamental discursive and 
social interdependence: 'Partial in all its guises, never finished... always constructed 
and stitched together', the relational subject may, as Donna Haraway (1990) has 
suggested in another context, be more 'able to join with another, to see together without 
claiming to be another' (193). In other words, empathy might be productively 
developed if we can acknowledge and map some of the specific ways in which we 
continuously affect one another and shape one another's conditions and experiences, if 
unequally and often violently. As Butler argues, 'this way of imagining community 
affirms relationality not only as a descriptive or historical fact of our formation, but also 
as an ongoing normative dimension of our social and political lives, one in which we 
are compelled to take stock of our interdependence' (2004b:27). 
It is important to emphasise that this empathy would not be produced through flattening 
distinctions of power and privilege between differently located subjects, but rather 
through understanding precisely how such relations of power operate and shape our 
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multi-layered encounters with one another. In some circumstances, empathy involves 
`acknowledging the power differentials that make absolute mutuality or correspondence 
an impossibility' (Ahmed, 1998:57). Moreover, the web model's aim is not exclusively 
to jolt oneself out of a particular view of seeing the world, but also to work towards 
producing more 'generous' representations of and encounters with the (multiple) selves 
and others to which one is constitutively linked. As I mentioned in Chapter One, 
Ahmed envisions a 'generous' encounter as one 'which would recognise how the 
encounter itself is implicated in broader relations and circuits of production and 
exchange' but would also offer room for 'the one who is already assimilated' to 'move 
beyond the encounter which names her and holds her in place' (2000:152). The web 
approach both recognises the complex, multifaceted relations of power that structure the 
ways in which discursive-material encounters between various subjects operate and 
allows for the possibility that subjects' positionality will shift within and between 
encounters. Providing the possibility of mapping what Inderpal Grewal and Caren 
Kaplan have referred to as 'scattered hegemonies', the web model may thus enable the 
production of 'analysis that acknowledges our structurally asymmetrical links' and 
refuses to 'construct exotic authors and subjects' (1994:15). 
Negotiating anti/new/post humanisms 
In the opening chapter of this thesis I suggested that desires to deconstruct essentialist 
cultural and bodily boundaries on the part of theorists who employ analogue, continuum 
and subset approaches may be closely related to larger commitments to an 'unfinished' 
humanist project. I argued that such cross-cultural models are underscored by a tenuous 
humanist claim (`fundamentally, we are all the same') and, as such, often avoid dealing 
with the relationships of social antagonism which continually function to (re)constitute 
bodies differently. I maintained that we need to pay careful attention to the ways in 
which bodies are differentially (re)produced in ways that make containing (all of) them 
in one normalising humanist category problematic. 
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The web model clearly rejects the notion of the individualist, autonomous and self-
contained subject upheld by traditional liberal humanist theory, envisioning instead a 
fragmented, non-unitary subject who is always linked to other subjects in a relational 
network. Rather than collapsing different bodies or embodied subjects into one single 
category or linear plane, the web approach seeks to recognise and account for the 
ongoing construction of embodied particularities (produced through the multiple 
intersections of gender, race, sexuality, class and nation, among other vectors). It thus 
makes a decisive move away from traditional liberal humanisms' underlying 
assumptions of (disembodied) sameness. As discussed, the web model proceeds from 
the assumption that bodies, as well as embodied practices and their imagined figures, 
cannot be separated from the contexts in which they are (re)constructed and gain 
meaning, but rather, must be theorised within those contexts. Moreover, it 
acknowledges that making discursive and/or political connections between various 
practices or enactments in different contexts often necessitates processes of cultural 
translation, which may not be easy, or indeed possible, in all circumstances. 
In Chapter One, I also provided a brief mapping of how some of the key critical 
theorists that I draw on in this project, including Judith Butler, Sara Ahmed, Elizabeth 
Grosz, Rosi Braidotti, Margrit Shildrick, Moira Gatens, Raia Prokhovnik and Paul 
Gilroy, could be positioned in respect to various anti/new humanist discourses. Some 
of these thinkers, I argued, seemed to be expressing a desire (similar to that illustrated 
by some advocates of the analogue, continuum and subset approaches) to reclaim and 
revise a critical new humanist project. Since I began this thesis, I have the sense that 
this desire has in some cases intensified. For example, in After Empire (2004), Paul 
Gilroy provides 'a critique of racial hierarchy and the infrahuman life foams it creates' 
which is infoinied by, in his words, an 'unabashed humanism' (xii). Extending the case 
he made in Against Race (2000) for the development of an 'empathetically post-racial 
humanism' (37), he argues for 'a multicultural ethics and politics...premised upon an 
agnostic, planetary humanism capable of comprehending the universality of our 
elemental vulnerability to the wrongs we visit upon each other' (2004:4). Moreover, in 
Transpositions (2006), Rosi Braidotti signals her desire to reclaim and radically revise 
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(rather than abandon) the humanist project: 'classical humanism needs to be reviewed 
and opened up to the challenges and complexities of our time...I offer a nomadic 
alternative of a sustainable ethical subject as a way of radicalizing the humanist vision' 
(35). Extending her earlier argument for the development of what I referred to as a 
specifically 'feminist' humanism (2002:58), she seeks in this text to develop a 
`materialist post-humanist ethics' (Braidotti:182) anchored to a vision of a 'non-unitary 
subject' (35) linked to other subjects through relations of 'deep affectivity' (182). 
While Braidotti's vision (which might be situated as 'post-humanist') differs from 
Gilroy's in some significant aspects, they share a similar desire to salvage and redirect 
humanist-oriented ethics in more productive and inclusive ways. 
Even Judith Butler, who, along with Sara Ahmed and Elizabeth Grosz, I situated in my 
opening chapter as critical of new humanist positions, focuses in Undoing Gender on 
how the 'human' might be rethought and resignified by those who have been excluded 
from it (2004a:13). 147 Advocating what could be described as a 'new humanist' ethics, 
she argues for the importance of developing a 'new legitimating lexicon for gender 
complexity' within 'law, within psychiatry, within social and literary theory' which 
would effectively include and recognise those genders not currently 'admitted to the 
terms that govern reality' (219). In Precarious Life (2004b) she theorises the operation 
of a common human 'corporeal vulnerability' (42) which makes a 'tenuous "we" of us 
all' (20). She is careful to stress, however, that there is no guarantee that our common 
vulnerability will be recognised in any particular encounter: 'In this sense, vulnerability 
is one precondition for humanization, and humanization takes place differently through 
different norms of recognition if it is to be attributed to any human subject' (43). 
Meanwhile, other critical theorists have moved towards a more radical anti-humanist 
perspective. For example, in Time Travels (2005), Elizabeth Grosz seeks to 'push even 
further the drive to antihumanism that has been central in some key post-Foucauldian 
147 Evaluating the impact of Gender Trouble here, she describes her agenda in that seminal text as arising 
from 'humanist' ideals: 'I wanted something of Gender Trouble to be understood and accorded dignity, 
according to some humanist ideal, but I also wanted it to disturb — fundamentally — the way in which 
feminist and social theory think gender, and to find it exciting, to understand something of the desire that 
gender trouble is, the desire it solicits and the desire it conveys' (2004a:207). 
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developments in feminist theory' (185). Distinguishing her perspective from Butler's 
focus on performative processes of 'subject-constitution and consolidation', she 
advocates a theoretical framework in which 'inhuman forces, forces that are both living 
and nonliving, macroscopic and microscopic, above and below the level of human are 
acknowledged and allowed to displace the centrality of both consciousness and the 
unconscious' (186). She argues for a 'politics of imperceptibility, leaving its traces and 
effects everywhere but never being able to be identified with a person, group or 
organization' (italics in original) (194). 
How, therefore, can we situate the relational web model in respect to these various 
anti/new/post-humanist perspectives? I do not understand the web approach as 
advocating a revised 'humanist' project similar to the one Gilroy envisions. On the one 
hand, Gilroy's interest in interrogating dualistic pairings such as black/white, 
settler/native, colonizer/colonized (2004:45) and his desire to offer 'multiple 
genealogies of racial discourse' (31) seem very close to my own theoretical concerns. I 
share his perspective that such binaries should be investigated and unravelled 'via a 
concept of relation' and a focus on 'the complex, tangled, profane and sometimes 
inconvenient forms of interdependency' (italics in original) (45). Indeed, this is 
precisely what the relational web model seeks to do. On the other hand, his vision that 
such relational or genealogical work can and should necessarily lead to the development 
of a 'post-racial humanism' remains problematic. From my perspective, it may not be 
possible or desirable to dispense with embodied categories such as 'race' in the way 
Gilroy imagines. The argument that particular categories of social differentiation can 
be disrupted and done away with does not address the ways in which bodies are 
produced and shaped in part through such categories, and hence bear their corporeal 
traces and effects. As Sara Ahmed puts it, 'race, like sex, is sticky; it sticks to us, or we 
become "us" as an effect of how it sticks, even when we think we are beyond it' 
(2004b:12). From her perspective, dealing with the effects of racism requires us not to 
disavow or move beyond the 'stickiness' of race, but rather to 'live with that stickiness, 
to think it, feel it, do it' (12). 
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This point about the impossibility of extracting race and sex from their constitutive role 
in shaping bodies relates to the differences between the various theoretical positions 
advocated by Butler, Grosz and Braidotti. While Grosz (2005) and Braidotti (2002) see 
Butler as advocating a project of 'undoing gender' (which might be seen as comparable 
to Gilroy's project of 'doing away' with race), they argue that gender cannot be simply 
`undone' as the effects of sexual differences remain permanently ingrained with 
particular bodies as a productive corporeal force. In relation to this debate, the web 
model does not claim to provide a model through which gender, sex or race can be 
undone in any total sense of the word. Instead, it offers a framework that might allow 
us to better understand the discursive-material histories which shape (rather than 
determine) the contemporary effects of such categories. Illustrating that race, sex and 
gender have a history (or indeed multiple histories) not only disrupts their status as 
`natural' or 'essential' categories (within, for example, culturally essentialist 
constructions of embodied practices such as 'female genital mutilation' and 'cosmetic 
surgery'), but also provides an impetus for thinking through possibilities for their 
radical reconstruction or redeployment within specific contemporary contexts. 
Returning to Gilroy's work, I would also question whether his notion of a new 
humanism that is specifically 'post-racial' problematically implies that race remains the 
only category preventing the development of a new humanist epoch - or, to put it 
another way, that doing away with one vector of social differentiation (race) and its 
oppressive and exclusionary effects will somehow also lead to the demise of all other 
vectors and their problematic effects (for example, gender, sexuality or nation). From 
an intersectional perspective, any radically new non-exclusive humanism would have to 
be inclusive of (and pay attention to the effects of) all categories of social 
differentiation (i.e. not just race). In this regard, it is interesting (and I would argue 
troubling) that Gilroy pays little attention to the ongoing oppressions and exclusions 
associated with categories such as gender and sexuality. I48 In short, Gilroy's new 
humanist vision problematically extricates race from its constitutive relationships with 
148 He also does not draw on the vast body of feminist literature which analyses the ways in which race 
always intersects with other vectors of embodied differentiation. Indeed, Gilroy mentions feminism in 
this text only to comment on its 'demise' (2004:28, 79). 
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other axes of embodiment. He is not alone, however, in implying that 'doing away' 
with one oppressive social vector can bring down the whole house of embodied 
oppressions. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Margrit Shildrick (1997) has envisioned 
the rearticulation of the humanist subject through the development of a concept of 
radical sexual difference. While I have drawn on Shildrick's deconstructive method as 
a critical model, her 'new humanist' approach, like Gilroy's, is weakened by a failure to 
effectively integrate intersectionality (and its relationship to embodiment). 
While I do not see the web model as a 'new humanist' framework, I also would not 
categorise it as strictly `anti-humanist' along the lines, for example, of Elizabeth 
Grosz's project. Grosz's interrogation of the 'drive to identity, recognition, and self-
affirmation' within 'contemporary feminist, queer and minoritarian politics and theory' 
(2005:186) provides a useful critique of the ways in which critical politics can 
problematically reify, and indeed fetishise, particular identities and subjectivities (for 
example, 'mixed-race' and `transgender', as I argued in Chapter Four). I share her 
perspective that developing 'a politics of acts, not identities' (186) might provide a 
means for critical feminist theory to break down essentialised constructions of gender, 
sex and culture and to open (rather than restrict) its possible future trajectories. Unlike 
Grosz, however, I do not think that we can or should dispense with concepts such as 
`subjectivity' and 'identity' all together. Examining and tracing the ways in which 
particular constructions of subjectivity and identity are (re)constructed and mobilised 
within specific contexts remains crucial not only to addressing embodied and epistemic 
oppressions, exclusions and violences, but also to tracing possible spaces for resistance. 
Furthermore, while Grosz advocates a 'politics of imperceptibiliy' which can never be 
`identified with a person, group or organisation' as the most fruitful direction for 
`feminist futures' (186), this strategy seems somewhat contradictory. Such a political 
approach could enable feminist (or other critical) politics to let go of particular identity 
categories (i.e. 'woman') that some see as limiting; however, it would also mean that 
such politics would, by definition, cease to be called 'feminist' (if such a politics cannot 
be associated with any person, group or organisation, then presumably it can also not be 
225 
named by the label `feminism'). Furthermore, while a politics of imperceptibility could 
function to disrupt oppressive hierarchies and relations of power by dismantling the 
essentialist identity constructions which underscore them, it could also work to shore up 
existing privileges by dis-enabling and silencing various disadvantaged peoples who 
already have little means of improving their life situation. From this perspective, I 
would maintain (in a similar fashion to Butler's argument above) that it does not yet 
seem possible to dispense with 'inclusion' and 'recognition' as political strategies, 
although we must continue to interrogate their potentially problematic effects. 149 
 Finally, while I would argue that Gilroy's new humanism privileges race 
problematically, Grosz's anti-humanism, as I suggested in Chapter Two, maintains an 
exclusionary focus on sexual difference. Neither perspective offers the kind of 
engagement with intersectionality that I have argued remains crucial to maintaining 
rigorous analysis within critical theory of the ways in which bodies are constantly 
(re)produced differently. 
The relational web model occupies a theoretical space somewhere between Gilroy's 
humanism and Grosz's anti-humanism (although, as I have suggested, it does not make 
sense to think of their perspectives simply as oppositional). While the web approach is 
based on a rejection of a rigid humanist notion of sameness and a recognition that 
bodies are constantly produced as different it is also underscored by a principle of 
relationality. Bodies and embodied subjectivities are constituted differentially through 
particular relations of power and thus cannot be subsumed within any normative 
category; however, they are also linked constitutively to other bodies and embodied 
subjectivities. In being (re)produced by and through others, 'each of us carries with us 
"impressions" of those others' which shape our bodies, gestures and turns of phrase' 
(Ahmed, 2004a:166). As Vikki Bell puts it, 'what is seen as one body is in fact made 
up of several bodies, entwined with various types of narratives' (1996:231). In this 
sense, relationality (and the model of relational subject formation that the web model 
149 Grosz maintains that as an alternative to thinking about subjectivity or identity, we should concentrate 
on impersonal 'wills, forces, powers that can be ascribed no humanity' (2005:186). Yet, in my opinion, 
she provides little useful description or examples to clarify what shape or form such wills, forces and 
powers might take and how we might identify them (let alone theorise them). 
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suggests) intervenes productively between sameness and difference, disrupting their 
dialectic relationship through theorising both particularity and connection. Importantly, 
as I have emphasised, connection is not the same as commonality. So, rather than 
providing a framework for theorising the ways in which we, despite our differences, all 
share basic or fundamental commonalities, the relational web approach offers a model 
which illustrates how we are all connected through, or because of our differences. 
Postscript 
Potential directions for future research in this context are multiple. For example, while 
my project has concentrated primarily on the similar problematic effects that various 
comparative cross-cultural approaches may produce, it would be productive to examine 
the significance of their differences in further depth. How, for instance, does the social 
and geo-political location from which particular cross-cultural parallels are constructed 
make a difference to the potential political effects of such comparisons? How might 
location shape the ways in which various cross-cultural comparisons are interpreted by 
different audiences? Moreover, my focus has been on how making links between 
different cultural practices is employed to break down essentialist identity categories 
within feminist theory. It would also be useful to examine how comparative cross-
cultural strategies are mobilised specifically within feminist activism or how they might 
be employed within more mainstream or popular cultural mediums. In this vein, we 
might consider whether, in addition to its potential contribution to feminist theory 
projects, the web approach might be utilised or adapted by activists or practitioners 
working 'on the ground'. In conclusion, the web I have begun to weave here suggests 
one particular path (produced from my own specific social perspective) that the 
development of a critical relational model of this nature might take. It is unfinished 
and, as such, unfixed. I would encourage others to build on it, critique it, or to explore 
alternative paths, directions or shapes that such a project might take. 
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